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Abstract 
 
This study examines, discusses and provides insights into tsunami risk resilience through an 
analysis of systems of governance, their architecture, and actor-agent perspectives, 
concentrating on the development of a Tsunami Early Warning System (TEWS) in 
Indonesia.  
 
The key problem is that so far, little attention has been paid to the cross-cutting issues of 
governance and institutions involved in such an Early Warning System (EWS). There is also 
no integrated and comprehensive framework to enquire into and analyse the role of multi-
level and cross-scale governance and institutions in the context of EWSs. Institutional 
analyses have focused on investigating the governance of natural resources and 
applications in new institutional economics and internal relations. In addition, current efforts 
are focused on building tsunami resilience based on either the four phase EWS model or the 
disaster management cycle only, and do not pay adequate attention to socio-ecological 
resilience attributes such as adapting and fitting systems according to ecological challenges. 
The main argument of this study is that an effective and sustainable EWS depends on multi-
level governance, institutional arrangements, and frameworks that draw on attributes of 
resilience capacities of managing the uncertain tsunami hazard risk and its interaction with 
social-ecological systems.  
Therefore, a comprehensive integrated framework is developed and employed to structure 
inquiry, and analyse governance and institutions in the context of the TEWS. The study 
employs a system-architecture-actor-oriented approach based on institutional analyses. It 
is mainly based on qualitative methodologies and data collected in Jakarta, Bali and Padang, 
Indonesia during the development of the TEWS in Indonesia.  
The key findings of this research highlight the underlying conditions that caused the coping 
capacity to be severely exceeded in the 26th December 2004 tsunami disaster in Indonesia. 
It argues and outlines the hindering and driving factors for institutional change in disaster 
risk management and points out the challenges in implementing and sustaining an effective 
TEWS based on prevailing systems of governance in Indonesia. On the other hand, it shows 
the emerging TEWS-related architecture in terms of the new TEWS design, supporting 
multi-institutional arrangements, frameworks and structures.  
The actors’ interaction with the TEWS architecture from the national to the local level 
underlines the highly debated and negotiated issues and improving good governance 
attributes centred on the creation of hazard-risk maps for further evacuation, spatial 
 
 
 
 
planning and development and preparedness versus response financing. The study outlines 
the key contrast in rooting TEWS in Padang and Bali based on demographic differences.  
ESG (2009) defines agency as the capacity to act in the face of earth system transformation 
or to produce effects that ultimately shape natural processes. This study also identifies and 
shows how agency for effective governance was exercised beyond the state in relation to 
the TEWS in Indonesia. The study explores the issues of TEWS effectiveness to this end and 
identifies the main unsatisfactory outcome and proposes multi-level incentive mechanisms 
beyond systems of governance and state agency to motivate change at operational and 
policy level to sustain an effective TEWS in Indonesia.  
The findings suggest that the developing polycentric and multi-layered institutions and 
structures synchronized according to the decentralized political-administrative system are 
ideal governance architectures for improved performance and for building national resilience 
to local and trans-boundary multi-hazard risks and disaster in Indonesia. However, it is 
argued that such a polycentric multilayered architecture and top-down technocratic TEWS is 
not completely adequate for dealing with local field earthquake generated tsunami risks due 
to problems of fit, adaptability, institutional diversity and norms in Indonesia. Tensions 
constantly emerge and are contested about the actual primary mode of TEWS governance. 
Hence, a theoretical basis of an effective and sustainable TEWS process and framework is 
proposed, drawing on the theoretical concepts, observations, experiences and empirical 
findings in Indonesia. It is a mixture model of the EWS process consisting of the local 
people-centred-adaptive approach and the national technocratic system approach to 
address the challenging issues of tsunami resilience in Indonesia. Other specific 
recommendations are also put forward to help improve the TEWS in Indonesia. 
Key limitations of the research such as deeper analysis of internal institutional capacities, 
and institutional performances are also highlighted.  
To conclude, the role of risk governance, multi-institutional arrangements and polycentric 
frameworks in the context of the TEWS has strengthened the tsunami resilience capacities 
of Indonesia; but are strongly affected by institutional path dependencies. The future of 
INATEWS should settle on system and people-centred approaches, improved coastal city 
planning and governance to build effective and sustained resilience to uncertain tsunami 
risks.  
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1. Introduction 
 
1.1 What is this Study About? 
 
This study examines and discusses how multi-level and cross–scale governance, 
institutional arrangement and frameworks, and the configuration of actors and communities 
interact together to develop resilience capacities to achieve an effective and sustained 
tsunami early warning system (TEWS) in Indonesia. It emphasises and compares the 
development of TEWS at the level of Padang, a large coastal city in West Sumatra and Bali.  
 
The Indian Ocean tsunami of 26 December 2004 killed more than 230,000 people, 
displacing more than one million people, and left a trail of destruction around the coasts of 
the Indian Ocean (IOC-UNESCO 2009). According to official statistics1
1.2 The Importance of Early Warning Systems 
, in Indonesia alone 
more than 128,728 people were killed, 179,312 houses were destroyed, 500,970 people 
were displaced, with total economic losses of US$4270 million. Since then, there has been 
unprecedented interest in developing an EWS to cater to the needs of all countries. On this 
note, in a special session of the Hyogo, Kobe World Conference on 18-22nd January 2005, 
the Indian Ocean countries including Indonesia agreed to design and establish respective 
national and an Indian Ocean Tsunami Early Warning System (IO-TEWS) based on national 
and regional cooperation. The current effort has its roots going back to the United Nations 
International Decade for Natural Disaster Reduction (1990-99). 
Early Warning Systems (EWSs) are a major element of disaster reduction. They should 
empower societies and communities to prepare for and confront the power and the 
uncertainties of both natural and climate change-driven hazards. They bring safety, human 
security and peace of mind. An EWS provides resilience to natural hazards, and protects 
economic assets and development gains (IEWP 2006). The importance of an effective EWS 
was re-emphasised in the third Early Warning Conference (EWC III) in Bonn in March 2006.  
An effective and sustainable EWS needs to have not only a strong scientific and technical 
basis, but also a strong focus on the people exposed to risk, with a systems approach that 
incorporates all of the relevant factors in that risk, whether arising from the natural hazards 
or social vulnerabilities, and from short-term or long-term processes (Basher 2006). 
                                                            
1 http://dibi.bnpb.go.id/ 
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To be effective, early warning systems should be people-centred and must integrate and 
span four elements from (i) a knowledge of the risks faced; (ii) a technical monitoring and 
warning service; (iii) the dissemination of meaningful warnings to those at risk; and (iv) 
response capabilities. The other critical cross-cutting issues are governance and multi-
institutional arrangements covering legislative, policy frameworks, institutional capacities 
and government funding that support the implementation and maintenance of effective 
EWSs. The best practice EWSs must have strong inter-linkages between all the elements, 
and the major players concerned with the different elements should be familiar with all the 
other components and what other parties need from them (IEWP 2006). A weakness or 
failure in any one part of the chain or link could cause the whole system to fail. 
1.3 Problem Definition and Research Challenges  
There are at least two levels of problems, challenges and gaps to outline. On one hand, the 
problem and challenge is that globally many societies have not adapted their frameworks of 
development to the natural surrounding environment (Villagran and Bogardi 2006). 
Therefore, globally many countries and millions of people are not protected by an effective 
EWS, thus risking devastation, death and destitution (IEWP 2006). A United Nations (UN 
2006) report on a global survey of EWSs stipulates that if an effective EWS had been in 
place in the Indian Ocean on the 26 December 2004, thousands of lives would have been 
saved. 
In addition, in a United Nations Development Program (UNDP 2004) report on Reducing 
Disaster Risk: a challenge for development highlighted that the critical cross-cutting issue of 
governance remains a key unresolved challenging problem and there is the need to further 
strengthen institutional and legislative systems for disaster risk management. However, 
though there have been extensive efforts in relation to the design and establishment of the 
EWS for tsunamis from all segments and chains down to the vulnerable coastal cities, there 
are still enormous gaps, weaknesses, problems and challenges to be resolved. Some of the 
specific problems in Indonesia range from the lack of an agreed inter-institutional 
operational tsunami warning chain from national level to the local level, to the lack of 
tsunami risk knowledge, preparedness, credibility and trust in the TEWS (Villagran 2006; 
Pribadi 2006, Siahaan 2006).  
Earlier understanding and use of EWSs were largely technical and scientific and less 
attention was placed on an end-to-end warning system. Lassa (2008) points out that what 
has often been termed as an EWS hardly uses a systems approach but rather a cyclical and 
chain type. Consequently, it is underlined that there is little experience and evidence of 
systematic successful testing and implementation of such a framework, particularly in the 
case of developing countries. Therefore, the design, implementation, and operation of such 
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a system are the major challenges (Villagran and Hinsberger 2007). More often, what has 
been observed is that existing EWSs which may be sustainable are rarely effective in terms 
of saving lives and reducing damage cost (i.e. Hurricane Katrina, the Chilean earthquake- 
generated tsunami etc). The above problems, gaps and challenges can be viewed as the 
consequence of pervasive, difficult, dynamic cross-scale and cross-level interactions in a 
multilevel world (Cash et al., 2006). 
On the other hand, governance and institutional analysis (i.e. IAD Framework) has heavily 
focused on investigating the governance of natural resources (i.e. Ostrom 1990, Oakerson 
1992), new institutional economics (i.e. North 1990) and applications in internal relations 
(i.e. Gordenker and Weiss 1995). However, there is a lack of an integrated and 
comprehensive framework to enquire into and analyse the role of multi-level and cross-
scale governance and institutions in the context of effective and sustainable EWSs.  
 
It is also clear that even within TEWS studies (i.e. Keating 2006, Rodrıguez et al. 2004, 
Seibold 2003, Michaelis 1984, Quarantelli and Taylor 1977, Weller 1970) research has 
mainly focused on the early warning elements with little attention paid to the cross-cutting 
issues of governance and institutions of these elements. In a recent international 
conference2 on tsunamis in Bali there were a total of 78 scientific papers covering issues 
from seismic monitoring, tsunami modelling to community preparedness; however only one 
conference paper3
In the context of development projects, the emerging reports on TEWS simply outline and 
list the institutions and institutional arrangements in Indonesia (UNESCAP 2009, BNPB 
2009, BGR 2009 & 2010). It is clear that such reports do not pay attention to the complex 
interactions between the actors, the community at risk, or the architecture in a multi-level 
and cross-scale context and do not analyse agency in TEWS.  
 discussed the cross-cutting issues related to governance and institutions.  
In addition, current efforts have not addressed the development of TEWS with a resilience-
based approach, considering the issues of self-organisation, threshold, uncertainty, 
diversity, learning, adapting and fitting systems according to ecological challenges (i.e. 
Lebel et al., 2006, Gunderson 1999, Berkes and Folke 1998, Peterson 2000, Holling 1986, 
Walters 1986 etc). Overall, the role of cross-cutting issues of governance and institutions in 
the context of TEWS remains largely under-researched. 
                                                            
2 International Conference on Tsunami Warning (ICTW) Bali, Indonesia, November 12-14, 2008 
3 BGR 
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1.4 Research Aims and Contributions 
The main aims of the research are to examine and understand the cross-cutting issues of 
governance and institutional architectures and frameworks which support the very 
foundation for an effective TEWS as part of the resilience capacities in Indonesia, and more 
specifically in Padang and Bali provinces. The second part of the research objective is to 
outline a framework of the TEWS process that links all elements, ranging from institutions 
to the people at risk.  
This study offers a more integrated and comprehensive framework for enquiring, analysing 
and measuring the role of multi-level and cross-scale governance and institutions for EWSs. 
The main argument is that an effective and sustainable EWS is founded on good 
governance and institutional arrangements, and attributes of ecosystem management. 
The study attempts to provide social science-based knowledge of EWSs with a view to 
improving the existing operational TEWS as part of disaster preparedness and in the 
development of more effective governance, institutional arrangements, policies and 
planning to reduce tsunami vulnerability throughout Indonesia. 
1.5 Main Research Question 
The central question addressed in this research is how do certain attributes of governance 
and institutions function and how should they function in society to enhance the capacity to 
manage resilience in the case of uncertain tsunami risks. 
1.6 Research Sub-Questions 
In order to fully address the objective of this research, the study also employs a number of 
sub-questions as follows:  
1. What were the prevailing tsunami warning capacities before December 2004 and 
how were the capacities exceeded? 
2. What were the hindering factors and driving forces for institutional change?  
3. What are the environmental consequences of a lack of TEWS governance? 
4. What are the prevailing systems of governance and capacities to implement and 
support TEWS in Indonesia? 
5. What are the governance, institutional-arrangements and structures to support 
TEWS in Indonesia and how is the performance of institutions affected by being 
embedded in larger architectures?  
6. Who are the actors-agents of TEWS and how are they exercising 
governance/agency? 
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7. Are there any impacts of institutional change and what is the TEWS performance to 
this end?  
8. What are the most challenging problems and what are the incentive mechanisms to 
effect changes at different levels? 
The research is mainly based on qualitative methodologies; however quantitative analyses 
are also employed. An integrated framework is employed to structure inquiry and analyse 
governance and institutions in the context of TEWS. The field research was carried out in 
Jakarta, Bali and Padang in Indonesia in two phases from October to November 2008 and 
January to mid-March 2009. The time of the field research and writing coincided with the 
intermediate and final stages of the German Indonesian Tsunami Early Warning System 
(GITEWS) project and also when the technical TEWC in Jakarta was officially launched in 
Indonesia in November 2008. 
This PhD research forms part of a PhD programme within the German-Indonesian Tsunami 
Early Warning System GITEWS and is coordinated by the United Nations University-Institute 
for Environment and Human Security (UNU-EHS) in Bonn, Germany. It is underlined that 
the study is a socio-geographical analysis of the socio-environment and institution relation 
at a time when Indonesia desires to build its resilience capacities to cope with hazards and 
disasters including tsunami. The study rests on three main academic research fields that 
are all prominent in human geography as indicated in Figure 1.  
 
Figure 1: Main research areas relevant to the study 
Source: Author 
The first field of study is a large diverse body of research on understanding institutions for 
improved governance. Institutions have focused on a wide range of ways to investigate the 
governance of natural resources and the particular challenges this entails (Ostrom 1990, 
Oakerson 1992,  Keohane and Ostrom 1995, De Groot et al., 2002, Hagedon 2002) and on 
governance issues in the context of development management and sustainability (i.e. 
Resilience Systems
SOCIO-
ENVIRONMENT 
(HUMAN-
GEOGRAPHY) 
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Fischer et al., 2007). It is also related to New Institutional Economics (e.g. North 1990) and 
is increasingly used in Internal Relations (Gordenker and Weiss 1995). It is  part of the 
social sciences, which studies how institutions - i.e. structures and mechanisms of social 
order and cooperation governing the behaviour of two or more individuals - behave and 
function according to both empirical rules (informal rules-in-use and norms) and also 
theoretical rules (formal rules and law). This field deals with how individuals and groups 
construct institutions, how institutions function in practice, and the effects of institutions on 
society. 
On the other hand, governance attributes have been of interest and widely employed in 
different settings (Leeuwis 2000, Roling 2002, Dryzek 1999, Backstrand 2003, Mc Ginnis 
1999, Cash 2000, Young 1994, Berkes 2002, Agrawal and Ribot 1999, Cash et al., 2003, 
Low and Gleeson 1998 etc). Of major interest is the use of governance in understanding 
regional socio-ecological systems and capacities to manage resilience (i.e. Lebel et al., 
2006).  
The second field of study consists of three other research areas, namely hazard, disaster 
and risk research. In the case of the hazard research area, studies cover a wide spectrum of 
topics, including geological hazards (i.e. earthquake, volcanic eruptions, floods, tsunamis), 
hydro-meteorological (i.e. tropical cyclones to droughts), technological hazards (i.e. 
industrial accidents) and biological (i.e. epidemic diseases).The natural hazards are of 
interest to this study. The natural hazard research area (see White 1974; Fischhoff et al., 
1978, Kreps 1991, Quarantelli 1991, Godschalk 1998, Pearce 2000, 2003, Cardona 2003, 
Rodriguez et al 2004, Wisner 2004, Keating 2006, Basher 2006, Chang Seng 2010 etc) is a 
relatively well studied area of great interest in the field of human geography.  
Disaster research deals with conducting field and survey research on group, organizational 
and community preparation for, in response to, and recovery from natural and technological 
disasters and other community-wide crises. The purpose behind this field of research is to 
attempt to advance and communicate knowledge on mitigation techniques and procedures 
and disaster preparedness, response, and recovery. Work in the disaster research field 
attempts to provide social science knowledge on disasters and information that can and has 
been applied to develop more effective policies, programs, and planning to reduce disaster 
impacts (See Quarantelli 1980, Kreps and Gary 1984, ISDR etc). It is clear that disaster 
research is a relatively new addition to the social sciences field and is expanding as an area 
of interest following the September 11th terrorist attacks, the South Indian Ocean tsunami, 
and hurricane Katrina. 
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The risk research area is also attracting great interest in human geography because natural 
hazards are not isolated events but complex features that are connected with the social and 
environmental system. Risk research (see Renn 1992, Smith 2004, IRG 2009) is related not 
only to hazards but also to vulnerability, which is also an area of increasing interest (see 
Cutter 1996b, Bohle 2001, Wisner et al., 2004, Birkmann 2004, 2005, 2006).  
The third area of study in this PhD is resilience systems, which have been a focus of interest 
in geography, environment, hazard research, sociology and economics. A very diverse body 
of research has developed, focusing on assessing people’s exposure to environmental and 
socio-economic risks and their mechanisms for coping and adapting to these. (See 
Chambers, 1989; Watts and Bohle 1993; Blaikie  et al., 1994, Ostrom 1999, Carpenter et 
al., 2001, Holling 2001, Adger et al. 2005 Brooks et al. 2005, Gunderson 1999, Berkes and 
Folke 1998, Berkes 1999, Peterson 2000, Ostrom 2005, Holling 1986, Walters 1986 Berkes 
1999, Young 2002, Brauch, 2005, Lebel et al., 2006). 
1.7 Structure of the Research Process 
Figure 2 gives an overview of the research process, capturing the main research structure 
and progressive steps from first defining the research problem, to data analysis and 
presentation.  The diagram is very useful for quickly assessing the material presented in the 
study. The study consists of nine chapters following the first chapter. Chapter 2 focuses on 
the discussion of the key research concepts and frameworks. It presents the conceptual 
framework used to study TEWS governance and institutions. Chapter 3 centres on the 
research methodology. Chapter 4 starts the analysis and discussion, focusing on tsunami 
capacities before the 2004 disaster and explores systems of governance in Indonesia to 
implement and sustain such efforts. Chapter 5 outlines the emerging architectures for 
TEWS/DRR in terms of the new TEWS design that supports multi-institutional arrangements 
and structures. Chapter 6 analyses and discusses the actors’ interaction with the 
architecture in Indonesia, while Chapter 7 examines and compares the interactions of the 
actors and the community at risk in developing the TEWS architecture and resilience 
capacities at the local level in Padang and Bali. Chapter 8 analyses agents and agency as 
fundamental issues in governance in relation to TEWS. The study also explores the issues of 
TEWS effectiveness to this end, mainly from the media perspective.  It describes the major 
problems and proposes incentive structures to motivate change from an actor’s perspective 
to improve and sustain an effective TEWS. The author outlines a theoretical basis for an 
improved TEWS based on theoretical concepts, field observations and the findings of this 
research study. Chapter 9 concludes the research study while chapter 10 provides 
recommendations and highlights key limitations of the research study and the way forward. 
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DEFINING THE RESEARCH PROBLEM 
 
Governance and institutional arrangements as a cross-cutting issue regarding effective and sustainable 
EWS for building tsunami hazard resilience  
 
 
DECIDING ON THE RESEARCH FOCUS 
 
Disaster risk preparedness for coastal hazards such as tsunamis 
 
DETERMINING COUNTRY AND AREA OF EMPIRICAL STUDY 
 
Indonesia is the study country, where more than 128,000 people were killed, and 500,000 were 
displaced, with economic losses of US$ 4,500 million from the December 2004 tsunami. 
Padang and Bali are selected based on earthquake-tsunami risk, remarkable demographic contrast and 
common pilot project areas for building tsunami EWS capacities 
LITERATURE REVIEW and DEVELOPING AN ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK [Chapter 2] 
FORMULATING MAIN RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND SUB-RESEARCH QUESTIONS  
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY [Chapter 3] 
 
 
 
 
MAIN ANALYSIS     and DISCUSSION   
• Prevailing Tsunami Warning Capacities and Systems of Governance in Indonesia [Chapter 4] 
• Emerging Architectures for TEWS/DRR: Design, Institutional Arrangements and Structures [Chapter 
5] 
• Actors Interaction and Perspectives with the TEWS Related  Architecture [Chapter 6] 
• TEWS at the level of Padang and Bali [Chapter 7] 
• Agency, Effectiveness and Sustainability in the TEWS [Chapter 8] 
• Conclusion[ Chapter 9], Recommendations ,  Limitations and the Way Forward[Chapter 10] 
 
 
Key Concepts 
Institutions and Governance; 
EWS, Disaster Risk Preparedness;  
Vulnerability/ Resilience 
Environment and Human Security 
Research Areas 
Governance and Institutions 
Hazards and Disaster Risk 
Resilient Systems 
How do certain attributes of governance and institutions function, and how should they function 
in society to enhance the capacity to manage resilience in the case of tsunamis? 
1. What were the prevailing tsunami capacities before December 2004 and how were these 
tsunami capacities exceeded? 
2. What were the hindering factors and driving forces for institutional change?  
3. What are the environmental consequences of non-TEWS governance? 
4. What are the prevailing systems of governance capacities to implement and support TEWS 
in Indonesia? 
5. What are the governance, institutional-arrangements and structures to support TEWS in 
Indonesia and how is performance of institutions affected by their embedding in larger 
architectures?  
6. Who are the actors-agents of TEWS and how do they exercise governance at different 
levels and across scales? 
7. Are there any impacts of institutional change and how does the system perform to this 
end?  
8. What are the main prevailing problems and what are the incentive mechanisms that affect 
changes at different levels? 
 
PRIMARY DATA 
• Multi-level and cross-scale expert 
interviews; 
• Informant interviews; 
• Focus group discussions; 
• Sector related survey (Quantitative) 
SECONDARY DATA 
• Conferences, workshops, meetings 
technical documents and papers; 
• Project documents and reports; 
• Media materials; 
• International, national and sub-
national data (Quantitative) 
Figure 2: Schematic overview of the research process 
Source: Author 
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2. Key Research Concepts and Theoretical Frameworks 
 
In this chapter the key research concepts and theoretical frameworks are discussed in order 
to address the research questions. The underlying theoretical concepts are based on 
institutional analysis to study governance in the context of the TEWS. Key subjects 
discussed range from institutions, mainstream and emerging views on institutional theory, 
key concepts of the Institutional Analysis and Development Framework (Ostrom 1990) and 
the extended IAD Framework (Fisher et al., 2007). In addition, governance is also explored 
from a slightly different angle by focusing on the attributes for ecosystem management 
(Lebel et al., 2006) and also on emerging concepts of governance of the new Earth System 
Governance project (ESG 2009). 
The second part of this chapter is devoted to understanding the concepts and frameworks in 
the area of hazards and disaster risk, including hazard early warning systems. The third 
part of this chapter focuses on discussions on resilient systems for ecosystem management. 
The chapter also highlights the issues of the environment and human security which form 
the central goal of the study. An integrated and comprehensive framework is developed for 
enquiring, analysing and measuring the role of multi-level and cross-scale governance and 
institutions for an EWS. 
2.1 Institutions and Institutional Analysis 
It is first important to understand the general notions and importance of institutions and 
institutional analysis. The term "institution" includes more than agencies and organizations, 
and extends to laws, legislation and management behaviours. These are the arrangements 
or 'rules of the game' which affect the management strategies of resource users. They 
shape the behaviour of local community members and include common understandings 
about how issues and problems should be addressed and solved. Institutions are dynamic 
and they respond to changes in local actors, as well as to external power or environmental 
conditions, but the process of change can often be difficult. Institutions form the 
'framework' upon which organizations are based.  
The benefits of institutional analysis include assessing the existing situation to discern which 
organization(s) could deliver services or interventions most effectively and efficiently by 
analysing the (potential) institutional and organizational setup, and by assessing which 
institutions and institutional linkages as well as organizational factors are critical to 
successful service delivery. This also includes the analysis of the policy-making and 
coordination processes. Institutional analysis can help to propose a design for the most 
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appropriate institutional setup to ensure that the institutional and organizational 
arrangements required will be available in the given country. It can also be used to develop 
measures to help strengthen the institutional capacities for the organizations and actors 
involved in order to ensure an appropriate institutional set-up for program performance. By 
understanding institutions and drawing upon the selection of management arrangements 
that they represent, development practitioners and local people can work together to 
develop the most effective, sustainable institutional arrangements for the community-based 
management of resources and services. 
2.2 Mainstream and Emerging Views on Institutional Theory 
 
In this section, the main ongoing discourses on institution theory are discussed. Firstly, 
traditional theories view institutions as the rules of the game (Ostrom 1990), or the 
regulations or conventions imposing constraints on human behaviour to facilitate collective 
action (e.g. North 1990). They are rather functionalist and managerial in style and are 
grounded on Common Pool Property (CPR) theory, which in turn is based on game theory. 
They are centred on collective action dilemmas and institutions which are designed or 
crafted to produce collective action. Mainstream institutional applications have focused on 
local situations of natural resource management which are subject to boundaries and to 
relative socio-economic homogeneity among users (Ostrom 1990, Wade 1998). 
On the other hand the New Institutional Economics (e.g. North 1990) views institutions as 
representing formal rules and conventions, including informal codes of behaviour, or norms 
in the context of transaction costs with effort of moving towards efficiency, but ignores 
history, socio-culture and political economy. 
Recent institutions based on Common Pool Property have paid more attention to differences 
in people’s capabilities (Keohane and Ostrom 1995); which now extends to include people’s 
assets, preferences and knowledge, but lacks the socio-cultural dimensions and information 
as well as power asymmetries. Others view institutions as more processual and dynamic. 
They are more than just rules or regulations but are what people do or how people behave, 
endowing actors as agentive roles (Cleaver 1998).  
In contrast, Internal Relations (IR) explains governance and the complex interlocking of 
global challenges and local realities as the ‘Global Commons”. In that context, global 
governance has focused and centred on a single type of formal organisation (Young 1994, 
Gordenker and Weiss 1995, Haas et al., 1993).  New IR thinking on governance is evolving 
to include plurality and a complex institutional mix of institutions at multiple levels 
consisting of state, private and public that are all involved in these networks of 
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environmental governance to deal with problems outside the scope of one actor (Gordenker 
and Weiss 1995). The network of governance operates both horizontally and vertically, 
drawing on the participation and cooperation of actors at national and local levels. However, 
the approach still draws on collective action and continues to make sharp formal distinctions 
between vertical institutions.  
Of particular contrast to mainstream institutionalists (Mehta et al., 1999) argue that 
institutions emerge to embrace, moderate or exacerbate uncertainty, and they are 
embedded in social relations, being symbolic and interlinked with knowledge and power that 
span temporal and spatial scales which are not self-evident in terms of formality and 
informality, rather than institutions that work to mitigate uncertainty as in the case of 
mainstream theories. 
Therefore, based on the different discourse on institutions, several analytical frameworks 
have been put forth to organize information about the interaction between institutions and 
the environment. Nevertheless, a methodology for institutional analysis should provide a 
systematic way to answer questions about architecture that includes: what are the laws and 
controls; what are the incentives; who has control and what roles do they take; and what is 
the management culture?  
2.3 Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) Framework  
One particularly useful framework, which has structured inquiry across a broad array of 
policy and disciplines, is the IAD framework developed by Elinor Ostrom and other scholars 
in Political Theory and Policy Analysis at Indiana University. Institutional analysis offers a 
wide range of ways to investigate the governance of natural resources and its particular 
challenges (Ostrom 1990, Oakerson 1992, De Groot et al., 2002, Hagedorn 2002, Campbell 
and Sayer 2003), and governance issues in the context of development management and 
sustainability (Fischer et al 2007). Its roots lie in the fields of classical political economy, 
neoclassic microeconomic theory, institutional economics, public choice theory, and non-
cooperative game theory.  IAD presents a general language describing how institutions 
(rules), physical and material conditions, and the attributes of community affect the 
structure of action arenas, the incentives that individuals face, and the resulting outcome 
(Ostrom 2006). In this context, the decision environment-action arena, the actors, rational 
choice and collective choice theories, the action situation, exogenous influence in the action 
arena and institutional development of the IAD framework are discussed. 
Ostrom (1999a:42) defines the action arena as “social spaces where individuals interact, 
exchange services, goods, solve problems, dominate one another, or fight”. Ebenhoh 
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(2005) explains the action arena as the decision environment of the actors.   The action 
arena exists in and ranges from households, village communities, local, regional, national, 
international levels to firms and markets (Ostrom 2005). It is characterised by interacting 
individuals with decision-making abilities who affect the activities and outcome in the arena.  
Satisfactory and positive outcomes encourage actors to maintain the present state of 
interactions while negative, unsatisfactory results are likely to challenge actors to change 
their strategy and tactics to confront the problem. The following elaborates on the 
characteristics of an actor in the action arena. 
An actor is any person, social group or institution that has an interest or stake in a 
development activity, project or programme, such as use of ocean resources (i.e. fisheries) 
or providing services and products (i.e. early warning information ). Actors have the 
potential to influence a specific state of affairs or a process by act, intervention or by 
refraining from intervening or participation (Giddens 1984). This definition includes 
intended beneficiaries and intermediaries, winners and losers, and those involved or 
excluded from decision-making processes. However, actors’ behaviour has been 
theoretically debated around the rational choice theory and the new institutionalism debate 
on collective decision theory or Collective Action “Prisoner’s Dilemma”. 
In this context, the rational choice theory for understanding and modelling social, economic 
behaviour is a central theoretical paradigm in microeconomics and political science, and is 
sometimes used in sociology and philosophy. It hinges on the analysis of the choices made 
by rational actors under conditions of interdependence. Rational choices are diverse, but all 
assume individuals choose the best action according to stable preference functions and the 
constraints facing them (Immergut 1998). 
 
On the other hand, collective actions imply that actors make the best choices collectively. 
However, the ‘Prisoner’s Dilemma’, with the precondition that all actors possess complete 
information, illustrates the benefits and limitations of collective action in decision situations 
because in reality not all actors have all the information necessary to enable them to make 
the best decision.  Under such circumstances, it is individually beneficial not to cooperate 
with each other even though collaboration by all actors would entail acceptable benefits. In 
that way, actors consider that they need to defect due to vagueness about other actors’ 
actions.  
Nonetheless, it is important to note that both theoretical debates have weaknesses in terms 
of explaining fundamental social attributes such as trust, altruism and the prevailing and 
binding issues of norms and obligations. The divergence of actors’ motives is of importance 
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and is not necessarily based on rationality or collective choice or action as discussed above. 
In that sense, the IAD framework is focused on the actors’ goal of achieving utility rather 
than achieving power, convenience and reputation. Therefore, actors in the IAD are 
considered to be constrained by their environment which is composed of social, 
institutional, historical , religious, ideological as well as psychological factors (GTZ 2004:9) 
rather than acting in absolute full rationality.  
In the action arena, a typical action situation could be an exchange of products by buyers 
and sellers or politicians negotiating an agreement with fishermen on access rights. In this 
case, for example the action situation is centred around the diverse stakeholders from the 
hazard scientist, warning centres, disaster emergency managers, civil societies and the 
community at risk agreeing or disagreeing on who will issue warnings, contrasted to who 
will decide what actions will take place (i.e. evacuation orders).  Ostrom (2005) describes 
the action situation when two or more actors have to come up with potential actions' 
leading to a certain goal or outcome.  Each individual actor has a set of potential decisions 
and actions to take which are influenced or determined by the positions of the other actors 
within a specific period of time.  In that context, actors’ control over their actions is an 
important issue because their decisions and actions may depend on the agreement of other 
actors. For that reason, actors can be divided into primary and secondary actors: primary 
actors are those who are ultimately affected, i.e. who expect to benefit from or be 
adversely affected by the intervention, or who may have defined mandates of responsibility 
(i.e. early warning centres for issuing warnings); while secondary actors have some 
intermediate role.  
 
At this point it is clear that the action arena is influenced by a variety of exogenous 
variables which the IAD framework groups into three clusters which are interrelated and 
impact on each other. These are the attributes of the natural resource/service, attributes of 
the community, and institutions. Attributes of the natural resource or service are often 
characterised by excluding ‘outsiders’ from resources or services. These affect the 
behaviour of actors within the action arena (Ostrom, Gardener et al. 1994). On the other 
hand, the attributes of the community comprise “generally accepted norms of behaviour, 
the level of common understanding about action arenas, the extent to which the 
preferences are homogeneous, and distribution of resources among members” (Ostrom, 
Gardener et al. 1994). The third group of exogenous variables which influences the action 
arena are institutions, the ‘rules of the game’ consisting of three worlds of action where 
every institutional arrangement is shaped by the three layers of hierarchy institutions 
consisting of: operational, collective choice and constitutional types (Kiser and Ostrom, 
1982). Each level is arranged to independently serve different functions, but nevertheless, 
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higher levels affect lower ones by dictating their boundaries of actions. Operational 
institutions regulate activities which occur on a day-to-day basis. Accordingly, the 
operational level includes the rules and regulations that define actors’ right and actions. 
Collective choice institutions regulate how decisions are made to establish operational rules. 
Finally, constitutional institutions provide political and legal arrangements which ‘officially’ 
shape the rules and laws by which actors operate.  
2.4 Institutional Change and Development Process 
2.4.1 Institutions and Path Dependence 
Institutional change is often found in history not only because of what can be learned from 
it, but because present time and future are linked to the past by the continuity of 
institutions. In this context, history determines the setting up, performance, as well as 
future development of institutions, and consequently provides stimuli or limitations for 
institutional change. Every institutional development is path-dependent and each change 
becomes the foundation for the next (Ostrom 1990). Once a particular path is chosen, the 
challenges of switching become more difficult (Pierson 2004). As path dependence limits 
actors’ bargaining flexibility, it may encourage relatively weak actors to decide whether 
institutional change will take place or not. In extreme cases, this might result in institutional 
deadlock (Levi 1990).  
2.4.2 Information, Origin and Institutional Change  
Shepsle (1989) underlines lack of information as a main factor influencing institutional 
change. Not all important parameters are known to each actor and institutions can be 
established with extremely incomplete information. This complicates coordination between 
actors and aggravates difficulties appraising unmeant outcomes of institutional change 
(Poteete and Ostrom 2002).The information incompleteness may prompt actors and the 
community to work for the establishment of new institutions (Wegerich 2001). Thus, 
information has to be regarded as one essential driving force or constraint for institutional 
change.  
On the other hand, the origin of institutions significantly influences their stability and 
potential for change. Studies have found that institutions that evolve without planning and 
instinctively within a group of executing individuals are likely to be more inertial and need 
more effort and time to change than institutions that are designed knowingly and planned 
from ‘outside’ (Jütting 2003).  
An interesting issue is that although institutions and governance constituting the formal 
rules change overnight as the result of political and judicial decisions, informal constraints 
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embodied in customs, tradition and codes of conduct are much more impervious to 
deliberate policies and are characterised by the individual or collective choice, intentionally 
or unintentionally, not to adhere to the rules or the formal results.  
2.4.3 Power and Institutional Change  
Power is an important factor impacting on institutional change because power can be 
exerted directly by humans in order to suppress or achieve institutional change. In 
traditional rural societies, power is characterised by patriarchal and clan systems. On the 
other hand, in the so-called modern societies, expertise and professionalism act as the main 
legitimisation factors (Marcus 1983). Elite power holders position themselves within 
different institutions and dominate decisions at the collective choice level. Elites dominate 
the institutional order (Marcus 1983). Elites interact with other elites across institutional 
boundaries, and develop systems which are not necessarily serviceable for the institutions 
or that may not correlate with recognized institutional hierarchies (Wegerich 2001). 
Institutional change can be supported or resisted depending on “if these changes do not 
change their position or enhance their status” (Wegerich 2001: 20). In that case, inequity 
in power encourages power holders to resist changes; hence fewer institutional changes 
occur (Das Gupta 2001). 
In regard to institutional change, it is important to underline that it is  more difficult and 
expensive to change higher level institutions, while it is relatively easy to change the rules 
and regulations on the operational than on the collective choice level, or even the 
constitutional one (Ostrom 1990,  Ostrom 1999b,  Vasenda 2001). 
2.5 The Extended Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) Framework 
 
The IAD frameworks of Ostrom et al., (1990) have some key weaknesses. The critical issue 
that has motivated the required changes to the IAD framework is that although it consists 
of an analysis of incentives of the prevailing status quo situation to  encourage ways to 
shape and modify these incentives, these do not explicitly account for dynamic aspects such 
as institutional change which is highly relevant in the study area.  Most important in this 
research is that the multiple stakeholder interactions (Paavola 2006) and the interplay 
between different rule systems (Young 2002, Kim 2004) are not necessarily accounted for 
in the IAD framework. Consequently, in the case of multiple actors on multiple levels are 
limited in application (Edwards and Steins 1998b). Fischer et al (2007) points out that the 
solution of Ostrom et al (1999) to governance cannot simply be scaled up because it is 
related and influenced by other levels and areas of governance. This addresses the question 
of how international agreements (i.e. HFA 2005-2015) and national action plans can be 
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translated and streamlined into strategies which respond to the local reality, and these are 
very important issues to address in this study. On these matters, very recently Fischer et al 
(2007) proposed a comprehensive extended analytical IAD framework to analyse 
sustainable governance of natural resources and institutional changes which was founded 
on earlier work by Oakerson (1992), Thompson  (1992), Thompson and Freudenberger 
(1997) and Ostrom (1999). It focuses on identification of incentives that motivate the way 
environmental goods and services are used. In addition, it provides an elaborate tool to 
analyse and categorise related cooperation measures. It focuses on the goods and services 
provided by the natural resources rather than on the resource itself. The authors suggest 
ways to modify institutional incentives for more effective governance. This aspect gains 
considerable importance in development cooperation practice where the implementation of 
incentives is crucial. Therefore, according to Fischer et al, the IAD framework needs a more 
elaborate second part that serves to describe the change activities that are also viewed as 
beneficial in the context of this research. It consists of two parts. The extended framework 
incorporates components from institutional analysis (Williamson, 1996; Wittmer and Birner, 
2004), policy sciences (Rohe 1977) and targets incentive changes initiated by development 
co-operation agencies. 
The framework may be structured in steps according to the analytical process, and supports 
the description and analysis of incentives that motivate resource use patterns at a given 
point in time and planning of corresponding incentive measures to guide resource use, or a 
retrospective analysis of past interventions. The Analytical Process consists of the Situation 
Analysis which tackles the analysis of the motives of the actual resource users’ behaviour, 
termed the ‘situation analysis’. The process of analysing the natural resource management 
(NRM) problem requires first of all a separate identification of the actual situation in 
question. Secondly, reasons in terms of motives or incentives for the ongoing problems 
have to be identified. The difference with Ostrom’s IAD work is in terms of the 
accountability for these often complex circumstances that involve a multitude of actors and 
their interaction at a single time, rather than focusing on the local community of resource 
users. Thus, an approach to examining institutional arrangements between the multitude of 
actors in natural resource management (Huppert & Urban 1998, Huppert, Svendsen & 
Vermillion 2001) is added to the first part of the framework. This becomes an essential, 
strong and relevant element of disaster risk reduction as it involves multi-level and cross-
scale actors. Thompson & Schoonmaker Freudenberger (1997) suggest the need to 
distinguish between three kinds of incentives related to (1) the characteristics of the goods 
and services in question, (2) characteristics of the community, and (3) characteristics of the 
actual rules in the respective community. Hence, the second part; the Analysis of Change 
Activities represents the major innovation of the extended IAD framework.  
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2.6 Suitability of the Extended Institutional Analysis Development Framework 
The extended framework analysis process is found to be suitable for this particular research 
because it is an open framework, it considers multiple actors and multiple level interactions 
(i.e. cross-scale and cross level), it is an elaborate tool to analyse incentive mechanisms for 
more effective governance, it is flexible in addressing different cross level issues (i.e. 
process, constitutional organisation and operation level) and it specially includes 
opportunities to set goals of development to induce incentive change. However, the 
extended IAD framework by Fischer et al (2007) and the wide range of literature and 
applications of the IAD framework have developed and focused on the issues of incentives 
for natural resource management and governance rather than on actors providing services 
to the community with the aim of saving lives and reducing damage costs. Therefore, the 
characteristics and incentives of a service can be in sharp contrast to natural resource use. 
The second issue is that in this study, the community are not gaining direct benefits in 
terms of wealth but receive information for human security and to minimise damage. It is 
important to differentiate between the institutional actors (i.e. early warning centre, 
disaster management agency) who are producing a service and the community at risk who 
receive the information and participate in the process. Thirdly, the extended framework 
focuses on the normative goals of development for sustainable development and the 
reduction of poverty. In this research, sustainable development is also part of the ultimate 
goal but is achieved through environment and human security and resilience building to 
hazards and disaster risks. 
2.7 Governance 
2.7.1 The Governance Attributes for Ecosystem Management 
It is highlighted that the IAD framework has been widely used to study natural resource 
governance and does not implicitly and adequately address the specific attributes of “good” 
governance. Therefore the study also considers the attributes of “good’’ governance as 
described in the framework of Lebel et al (2006).  
This includes participation, deliberation, negotiations, mediation, polycentric-multi-layered 
organisation, transparency and accountability, equity and justice. These are further 
discussed below:  
2.7.1.1 Participation  
Communities are becoming increasingly frustrated at being excluded from participation and 
the decision–making process with reference to risk and disaster management (Rubin 1991). 
Multi-stakeholder participation is a mechanism for coping with plural values and interests 
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(IRGC 2005). Rechkemmer (2005a) argued that with the advance in globalisation, new 
agreements will be developed which hinge on multi-stakeholder participation. The IRGC 
(2005) framework for risk governance has broadened the concept of risk assessment by 
adding the parallel activity of concern assessment which considers individual, organisational 
and societal perceptions of and concerns about the consequences of risk.  Furthermore, it 
addresses the issue of inclusive governance by providing guidance, which is based on the 
assumption that all stakeholders have something to contribute to the process of risk 
governance and that their inclusion improves the final decisions rather than impedes the 
decision-making process or compromises the quality of scientific input. In that sense IRGC 
has recommended that stakeholder involvement is a function dominant characteristic of a 
risk. For instance, a simple risk may require little consultation while highly complex and 
uncertain risks (i.e. tsunami) may benefit from wider dialogue amongst, respectively, a 
broader base of people with expert knowledge, or all directly affected stakeholders. The 
involvement of stakeholders is both to ensure that the risk handling process is inclusive and 
responsive to those affected by it and to maximise the effectiveness and acceptability of the 
decisions that are made (IRGC 2005). Public participation often broadens the range of 
interests and issues that need to be considered, because different stakeholders assign 
different values to different ecosystem services and risks.  
2.7.1.2 Deliberation and Negotiation  
 
Deliberation is discussion and consideration of all sides of an issue. It is characterised by a 
process of open communication, discussion, and reflection among actors who have different 
political viewpoints and understandings (Leeuwis 2000, Roling 2002). Schusler et al. (2003) 
argues that deliberation offers the opportunity to learn about the views and motivations of 
others even when their positions remain fixed. This argument is supported by Backstrand 
(2003) who suggests that such a processes helps both citizens and scientists to understand 
each other better. Dryzek (1999) argues that deliberation is a form of democracy.  
Negotiation is often viewed as a dialogue intended to resolve disputes, to produce an 
agreement upon courses of action, to bargain for individual or collective advantage, or to 
craft outcomes to satisfy various interests. It is the primary method of alternative dispute 
resolution. One interesting development dating back to the 1970s is the win-win or mutual 
gains bargaining approach adopted from the Economic Game Theory.  The mutual gains 
approach in negotiation4
                                                            
4 A new approach based on ten new rules for global negotiations has been advocated by Hernandez and Graham (2008) 
 has been effectively applied in environmental settings. 
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2.7.1.3 Polycentric -Multilayered Institutions 
 
Polycentric institutions, by definition, have multiple centres or authorities (Lebel et al., 
2006). Such organisations’ structures have been argued (Imperial 1999, McGinnis 1999, 
Cash 2000) to enhance contribute opportunities for understanding and for servicing needs 
in spatially heterogeneous contexts. Polycentric systems are often multilayered, but do not 
necessarily have neat hierarchical structures. Multilayered institutional arrangements are 
important for handling scale-dependent government challenges as well as cross-scale 
interactions (Young 1994, Berkes 2002, Lebel 2005). Multilayered governance facilitates 
vertical interplay among institutions (Berkes 2002, Young 2002, Lebel 2005). However, the 
conventional criticism of polycentric and multilayered arrangements is that there is 
inefficient overlapping of co-ordination and administrative responsibilities.  
2.7.1.4 Transparency and Accountability  
 
Transparency often implies openness, communication, and accountability. One may be 
transparent, but not see oneself as accountable. In that sense, authorities are obliged to 
provide information and explain decisions and actions or inactions and whether they can be 
sanctioned when those answers are unsatisfactory (Agrawal and Ribot 1999). The lack of 
these elements may often lead to corruption. Corruption is the abuse of entrusted power for 
private gain. Ribot (2002) argues that top-down accountability is often weak, while Cash et 
al. (2003) point out that horizontal accountability between actors is stronger. Mechanisms 
that support accountability are transparency, independent monitoring, polycentricity,  
separation of powers, legal recourse, budget control, and a free media (Ribot 2002). 
Accountability is an important element in EWSs. For instance authorities who fail to give 
legitimate reasons for why a warning was inaccurate or untimely will rapidly erode people’s 
trust and credibility in the EWS.  
2.7.1.5 Equity and Injustice 
Equity in the context of the research implies that every individual at risk receives early 
warning information and knows how to respond to the threat or risks and in the distribution 
of benefits and involuntary risks. Injustice is the result of repressive social control and of 
structural inequalities of power and actual realities (Swyngedouw and Heynen 2003, Barry 
2005). 
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2.7.2 The New Earth System Governance (ESG) Conceptual Framework 
Humans now influence all biological and physical systems of the planet (ESG 2009). On this 
basis the Earth System Science Partnership has declared an 'urgent need' to develop 
'strategies for Earth System management'. However, what such strategies might be, how 
they could be developed, and how effective, efficient and equitable such strategies would 
be, remain unspecified. 
Apparently, the institutions, organizations, and mechanisms by which humans currently 
govern their relationship with the natural environment and global biochemical systems are 
not only insufficient - they are also poorly understood (ESG 2009), and this is the rationale 
for the ESG research programme developed under the auspices of the International Human 
Dimensions Programme on Global Environmental Change. In this context, the ESG is 
defined as the interrelated and increasingly integrated system of formal and informal rules, 
rule-making systems, and actor-networks at all levels of human society (from local to 
global) that are set up to steer societies towards preventing, mitigating, and adapting to 
global and local environmental change.  It is understood that the notion of governance in 
ESG refers to forms of steering that are less hierarchical than traditional governmental 
policy-making, rather decentralized, open to self-organization, and inclusive of non-state 
actors that range from industry and non-governmental organizations to scientists, 
indigenous communities, city governments and international organizations. The Earth 
System Governance Project Framework advances a science plan that is organized, first, 
around five analytical problems ranging from architecture, agents, adaptiveness, 
accountability, allocation and access.  
The architecture of earth system governance includes questions relating to the emergence, 
design and effectiveness of governance systems as well as to the overall integration of 
global, regional, national and local governance.  
Understanding effective earth system governance requires understanding of the agents that 
drive earth system governance and that need to be involved. The research gap here 
concerns especially the influence, roles and responsibilities of actors apart from national 
governments, such as business and non-profit organizations, and the ways in which 
authority is granted to these agents and how it is exercised.  
The earth system governance must respond to the inherent uncertainties in human and 
natural systems. It must combine stability, to ensure long-term governance solutions, with 
flexibility to react quickly to new findings and developments. In other words, we must 
understand and further develop the adaptiveness of earth system governance.  
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Accountability in earth system governance entails more regulatory competence, and the 
more authority is conferred upon larger institutions and systems of governance - especially 
at the global level - the more we will be confronted with questions of how to ensure the 
accountability and legitimacy of governance. Simply put, we are faced with the need to 
understand the democratic quality of earth system governance.  
Allocation and Access as the fifth analytical problem addresses any political activity related 
to the distribution of material and immaterial values. It is, in essence, a conflict about the 
access to goods and about their allocation - it is about justice, fairness, and equity. The 
novel character of earth system transformation and of the new governance solutions that 
are being developed puts questions of allocation and access, debated for millennia, in a new 
light. This might require new answers to old questions.  
2.8  Disasters and Risks, Hazard Early Warning Systems  
2.8.1 The increase in Disasters and Risks, and their Underlying Causes 
The incidence of global societal calamities is growing (ProventionConsortium 2004: 3, 
MunichRe). Consequently, the cost of disaster recovery far exceeds the cost of sustainable 
hazard management. Basher (2006) compares the most recent decade 1995-2004 with the 
previous decade 1985-1994 using the CRED data to show that the number of people 
affected has  increased 1.5 times, economic damage has  increased 1.8 times and the total 
number of deaths increased 2.0 times. The latter figure is heavily influenced by the 26 
December 2004 tsunami. This largely undermines the claimed great achievements of 
science and technology during the 20th century which have supposedly improved warning 
and forecasting systems (WMO 2005). This strongly suggests that there are certain critical 
problems within the EW process which are being not addressed. Shah (2006) begins by 
asking questions such as ‘why is this happening?’ Are information or programmes reaching 
the right people? He suggests that maybe we are reaching the people and doing the right 
actions, but the question is whether we are reaching the people who represent the ‘last 
mile’ of the pathway to effective mitigation. 
The causes of disasters and the increase in risks can be related to the fact that people are 
simply becoming more vulnerable as populations increase, and they are living in risky 
areas. There are also recurrent themes such as rural poverty that characterize how 
development shapes risk worldwide (Prevention Consortium 2004). Brauch (2005) 
underlines that the impacts of hazards also differ for people at different levels of 
preparedness, resilience, and with varying capacities to recover (Brauch 2005). The United 
Nations University for Environment and Human Security (UNU-EHS) points out that globally 
many societies have not adapted their frameworks of development to the natural 
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surrounding environment (Villagran and Bogardi 2006). Thus, globally many countries and 
millions of people are not protected by effective early warning systems, thus they risk 
devastation, death and destitution (IEWP 2006). A United Nations (UN 2006) report on a 
global survey of Early Warning Systems stipulates that if an effective early warning system 
had been in place in the Indian Ocean on the 26 December 2004, thousands of lives would 
have been saved. However, others argue that an extraordinary amount of money is spent 
on developing science and technology 
but that this has not been very 
successful in reducing deaths and 
injuries and property damage 
(Rodriguez et al., 2004). This is partly 
because the technical EW is the well-
recognised part of the EWS while 
failures typically occur in the 
communication and preparedness 
element, as happened during 
Hurricane Katrina in New Orleans in 
August 2005 (Basher 2006). 
Rodriguez et al., (2004) argues that 
effective warning is only part of the equation. There is a general consensus that a state of 
the art warning system has to link directly with the community. Figure 3 illustrates the 
increase in disaster and risk with time, and the causes. 
2.8.2 Disaster Risks: Hazard, Vulnerability, Exposure and Coping Capacities 
In a methodological review Villagran (2006) concludes that a disaster is preceded by at 
least two predispositions: the possibility that the triggering event will take place, usually 
called a hazard in this potential state; and a pre-existing vulnerability, the pre-disposition of 
people, processes, infrastructure, services, organisations, or systems to be affected, 
damaged or destroyed by an event. Villagran summarises some important mathematical 
expressions in terms of hazards, vulnerability, coping capacity, exposure, and susceptibility. 
In this study, the International Strategy for Disaster Reduction (ISDR) definition is 
employed based on global scientific consensus. In this case, risk is the multiple 
combinations of hazard, vulnerability and coping capacity. ISDR expresses risk in the 
context of probability of harmful consequences, or expected losses (i.e. deaths, injuries, 
property, livelihoods, economic activity disrupted or environmental damage) resulting from 
crossovers between natural or human-induced hazards and vulnerable conditions (UN/ISDR 
2004). 
 
Figure 3: The causes of the increase in disasters and risks 
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Vulnerability is a complex term and is understood in diverse ways. In a review process 
related to the study of vulnerability to environmental change and the challenges for current 
vulnerability research in integrating with the domains of resilience and adaptation, Adger 
(2006) finds that the antecedent traditions include theories of vulnerability such as 
entitlement failure and theories of hazard. In another review process on vulnerability, 
Birkmann (2006) identifies at least six different schools of thought on the subject by 
analysing the different conceptual and analytical frameworks. 
Present formulations of vulnerability to environmental change are viewed as a characteristic 
of social–ecological systems linked to resilience. In the context of global environmental 
change and, more specifically, climate change, vulnerability is most often described in 
terms of three primary attributes: 1) the exposure of a particular population, place, or 
system  to a threat, or suite of threats associated with global environmental change; 2) the 
sensitivity of the population, place or system to the threat(s), and 3) the capacities of the 
population, place or system to resist impacts, cope with losses and/or regain functions 
when exposed to global environmental change. Exposure and sensitivity increase 
vulnerability, while capacity acts to decrease it. While the inter-relationship and relative 
importance of these three attributes is ambiguous and openly debated, together these three 
attributes capture both the internal and external dimensions of vulnerability. 
Hence, the double structure of the vulnerability model is a remarkable concept of 
vulnerability characterised by an external and an internal side (Bohle 2001). The external 
side involves the exposure to shocks (i.e. tsunami hazard) while the internal side includes 
coping capacities (i.e. EWS, Governance and Institutional Arrangements), and resistance to 
and recovery from the impact of the hazard. The model views vulnerability as the exposure 
to shocks and stressors and the ability to cope with the shocks. On the other hand, another 
famous vulnerability concept is the Wisner et al., (2004) Pressure and release PAR model 
which views vulnerability as the intersection of two major forces: those processes 
generating vulnerability, and on the other hand, the natural hazard event. It relates to the 
root causes and dynamic pressures that determine vulnerability and unsafe conditions. A 
recent concept of vulnerability is the so called BBC model (Bogardi and Birkmann 2004) and 
(Cardona 1999) which links vulnerability assessment to the concept of sustainable 
development by focusing on exposed and susceptible elements, and on the coping 
capacities at the same time, and is a process operating at different levels spanning socio, 
economic and environmental spheres. UNDP (2004) defines exposure as “Elements at risk, 
an inventory of those people or artefacts that are exposed to a hazard.” In an uninhabited 
area the human exposure to a hazard is zero. The definition of coping capacity adopted in 
this research is “The means by which people or organisations use available resources and 
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abilities to face adverse consequences that could lead to a disaster. It involves managing 
resources, both in normal times as well as in crises or adverse conditions. The 
strengthening of coping capacities usually builds resilience to withstand the effects of 
natural and human-induced hazards.” of UN/ISDR (2004).  
Interestingly, Füssel (2007) presents a generally applicable conceptual framework of 
vulnerability that combines a categorization of vulnerable situations and a terminology of 
vulnerability concepts based on the distinction of four fundamental groups of vulnerability 
factors. It provides the much-needed conceptual clarity and facilitates bridging the various 
approaches to researching vulnerability to climate change. 
2.8.3 Definition of Resilience 
In this PhD research resilience is defined and understood as: 
“The capacity of a system, community or society potentially exposed to hazards to adapt by 
resisting or changing in order to reach and maintain an acceptable level of functioning and 
structure. This is determined by the degree to which the social system is capable of 
organising itself to increase its capacity for learning from past disasters for better future 
protection and to improve risk reduction measures” (UN/ISDR 2004). 
2.8.4 Disaster Risk Management and Consensus for Disaster Risk Reduction 
Scanlon (1982) claims that historically, disaster management planning in North America has 
been viewed from a para-military perspective; that is, it has been conducted for, not with, 
the community (Laughy 1991). It dates back to the cold war and preparing for military 
attacks in bomb shelters. Kreps (1991) found that whether or not a community has 
effective emergency management depends to a large extent on the credibility given to it by 
local government officials. In that sense, Rubin (1991) observes that community members 
are becoming increasingly frustrated at being excluded from the decision–making process in 
community planning, but also at being excluded from disaster management. Public 
participation has increased along the Pacific coast from California to Canada and involves 
the push to develop neighbourhood emergency programs such as the Home Emergency 
Response Organisation System (HEROS) in Coquitlam, British Columbia.  
To be effective and efficient, sustainable disaster risk reduction requires a paradigm shift 
throughout the disaster risk reduction process. It requires a focus not only on the hazards 
but also on the notion of vulnerability and how to build resilience capacities. Secondly, there 
should be a shift from a reactive to a proactive approach which would move towards 
mitigation rather than response and recovery. Thirdly, the process requires a 
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multidisciplinary approach which recognises all the stakeholders and community and strives 
to create partnership (i.e. Keating 2006, Rodrıguez et al., 2004, Seibold 2003, Michaelis 
1984, Quarantelli and Taylor 1977, Weller 1970). The fourth requirement is working,  
relating and communicating with rather than to the community. There needs to be a 
comprehensive global framework, strategy and mechanism to meet such desired goals. The 
Yokohama strategy and Hyogo framework for action represents such a vision. 
Globally, there is increasing consensus for DRR. In recent years key international players 
such as the International Strategy for Disaster Reduction (ISDR) and the International Early 
Warning Programme (IEWP) have been promoting national systems for comprehensive and 
sustainable disaster and risk management with a view to transforming concepts into action, 
thus changing the prevalent culture of reaction to a culture of prevention (Annan 1999). 
The Yokohama Strategy of the World Conference on Disaster Reduction held between 18-22 
January 2005, in Kobe, Hyogo, Japan conveyed and resolved to pursue the following 
expected outcome for the years 2005-2015: “The substantial reduction of disaster losses, 
lives and in the social, economic and environmental assets of communities and countries”.  
It is worth pointing out at this point that the Hyogo Framework of Action identified five 
priority areas for action. This research also falls under priorities 3 and 5 which are on public 
commitment and institutional frameworks, including organisational, policy, legislation and 
community action in the context of early warning systems including forecasting, 
dissemination of warnings, preparedness measures and reaction capacities. Overall, there is 
little experience and evidence of systematic successful testing and implementation of such a 
framework. It also appears that there is relatively little research in this area. Very recently, 
some project documents have emerged on the issue; however most if not all view and 
analyse the system in isolation rather than considering the dynamic interaction between 
architectures (i.e. institutions, norms and structures)-actors-agents in the action arena.  
2.8.5 Natural Hazard Early Warning Systems  
Basher (2006)  claims that the most common view of early warning systems is a linear top 
down warning chain, that is expert-driven and hazard-focused from observation through 
warning generation and transmission to users. He suggested that an effective and 
sustainable early warning system needs to have not only a strong scientific and technical 
basis, but also a strong focus on the people exposed to risk, with a systems approach that 
incorporates all of the relevant factors in that risk, whether arising from the natural hazards 
or social vulnerabilities or from short-term or long-term processes. Basher suggests that an  
integrated EWS should include linkages and interactions, feedback from the population at 
risk through their organisations, the actors, i.e. political administrators, the district and 
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community actors, and the research community, and links to international communities. 
The risk manager and citizens are most concerned with the integrated risks faced and how 
to mitigate and prepare for them. This implies that an approach that addresses all relevant 
hazards in an integrated fashion, and not as separate unconnected systems, is more 
appropriate to the management of natural risks. However, Basher (2006) clearly underlines 
that the multi-hazard approach should not encourage generalities and control of warning 
systems. It must be tailored for each hazard, and the issue is how to create a coordinated 
“system of systems”.  
In addition, when designing devices and systems such as TEWS, we understand and know 
from the very start that these devices will not stand alone, but rather are used by people 
and subject to cost. The architecture or design should start with the fundamental issue, 
which is people. It should start by analysing situations in the ways that they are meaningful 
to the people involved (Agre 2000).  In that sense, the effectiveness of an institutionalized 
EWS can only be achieved by close cooperation between agencies running the system and 
the vulnerable people. Early warning systems need to be adapted to different conditions. 
The complex structure of large cities for example requires different arrangements than a 
rural environment. In order to reach the last mile, an integrated approach to early warning 
has to be based on the needs, priorities, capacities, and cultures of those people at risk. 
People at risk must be partners in the system, not controlled by it.  
Experience has shown that an effective EWS must be both technically systematic and 
people-centred (EWCIII 2006). Being people-centred means including actors and the risk 
community,  identifying the risks through social interactions, exploring mapping, planning 
and responses, generating public information, and using the media, perception surveys, 
monuments, publications, organising annual events, exercise, drills and simulations. Such 
activities require the coordinated participation of different organisations.  They should be 
based on community engagement, empowerment and the sense of ownership. In this 
context, it is important to understand human heterogeneity, the community size at risk, 
behaviours of individuals and groups, current practices, system unification, intrinsic human 
interactions and persistence in the existing institutional order. These issues influence the 
individual, community members’ motivation to cooperate, participate, and communicate 
with each other, obey rules, and use and manage local affairs in a ‘positive’ way. Such 
initiatives are the conditions for a sustainable, scaled up and, most importantly, adaptable 
and resilient system. To have a sustainable early warning system requires annual and long 
term strategies.  
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The other important issue to consider when designing an early warning system is the need 
for different risk management strategies. These include strategies of how to deal with 
routine, mundane risks, complex and sophisticated risks, highly uncertain risks, highly 
ambiguous risks and imminent dangers and crises. The IRGC (2005) proposes the following 
for characterisation and their implications for Risk Management. To be more specific, IRGC 
underlines the coping strategies to deal with complex, uncertain and ambiguous risks. For 
highly complex risks, there is a need for risk–informed and plural knowledge strategies with 
stakeholder participation through mainly epistemological or theory of knowledge discourse. 
On the other hand, highly uncertain risks require a precautionary and resilience building 
approach including making compromises between too much and too little precaution with a 
reflective discourse approach. This strategy should be of great relevance in the case of 
developing a defence system against tsunami. Ambiguous risks require plural value input 
social groups in terms of reflective discourse. EW systems not only need to continue to 
innovate and adapt in the context of technologies, but must also continuously review their 
aims during performance and renegotiate the multiple organisational and community 
relationships of the system. A prerequisite for an effective EWS is the recognition of its 
benefits by the general public, policy makers, and the private sector. A cost benefit analysis 
for example will help to foster the necessary political engagement and the will to promote 
the objectives.  
2.8.6 The Effective Early Warning System Framework 
The International Strategy for Disaster Risk Reduction (ISDR) also claims that for an EWS 
to be effective, it must be people-centred and should integrate and span four elements as 
defined by the ISDR model: (i) a knowledge of the risks faced; (ii) a technical monitoring 
and warning service; (iii) the dissemination of meaningful warnings to those at risk; and 
(iv) responses which depend on public awareness and preparedness (Figure 4). While this 
set of four elements appears to have a logical sequence, in fact each element has a direct 
two-way linkage and interaction with each of the other elements.  
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In order to sustain the four elements, it 
is necessary to have strong political 
commitment and durable institutional 
capacities, which in turn depend on public 
awareness and an appreciation of the 
benefits of an effective EWS (Basher 
2006). A weakness or failure in any one 
part of the chain or link could cause the 
whole system to fail. 
The major failures of EWSs over recent 
times have been failures largely of 
governance and institutions rather than 
science. The governance and multi-
institutional arrangements range from 
legislative, policy frameworks, 
institutional capacities and, government 
funding that supports the implementation and maintenance of effective early warning 
systems. The cross-cutting issues also include the (UN/ISDR-EWCII 2006) multi-hazard 
approach, involvement of the local communities, and consideration of gender perspectives 
and cultural diversity. Institutions are required to capture and sustain political commitment, 
to capitalise on and apply existing scientific knowledge, to assess risks and manage 
investment in systems, to globalise and systematise EWSs, and to guide and resource 
scientific research (Basher 2006). 
The United Nation Development Program (UNDP 2005) report on Reducing Disaster Risk 
(DRR): a challenge for development highlighted that the critical cross-cutting issue of 
governance remains a key unresolved and challenging problem, and there is the need to 
further strengthen institutional and legislative systems for disaster risk management. On 
this note, it was highlighted that governance areas ranging from political commitment, 
policy priority, legal and regulatory frameworks, institutional frameworks and structures, 
multi-stakeholder participation, capacities for disaster reduction, and financial resources are 
increasingly recognised to be key areas for the success of the sustained risk reduction.  
In addition, the UN Survey requested by Annan (2005) on a global early warning system for 
all natural hazards confirmed that there is inadequate political commitment and 
responsibility, a poor legal framework, poor links between disaster risk reduction and 
sustainable development, and insufficient investment in EWS capacities. Moreover, there is 
 
Figure 4: The four elements for an effective EWS 
framework 
Source: International Early Warning Programme 2006  
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insufficient coordination among actors, a lack of a participatory approach, with over-reliance 
on centralised government direction, and limited engagement of civil society, NGOs and the 
private sector as well as inadequate identification and sharing of methodologies and good 
practices. 
2.8.7 The Modified Effective Early Warning System Framework 
The ISDR model for effective EWS has one major weakness. It lacks the differentiation of 
the communication process between and within actors during both non-hazard events and 
during impeding disaster events. Apparently, the model shows communication as active 
only between the monitoring, warning and 
response processes (see Figure 4.) 
Therefore, it is necessary to differentiate 
between the two communication 
processes and to show that 
communication is a central element across 
all the components of an EWS. In other 
words, communication between actors is 
viewed as a central and important 
mechanism which should remain active at 
all times throughout the process to 
improve learning, information exchange 
and coordination (Thompson 1967, 
Galbraith 1977, IRG 2005). In this context 
the ISDR EWS in modified as shown in 
Figure 5. The modified model of the ISDR 
effective EWS is adopted in this research. 
2.9 The Ecosystem Resilience Capacities Framework 
In this PhD research, it is suggested that an effective and sustainable TEWS should also 
satisfy the attributes of resilience rather than simply address the elements of the TEWS. 
The ecosystem resilience capacities include considering attributes of resilience such as self-
organisation, learning and adapting, scale, uncertainties, fit, thresholds, knowledge and 
diversity. These are further elaborated below: 
A system can maintain and renovate its identity if it has the capacity for self organisation. 
Although most systems are linked to, and impacted by other systems, self-organizing 
systems are able to buffer the impacts of other systems and do not need to be continually 
invested in, subsidized, or replenished from outside to persist (Ostrom 1999, Carpenter et 
 
Figure 5: Modified model of the effective EWS  
Source: Author 
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al., 2001, Holling 2001). Management systems can get better over time with an increased 
ability to learn and adapt (Adger et al. 2005, Brooks et al. 2005, Folke et al. 2005).  
 
The capacity to cope with non-linearities or other forms of surprise and uncertainty requires 
openness to learning, an acceptance of the inevitability of change, and the ability to treat 
interventions as experiments or adaptive management (Gunderson 1999, Adger 2000, Pahl-
Wostl and Hare 2004, Adger and Vincent 2005).  The ability to detect hard-to-reverse 
thresholds in a timely matter is important because it could allow societies to take measures 
to prevent ecosystems from crossing thresholds and ending up in another undesirable basin 
of attraction (Holling 1978, Carpenter et al. 2001, Scheffer and Carpenter 2003). It is 
crucial to have abilities to engage effectively at multiple scales to deal with regional 
systems because they are invariably subject to powerful external influences, including 
changes in regulations, investments, and the environment (Berkes 2002, Young 2002). 
 
The ability to improve knowledge about ecological processes in institutions should improve 
the fit between rules and ecosystems even as they go through dynamic cycles (Holling 
1986, Walters 1986, Berkes 1999, Gunderson 2000, Young 2002, Folke et al. 2003).  
Following a major crisis the capacity to build and maintain social and ecological diversity 
provides the opportunity for renewal and reorganization (Peterson 2000, Ostrom 2005). Our 
capacity to successfully combine or integrate understanding gained from different sources 
and forms of knowledge, including tacit and formal knowledge, increases the likelihood that 
the key thresholds and components of diversity will be acknowledged (Berkes and Folke 
1998, Berkes 1999).  
2.10 Environment and Human Security 
2.10.1  Environment: Global Governance and Sustainable Development 
Finally, the ultimate goal of developing an effective TEWS and resilience capacities is geared 
towards environment and human security. However, it is important to highlight the concept 
and discourse on the environment and human security in the context of this study. 
Environmental phenomena can be categorised into three levels: local, regional and global. 
By definition, global problems are of international concern; nevertheless, local problems can 
evolve into global problems (Rechkemmer 2005). It was in 1968 that the General Assembly 
for the first time engaged in international environmental issues with the resolution of the 
GA 23/198. A breakthrough for global environmental governance came in the eighties 
following the release of the so-called Brundtland-World Commission on Environment and 
Development (WCED, 1984) report: Our Common Future. It instantly became the 
foundation and blueprint for sustainable development; its definition a paradigm: “Humanity 
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has the ability to make development sustainable to ensure that it meets the needs of the 
present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs” 
(WCED 1987:8). The notion of global environmental governance which is highly relevant to 
this research is characterised by national governance through governmental regulation, and 
international governance through collective action facilitated by international organisations 
that foster partnership arrangements due to the complexity of managing human relations. 
It consists of elements ranging from public-private partnerships, multi-stakeholder 
processes, and global public policy networks (Ivanova 2003). It is clear that cooperation 
mechanism such as multilateral cooperation between actors, which characterises global 
environmental governance, was driven by the incentive of achieving sustainable 
development. 
 
The threats and challenges of global environmental governance emerged due to a collapse 
of multi-lateral cooperation after the 1990s linked with the unilateral actions of the classic 
restoration of power politics based on the national interest5
The report “In Larger Freedom”: Towards Development, Security, and Human Right for All 
(UNGAA/59/2005) by UN Secretary General Kofi Annan identifies environmental governance 
as particularly relevant. In this context, a bold new vision of collective security for all was 
identifying and clustered into six threats. The report perceives global environmental change 
and environmental degradation as a new challenge and a major threat to collective human 
security, exemplified by natural catastrophes, such as the recent tsunami in the Indian 
Ocean, requiring global environmental governance. The most important call of Annan 
(2005) is to establish a worldwide early warning system for all natural hazards, building on 
existing national and regional capacity. Finally, a new paradigm shift for environmental 
governance is emerging. Rechkemmer (2005) urges us to pay attention to human security 
and to methodically add to the model concept of sustainable development, bringing about a 
triangular understanding of the inter-relatedness of environmental change, development 
and human security.  
 which undermined the principles 
of collective action and global governance. However, in response to this deadlock, new 
initiatives and the approach of selective multilateralism emerged, led by European Union 
member countries (Messner, Schade and Weller 2003). Thus, a change in international 
politics has emerged where willing states are forming new alliances of political forerunners 
creating a new form of “multilateralism at different speeds” (Messner, Schade and Weller 
2003:247). Hamm (2002) and Rechkemmer (2005a) foresees an advance in globalisation, 
new avenues and strategies for joint implementation or informal agreements which may be 
between states or in the form of voluntary networks and partnerships.  
                                                            
5 especially after 11 September 2001 
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2.10.2 Human Security: State and People-Centred Security 
In this section, the human security dimension is discussed from a number of research fields, 
including development studies, international relations, strategic studies, and human rights. 
It is an emerging paradigm for understanding global vulnerabilities whose proponents 
challenge the traditional notion of national security by arguing that the proper referent for 
security should be the individual rather than the state. Human security emerged after the 
cold war as a challenge to ideas of traditional or state security, based on the argument that 
the proper referent for security should be the individual rather than the state. Traditional 
security or state security is about a state's ability to defend itself against external threats, 
and in this context the UN High Level Panel recognised “human security” in the context of 
the “State” as the cause and the key actor in dealing primarily with military and societal 
threats, but also pointed out that “to be secure is to feel free from threats, anxiety, or 
danger”. Wolfers (1962) argues that there are two sides to the security concept, where 
“Security, in an objective sense, measures the absence of threats to acquired values, in an 
objective sense, the absence of fear that such values will be attacked”. However, fairly 
recently in 2003, Moller criticised this definition for its inability to explain whose and which 
values might be threatened and from who and how? However, a remarkable contribution 
and critique to the above state-centred security paradigm was highlighted by Mack (2004) 
to explain situations where the state is actually the threat to the individual.  
One of the greatest achievements in human security is the publication of the Human 
Development Report by the United Nations Development Programme's (UNDP) in 1994 with 
its argument that ensuring "freedom from want" and "freedom from fear" for all persons is 
the best path to tackle the problem of global insecurity. The Human Development Report's 
definition of human security argues that the scope of global security should be expanded to 
include threats in seven areas from economic, food, health, environmental, personal, and 
political and community security. Wolfrun (1994:50) indicates that the UN charter on the 
“nation-centred concept of “international security” and the concept of “negative” peace 
indicate that peace is more than just the absence of war. Two years later, Waever (1997) 
notes that the scope of “securitisation” has changed, notably from a “national” to a 
“human–centred” security concept within the UN system and the academic security 
community. Nevertheless, the human security concept used by UNDP (1994) stirred, 
globally, contrasting and deepening views and debate that has not abated.  
Annan (2001) informs us that human security can no longer be understood in purely 
military terms, but encompasses economic development, social justice, environmental 
protection, democratisation, disarmament, respect for human rights and the rule of law. He 
further suggests three building blocks of human security which include: freedom from want, 
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freedom from fear and the freedom of future generations to inherit a healthy environment-
these are the interrelated building blocks of human and therefore national security. 
Human security can be considered a condition whereby individuals and communities have 
the options necessary to end, mitigate, or adapt to threats to their human, social, and 
environmental rights, and where they have the capacity and freedom to exercise these 
options (GECHS 1999).  
 
The Sen-Ogata Commission’s 2003 report “Human Security Now” raised the visibility of 
human security. Freedoms emphasize “both the processes that allow freedom of actions 
and decisions, and the actual opportunities that people have, given their personal and social 
circumstances” (Sen 1999, p. 17). Human security thus implies both protection from 
threats, and empowerment to respond to those threats in a positive manner. Gasper (2005, 
p. 228) further argues, it “includes normative claims that what matters is the content of 
individuals’ lives, including a reasonable degree of stability.” It encompasses issues related 
to human development, human rights, and environmental sustainability (Gasper 2005). 
2.10.3 Human Security: Freedom from Hazard Impact 
Brauch (2003) and Bogardi (2004) suggested focusing the human security discourse on the 
environmental dimension, especially on interactions between individuals or humankind as 
the cause and victim of factors of global environmental change, both in anthropogenic and 
natural variability. Finally, in 2005, Bogardi and Brauch claimed that human security could 
rest on three pillars (freedom from want, freedom from hazard impact and freedom from 
fear) reflecting the corresponding issues of sustainable development.  
The Commission on Human Security report (CHS 2003) proposes a new people-centred 
security framework that requires two general, mutually reinforcing strategies which offer 
protection so that individuals are shielded from dangers and are empowered to become full 
participants in decision-making. Aiming towards a learning society by creation of knowledge 
is a key approach to reducing vulnerability and enhancing resilience.  
2.11 Synthesis and Integrated Conceptual Framework and Analytical Steps 
To investigate a problem and propose possible explanations, it is important to distinguish 
among three conceptual levels; frameworks, theories, and models. Overall, a framework 
organises an enquiry by specifying the general sets of variables of interest. It specifies 
classes of variables and their relationships to each other such that there is a coherent 
structure to the enquiry (Schlager 1999). The advantage of a framework is that it allows the 
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use or integration of several theories that would otherwise be examined in isolation from 
each other (Kootz 2003).  
2.11.1 The Integrated Framework 
An integrated Governance-Institution-EWS-Resilience framework is developed (Figure 6) to 
address the central question of this research: how do certain attributes of good governance 
such as participation, deliberation, equity, multi-layeredness, policentricity, accountability, 
transparency, and institutional arrangement (i.e. rules and regulations), configurations of 
actors, and social processes function, or how should they function, to enhance and shape 
the capacity to manage resilience in Indonesia. 
Firstly, the integrated framework consists of the systems of governance (i.e. political, 
economic and social) required to support the TEWS. Secondly, the core of the analyses 
focuses on the governance framework which consists of architectures (i.e. institutional 
frameworks, arrangement, norms, structures, polycentric-multi-layered systems and 
actors-agents (i.e. their participation and networks, mediation, negotiation, deliberation, 
cooperation, partnership, transparency, accountability, equity and legitimacy). The 
underlying theories and concepts are grounded on earlier institutional work by Fischer et 
al., (2007), emerging institutional theorists (Mehta et al., 1999), and mainstream 
institutions (Ostrom 1990, North 1990, Keohane and Ostrom 1995 etc). Thirdly, the 
framework addresses the issues of ecosystem resilience capacities to manage ecological 
challenges (Lebel et al., 2005). Fourthly, these frameworks operate on the EWS framework 
with the central goal of tsunami vulnerability reduction or alternatively tsunami resilience to 
safeguard the environment and human security.  
The integrated framework captures multi-level and cross-scale interactions. It considers 
both mainstream institution theory (Ostrom 1990; North 1990; Keohane and Ostrom 1995; 
Gordenker and Weiss, 1995; Wade 1998; Cleaver 1998) and emerging views such as 
(Mehta et al., 1999). It addresses the notion of formal and informal institutions. Therefore, 
on one hand, institutions could serve as the rational, collective choice (e.g. Ostrom 1990) 
and be geared towards utility maximisation, economic and operational efficiency for 
deliberate ends (e.g. North, 1990) in the upstream technical component of the EWS. On the 
other hand, the framework simultaneously seeks to capture the idea that in the 
downstream-culture component of the EWS it is possible to cater for flexible-informal 
processes which can be blurred and often overlapping, to respond to dynamic 
environmental uncertainties (Mehta et al., 1999). It recognises that institutions designed 
with the community should be flexible and contingent, and should have ad-hoc and non-
robust approaches making use of public institutions characterised by social relations and 
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networks. This requires not only an inclusionary, participatory decision-making process, but 
the creation of space for institutional learning that reflects and makes use of plurality of 
perspectives. This approach is particularly relevant when addressing the issue of people-
centred warning system as institutions should be embedded in social interactions and social 
practices and everyday life for sustainability. Thus, it includes plurality and the complex 
institutional mix of institutions at multiple levels - state, private and public - involved in 
these networks of environmental governance to deal with problems outside the scope of 
one actor. Therefore, in this research, governance is understood as the body of rules, 
enforcement mechanisms, and the corresponding interactive process that coordinates and 
brings into line the activities of the involved persons with regard to a concerted outcome 
(Huppert, Svendsen & Vermillion 2003 p.8). The concerted outcome in this case is resilience 
to the uncertain tsunami risks in the context of Indonesia.  
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Figure 6: The Integrated Governance-Institutions-EWS-Resilience framework 
Source: Author 
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2.11.2 The Institutional Analysis Analytical Steps 
In order to show the dynamic process the framework is reconfigured to capture the 
analytical steps based on the modified extended IAD framework of Fisher et al., 2006 as 
indicated in Figure 7. The reconceptualised analytical process describes the past and 
prevailing situation analysis which consists of the architecture, actors-agents and the 
community at risk, the system of governance and the prevailing associated incentives in the 
arena. To analyse the complex interactions, the framework considers the issues of cross 
level and cross-scale interactions consisting of the multitude of actors from state to non-
state actors, technical to non-technical actors and their interaction spanning different levels 
vertically (i.e. international, national and local levels). The goals include effectiveness and 
sustainability in tsunami resilience viewed from the TEWS standpoint for environment and 
human security. For instance, if the outcome is not satisfactory, then actors and the 
community need to aim for an improved outcome.  The second part of the analysis process 
consists of the incentive change activities as described by Fischer et al., (2007) that can be 
applied to the constitutional, organisational and operational levels, and it examines their 
impacts on the prevailing situation in part 1.  
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Figure 7: The institutional analysis analytical steps 
Source: Author, based on modified extended IAD Framework of Fischer et al., 2007 
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3. Research Methodology 
 
This chapter discusses and provides a detailed account of the selection procedures for the 
research country and areas, describes the methodological steps undertaken for data 
collection, and presents analysis and interpretation. It also includes the process of selecting 
the empirical methods and tools employed during different phases of the research study. 
The difficulties and challenges encountered during the field research are also presented. 
3.1 Selection of Research Country, Area and Sites (Arenas of Action) 
 
The question is, why were Indonesia and Padang coastal city and Bali chosen as specific 
research sites for this study? Indonesia is one of the largest archipelagos in the world, 
composed of 18,000 islands with a population of over 200 million, and it is vulnerable to 
natural disasters. Indonesia’s location on the edges of three tectonic plates makes it the 
site of 130 active volcanoes and it has frequent earthquakes and tsunamis. The Indonesian 
earth segment, the coastal and marine waters, and the atmospheric conditions are quite 
dynamic and potentially prone to all sorts of natural disasters, including tsunamis. 
In December 2004, the Aceh tsunami killed more than 128,728 people and displaced 
500,0006
Secondly, Indonesia has experienced many tsunamis in the past (see Chapter 4). A recent 
study by OCHA (2009) based on a tsunami inundation deterministic scenario
 people in Indonesia alone because there was no TEWS in Indonesia. Following the 
calamity, Indonesia and the other Indian Ocean countries agreed to develop their own 
national TEWSs to build national resilience to tsunami hazards and disasters. Based on a 
bilateral agreement, Indonesia and Germany spearheaded a project named the German 
Indonesia Tsunami Early Warning System (GITEWS). This PhD research forms part of the 
capacity building of experts of the GITEWS project in Indonesia and the Indian Ocean 
region.  
7
                                                            
6 http://www.irw.org/tsunami/ 
 and 
population exposure results shows that Indonesia is exposed to the highest wave run-up 
ranging from 5-20 m over most parts of the coast facing the Indian Ocean (Figure 8) with 
an exposed population of 1.5 million people (Figure 9). Therefore, it was natural to select 
Indonesia as the country for this research.  
7 No probabilities are associated with the scenarios, which is important for effective risk assessment 
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Figure 8: Tsunami hazard map of Asia-Pacific.  
The legend indicates ranges of the shoreline wave height 
  
Source: OCHA 2009 
 
 
Figure 9: Population exposed to tsunami risk at coastal regions of Asia-Pacific  
Number of persons per km length of coastline 
 
 Source: OCHA 2009 
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Initially, three research areas were envisaged to be covered in the study. However, during 
the first field trip it was quickly realised and decided that only two research areas would be 
manageable considering that the two research areas are about 1 hour’s flight time from 
Jakarta, the capital of Indonesia. Hence, Padang and South Bali (Figure 10) were finally 
selected as the research areas based on three criteria which are further elaborated below:  
 
 
Figure 10: Study areas in Indonesia 
 
Source: National Geographic Society 2003 
3.1.1 Geography, Socio-Economic and Demographic Characteristics in Padang and 
Bali  
 
Firstly, the two communities, Padang and Bali, profoundly contrast in terms of their socio-
economic activities, religious and cultural dimensions. Therefore, it would be desirable to 
understand how these existing underlying conditions influence and determine how actors 
and communities develop capacities to manage tsunami resilience. This is further 
elaborated below:  
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Padang is the capital and the largest city of West Sumatra, Indonesia. It is located on the 
western coast of Sumatra (Figure 10 and 11) with an area of 694.96 square kilometres and 
a population of over 750,000 people. Padang has 11 sub-districts (kecamatan) and its 
transportation system includes the newly-opened Minangkabau International Airport in 
Ketaping, Padang. Padang’s Teluk Bayur harbour is the largest and busiest harbour on the 
west coast of Sumatra. Andalas University is the main campus, located about 12 kilometres 
from the centre of Padang, and it 
is the oldest university in 
Indonesia outside Java. Since the 
16th century Padang has been a 
trade centre. During the 16th and 
17th centuries pepper was 
cultivated and traded with India, 
Portugal, the United Kingdom and 
the Netherlands. In 1663 the city 
came under the authority of the 
Dutch. Later the city came under 
British authority twice, the first 
time from 1781 to 1784 during the 
Fourth Anglo-Dutch War, and 
again from 1795 to 1819 during 
the Napoleonic Wars. Afterwards 
the city was transferred back to 
the Netherlands. Up to 
approximately 1780 the most 
important trade product was gold, 
originating from the gold mines in 
the region. When the mines were 
exhausted, the emphasis shifted to 
other products such as coffee, salt and textiles. At the time of independence, the city had 
around 50,000 inhabitants. Coffee was still important, but copra was also a major item 
produced by farmers in its hinterland. The population growth has been partly a result of 
growth in the area of the city, but is mainly a result of the migration to major cities seen in 
so many developing nations. In 1950 there was also development of the Ombilin coal field, 
with Padang as its outlet. This is an indication of the colonization of Indonesia having been 
economic as well as political. Padang is not a popular tourist destination but it is a common 
transit point for travelling to other islands, and for tourists visiting the West Sumatran 
highlands. 
 
Figure 11: Map of Padang city, West Sumatra, Indonesia  
 
Source: Google map 2010 
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According to local social indicators the life expectancy is 68.2 years in Padang (See Table 2) 
while the literacy rate is 96 % and there is 8.0 years of schooling. The relatively high 
educational indicators are influenced by the fact that Padang established an education 
system very early, for example Andalas University. The overall Human Development Index 
(HDI) is 70% while the infant mortality rate and the crime rate are 48% and 7203 
respectively. The Gross Regional Product in West Sumatra including Padang is 17.5 Million 
Indonesian Rupiah per year.  
 
In contrast, Bali (Figure 10 and 12) is an Indonesian island located at the westernmost end 
of the Lesser Sunda Islands, lying between Java to the west and Lombok to the east. It is 
one of the country's 33 provinces, with the provincial capital at Denpasar towards the south 
of the island. Bali had a population of 3.15 million as of 2005.  
 
Historically, about 2000 BC 
the Austronesian people 
migrated from Taiwan 
through Maritime Southeast 
Asia to Bali. Therefore, the 
Balinese people are 
culturally and linguistically 
closely related to the 
peoples of the Indonesian 
archipelago, the Philippines, 
and Oceania. When the 
empire of the Hindi 
Majapahit Empire (1293-
1520 AD) on eastern Java 
declined in 1343, there was 
an exodus of intellectuals, 
artists, priests and musicians from Java to Bali in the 15th century. 
 
In 1597 the first European, a Dutch explorer, made contact with Bali. The Europeans used 
the strategies of distrustful Balinese realms against each other and the Dutch began to take 
political and economic control over Bali. In the late 1890s, struggles between Balinese 
kingdoms in the island's south were exploited by the Dutch to increase their control. 
Following the conflict and wars, the Dutch governors were able to exercise administrative 
control over the island, but local control over religion and culture generally remained intact. 
During World War II, Imperial Japan occupied Bali, but the Dutch promptly returned to 
 
Figure 12: Map of Bali  
 
Source: Google map 2010 
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Indonesia to reinstate power, including over Bali, following Japan's surrender in August 
1945. However, following further fighting, the Dutch wiped out the last traces of Balinese 
military resistance. In 1946 the Dutch constituted Bali as one of the 13 administrative 
districts of the newly-proclaimed State of East Indonesia, a rival state to the Republic of 
Indonesia which was proclaimed and headed by Sukarno and Hatta. Bali was included in the 
"Republic of the United States of Indonesia" when the Netherlands recognised Indonesian 
independence on 29 December 1949. After 1965/66 Bali emerged in a modern form, and 
the resulting large growth in tourism has led to a dramatic increase in Balinese standards of 
living and significant foreign exchange earned for the country. Tourism is now the largest 
single industry, and as a result, Bali is one of Indonesia’s wealthiest regions. About 80% of 
Bali's economy depends on tourism. Previously the Balinese economy was agriculture-
based.  
 
About 93.18% of Bali's population adheres to Balinese Hinduism, formed as a combination 
of existing local beliefs and Hindu influences from mainland Southeast Asia and South Asia. 
Minority religions include Islam (4.79%), Christianity (1.38%), and Buddhism (0.64%). 
When Islam triumphed over Hinduism in Java (16th century), Bali became a refuge for 
many Hindus. Balinese Hinduism is an amalgam in which gods and demigods are 
worshipped together with Buddhist heroes, the spirits of ancestors, indigenous agricultural 
deities and sacred places. It pervades nearly every aspect of traditional life. There are an 
estimated 20,000 temples and shrines, and this is why Bali is known as the "Island of the 
Gods". Balinese and Indonesian are the most widely spoken languages in Bali, and the vast 
majority of Balinese people are bilingual or trilingual. Balinese culture was strongly 
influenced by Indian and Chinese, and particularly Hindu culture, in a process beginning 
around the 1st century AD. Bali is renowned for its diverse and sophisticated art forms and 
boasts one of the most diverse and innovative performing arts cultures in the world.  
 
Basic socio-economic indicators show that the average annual population growth in the year 
2000 was 1.31 % compared to Padang at 0.63 % in 2000. Social indicators such as life 
expectancy are slightly higher by 3.1 % in Bali with an age of 70.4 compared to Padang at 
68.2 years of age. However, Bali has a slightly lower literacy rate and fewer years of 
schooling of 86.2% (-9.8 %) and 7.4 years (-8.1%) compared to Padang with 8.0 years of 
schooling. Therefore, the overall HDI is slightly lower in Bali at 69.1% (-2.0 %) compared 
to Padang with an HDI of 71.2 % in the year 2005. Infant mortality and the crime rate are 
lower in Bali by 17 % and 22 % respectively compared to Padang. In terms of economic 
indicators, the GDP is higher by 41% for the whole of West Sumatra-Padang compared to 
Bali. However, in terms of tourism-related activities, Bali receives a total of 15,045 tourists 
per day while Padang receives only 1,272. Hence, tourism is 91.5 % higher in Bali than in 
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Padang. Table 1 summarises the key socio—economic and demographic characteristics of 
West Sumatra (Padang) and Bali in Indonesia. 
 
 
Dimension Socio-Economic Indicators 
West Sumatra 
(i.e. Padang) 
Bali 
Geography 
Area (km²) 
 694.96 5,632.86 
Population-2000 
 750,000 3151162 
Population Density(Pop/km²) 
 1,090 630.4 
Socio 
Religion (%) 98 Muslim majority 
93.2  
Hinduism majority 
Average Annual Pop Growth Rate-(%)1990-2000 0.63 1.31 
Live Expectancy-2005(%) 
 68.2 70.4 
Literacy Rate (%)-2005 
 96 86.2 
Mean Years of Schooling-2005 
 8 7.4 
HDI (%)-2005 
 71.2[9]
8 69.1[15] 
Ranking  in Indonesia-2005 
 9 15 
Infant Mortality Rate -19999
 
 (%) 48 31 
Under Five Mortality Rate (%)-1999 
 62.2 38.06 
Crime -2005 
 7203 5902 
DIPLOMA i/ii (%)-2005 
 25.136 23.984 
University (%)-2005 
 73.021 72.241 
Quantity of Cleaned Water Distributed to Customers 2006 
 40,280.00 78580 
Economic 
GRDP at Current Market Prices, 2007 (Million Rp) 
 59,799,045.30 42,336424 
Total Foreign Guests per day-2008 
 220 11,759 
 
Table 1: Local Geography-Socio-Economic indicators of West Sumatra  
(Padang) and Bali 
 
Source: Statistics Indonesia of the Republic Indonesia, Badan Pusat10
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
8 Rank in Indonesia 
9 No recent updated data.  
10 http://www.bps.go.id/eng/aboutus.php?tabel=1&daftar=1&id_subyek=07 
Research Methodology   
 
 
44 
 
3.1.2 Tsunami Risk in Padang and Bali  
Padang is a large coastal city sitting 40 kilometres above the most earthquake-prone 
stretch of the interface between the Indo-Australian and Eurasian plates (Figure 13).  
 
 
Figure 13: Geological setting around Indonesia 
Source: Gertisser & Keller 2003 
 
According to Hamzah, Puspito and Imamuru (2000), destructive earthquakes and tsunamis 
originate from the seismic region of the Western Sunda Arc, the Eastern Sunda Arc, the 
Banda Arc and the Makassar Strait (Table 2). The seismic zones of the Western and Eastern 
Sunda Arcs are potential earthquake-tsunami sources for Padang while the Eastern Arc, the 
Banda Arc, and the Makassar Strait affect Bali. The number in brackets indicates tsunami-
related statistics. There have been about 117 disastrous earthquakes and 26 tsunamis in 
the zones of the Western and Eastern Sunda Arcs relevant to Padang with a total of 39,621 
fatalities killed from tsunami.  
 
Region 
Number of 
Disastrous 
Earthquakes and 
Tsunamis 
Percentage 
of 
Occurrences 
Number of 
Fatalities 
Percentage of 
Fatalities 
Western Sunda Arc 35 [16] 19.1 [15.3] 716 [36,360] 6.7 [67.7] 
Eastern Sunda Arc 82 [10] 44.8 [9.5] 2502 [3261] 24.9 [6.0] 
Banda Arc 20 [35] 10.9 [32.3] 285 [5,570] 2.7 [10.3] 
Makassar Strait 10 [9] 5.5 [8.6] 2 [1,023] 0.0 [1.9] 
Others 183 [105] 100 54,147 100 
 
Table 2: Destructive earthquakes and tsunami activity around Indonesia 
 
Source: Derived from Hamzah, Puspito and Imamuru 2000 
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In 1797, Padang was inundated by a tsunami with an estimated flow depth of 5–10 meters, 
following an earthquake estimated to be 8.5–8.7 moment magnitude, which occurred off 
the coast (Table 3). The shaking caused considerable damage and the deaths of two people. 
In 1833, another tsunami inundated Padang with an estimated flow depth of 3–4 meters as 
a result of an earthquake, estimated to be 8.6–8.9 moment magnitude which occurred off 
Bengkulu. The shaking and tsunami caused considerable damage in Padang. 
 
This interface has not experienced the 
stress relief of an earthquake for over 200 
years. According to New Scientist (02.10. 
2009), Mc Closkey's analysis of historical 
coral growth rings, shows no sign of 
seafloor uplift. GPS measurements of the 
rate of plate motion suggest that there has 
been around 13 metres of movement in 
this area over the same period. "A shallow 
earthquake at the plate interface off 
Padang is long, long overdue" says 
McCloskey. Konca, Avouac et al., (2008) 
have shown that the earthquakes of March 
2005 with moment magnitude of 8.6 Mw 
occurred at the site of a similar event in 
1861, and large earthquakes also occurred 
in the Mentawi area in 1797 (Mw 8.8), 
1833 (Mw 9.0) and in September 2007 
two mega earthquakes of 8.4 and 7.9 Mw 
occurrence represented only a fraction of 
the rupture in 1833 (Figure 14). The 
interface consisted of distinct asperities within a patch of the mega-thrust that had 
remained locked in the inter-seismic period. In other words, the moment released in 2007 
amounts to only a fraction of both that released in 1833 and the deficit of moment that had 
accumulated as a result of inter-seismic strain since 1833. It can be concluded that the 
potential for a large mega thrust event in the Mentawi area remains large.  Therefore, 
Padang is a large city with a high risk of being impacted by an earthquake-generated 
tsunami. Figures 15 and 16 show the latest tsunami hazard probability scenario of daytime 
population exposure to tsunami hazards. The whole coast of Padang is characterised by 
high to moderate tsunami hazard probability and population exposure to tsunami. 
 
Figure 14: Inter-seismic coupling on the Sunda arc and  
large seismic ruptures  
 
Source: Konca, Avouac et al., 2008 
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Figure 15: Tsunami hazard map for Padang  
 
Source: DLR in the framework of the GITEWS project 2009  
 
 
Figure 16: Tsunami hazard exposure: Daytime population 
 
Source: DLR in the framework of the GITEWS project 2009 
Research Methodology   
 
 
47 
 
On the other hand, in Bali the very same fault line which caused the December 26th 2004 
tsunami, where the Eurasia plate pushed over the Australia plate, runs just south of Bali, 
and some worry about the extra tension created between the plates just off south 
Sumatra, Java and Bali by the December 2004 disaster. Therefore the major tectonic 
feature in the region is the Sunda Arc, which extends approximately 5,600 km between 
Andaman Island in the northwest and the Banda Arc in the east. The island arc results 
from convergence and subduction of the Indo-Australian plate beneath Southeast Asia. 
The direction of plate convergence between Southeast Asia and the Indo-Australia plates 
is assumed to be about north-south and the overall rate of convergence is probably 
about 7.7 cm/year.  
According to further calculations based on Hamzah, Puspito et al, Imamuru (2000) data, 
there have been about 112 disastrous earthquakes and 54 tsunamis in the zones 
relevant to Bali with a total of 9,854 fatalities representing 18.2 % killed from tsunamis. 
The deadliest event in Bali was in the year 1816 with 10,253 fatalities. There is almost 
an equal number of earthquakes in the north. There are more tsunamis generated in the 
southern zones, but the tsunamis to the north are more disastrous. Table 3 summarises 
the earthquakes and tsunamis generated and the level of impacts in Bali and Padang 
respectively, compiled from different sources. The events and statistics have been cross 
checked, but do not necessarily show all the events and disasters. 
The City of Denpasar, the capital of Bali Province, is considered one of the most densely 
populated cities in this province. The recent tsunami hazard probability scenario and 
daytime population exposure to tsunamis for the southern coast of Bali are shown in figures 
17 and 18 respectively. There is a moderate to high tsunami risk potential for most of Kuta, 
South Bali. The maximum risk is located east of South Kuta and along the Sanur coast. 
Interestingly, the daytime exposure is highest to the west of Kuta and inland of the Sanur 
area. Clearly, both areas have high earthquake-tsunami risk probability. Overall, as 
mentioned by the Bali Hotel Association Tsunami Alert Coordinator11
                                                            
11 http://web3.bernama.com/ssig/news/fullnews.php?news_id=78134&news_cat=wh 
  “Bali is one of the 
world's international tourism icons, and needs to be prepared for possible tsunami 
disasters”.  
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Figure 17: Tsunami hazard map of South Bali, Guta 
 
Source: DLR in the framework of the GITEWS project 2009 
 
 
Figure 18: Exposure map of day time population in south Bali, Guta 
 
Source: DLR in the framework of the GITEWS project 2009  
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Areas  Year 
 
Earthquake 
Magnitude 
(Mw) 
Flow Depth 
(m) Death Toll 
Level of 
Damage 
Bali 
 
1816* - - 10,253 - 
1840*** - - - - 
 1859* 6.0 - - Some damage 
 1862* 7.0 - - - 
 1867*** - - 5 - 
 1875*** - - 7 - 
 1896* 7.0 - 250 - 
 1917* - - 1500 - 
 1950* 7.0 - - - 
 
1976* - - 6000 
75% of buildings 
in the area 
damaged 
 1979* - - 24 - 
Padang 
1797** 8.7-8.9 5-10 2 Several houses washed away 
1833** 8.9-9.1  3-4 
Numerous but 
unknown 
Considerable 
damage 
1861* -  - 725 - 
1935** 7.7  - 11 - 
2000** 7.9 - - - 
2005** 8.6  - - - 
2007** 7.9 - - - 
2009 7.2 - 1100 - 
 
Table 3: Statistics of earthquakes, tsunamis, and level of impacts in Bali and Padang 
 
Source:* Hamazah, Puspito and Imanura 2000; ** Konca, Avouac et al 2008;*** NewComb and McCann 1987 
3.1.3 Pilot Areas of the German Indonesian Tsunami Early Warning System 
Project 
The rational for selecting these two locations was that they are also GITEWS pilot project 
areas. The pilot areas will be used to show lessons learnt and best practices developed for 
the development of a national TEWS in Indonesia. It should be pointed out that the author 
also spent a significant amount of time in Jakarta, the capital of Indonesia. This was 
because the Tsunami Early Warning  centre (TEWC) with all the other key international and 
national institutional actors such as UNDP, UNESCO, the coordinator of the TEWS (RISTEK), 
Disaster National Management Agency (BNPB)  etc  are actually located in Jakarta. 
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3.2 Field Research Methods 
The empirical data on which the main analyses are based was collected during three stages 
of field work.  The first field trip took place in Jakarta, Indonesia over a period of six weeks 
from mid-October to the end of November 2008. The primary objective of the first mission 
was to start the process of establishing a network of actors to be interviewed. Secondly, the 
in depth and informant interviews were initiated in Jakarta with the international and 
national actors.  Thirdly, because the research permit was still in the process of approval, it 
was necessary to start engaging in the collection of data by participating in meetings, 
workshops and conferences both in Jakarta and Bali. These included observing the 
International Conference of Tsunami Early Warning: Resilience coastal Communities, 12-14 
November 2008, Nusa Dua Bali and participating in the IOC-UNESCO -IOTEWS International 
conference in working group six on preparedness.  
On returning to UNU-EHS, Bonn, Germany the research questions were re-examined and 
fine-tuned based on the first field trip experience. It was also necessary to reduce the 
number of questions as the interviewees said the interview was very long, sometimes 
exceeding three hours. In Jakarta, the researcher was briefly based at BGR/InWent12
The second phase of the field trip was very intense. It started in early January 2009 even 
though it was the rainy season with frequent flooding in Jakarta. The plan was to avoid 
planning a second field trip that would coincide with the national parliamentary and 
presidential election scheduled for the second quarter of the year. Usually the political 
campaign in Indonesia starts early and actors’ interest and priorities would probably shift 
during these times. It was also necessary to exercise basic safety and security procedures 
and avoid being in the field during these periods. The second field trip ended close to mid-
March of 2009. It consisted of three field visits. In the first two-three weeks, the in-depth, 
informant interviews, and the process of observing meetings and workshops continued in 
Jakarta with actors at international and national level. This was followed by a second field 
trip to Bali, where the author stayed in Sanur to conduct the interviews and focus group 
discussions. While operating from Sanur, the author also travelled to Nusa Dua where most 
tourism activities are concentrated.  In addition, the author also participated in another 
GTZ-IS workshop with the objective of reviewing the progress of TEWS capacity building at 
the community level and planning for the next steps. After completing the primary data 
collection in Bali, the author returned to Jakarta to organise the final field trip to Padang.  
. This 
provided the opportunity to meet different actors and strengthen the network while sharing 
useful and practical field trip advice.  
                                                            
12 Responsible for institutional development and inter-institutional capacity building for the INATEWS respectively. 
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The last field trip was more challenging because the awareness and perception of the higher 
earthquake-tsunami risks in Padang contrasted with the many poor buildings and 
inadequate infrastructure. There were few options for hotel accommodation in Padang. On 
this note, the researcher stayed at the Ambacang hotel. Several months later, on 31st 
September 2009, Padang was hit by an undersea earthquake of 7.6 moment magnitude 
which razed a large part of the city to the ground killing more than 1100 people, with as 
many as 5000 people left homeless. The five-storey Ambacang hotel collapsed like a 
pancake (Figure 19). At least 80 people were missing at the Hotel (Reuters 02.10.2009). 
One man was later rescued. Currently, no official figures for the victims killed in the hotel 
have been officially published. At that time, the researcher followed the earthquake disaster 
news with grief from Germany. The event highlights the risks many hazard-disaster–risk 
researchers constantly face on a daily basis. 
 
Figure 19: Researchers hotel in Padang city before and after the earthquake disaster  
Source: Photo-top left13, middle by Ibrahim 2009, right14
The third field trip in April 2010 was very brief and included informant interviews to fill the 
identified gaps, observations of the latest developments, participation in and feedback from 
workshops and conferences in Padang, Aceh and Jakarta, Indonesia.  
 
3.2.1 Expert In-Depth Interviews on Multiple Levels 
As a foreigner in Indonesia with limited resources and logistical support, it was important to 
be highly efficient in the data collection process. The approach adopted was “no entry 
without a strategy’’. As a first step it was necessary to develop a theoretical framework and 
broad research questions before heading for Indonesia. The main questions developed were 
based on the synthesised governance-institutions-EWS-resilience theoretical framework. 
The in-depth actor interview was the principle method of data collection at international, 
national and sub-national levels.  
                                                            
13 http://www.hotelscombined.com/Hotel/Ambacang_Hotel_Padang.htm 
14 http://islamizationwatch.blogspot.com/2009/10/indonesians-blame-earthquake-on-unlucky.html 
Research Methodology   
 
 
52 
 
The expert qualitative interview was selected as the key method for collecting primary data 
at multiple levels and cross-scales in Indonesia. Today, the expert interview is considered a 
standard method of qualitative approach in divergent fields of the political and social 
sciences, such as international relations, science and technology studies, organizational 
research, gender studies etc. It is frequently applied in empirical research (Bogner, Liitig 
and Menz 2010). Therefore, the method seems suitable compared to other methods for this 
kind of study. Normally, experts are responsible for the development, implementation or 
control of solutions/strategies/policies and may have privileged access to information about 
groups of persons or decision processes (Meuser and Nagel 1991). In other words, they 
have direct or indirect decision powers, technical knowledge in the field such as details on 
operations, rules, process knowledge and explanatory knowledge. On the other hand, the 
drawbacks of the expert interview are that the knowledge obtained is not always neutral, 
and there is also the issue of experts and counter experts. The method has rather high 
effects of interaction and is not rigorously standardised. Other weaknesses are the dangers 
of anecdotal and illustrative information. This weakness was noticed for some key high 
profile people who wanted move off the subject to explain actual experiences or events. 
Furthermore, clearly this interview method is not inter-subjectively repeatable.  
Initially, the in-depth interview consisted of 60 questions; however these were reduced to 
40 questions following the feedback and experience of the first field trip. The interview 
questions were designed with a first level giving the interviewee a chance to answer either 
Yes, No, or Unsure. The second level of interview consisted of the open-ended unstructured 
questions of What, When, how, why, who etc. In addition, for some questions there was a 
scale to rank the priority of the issue to be addressed. For example, if the interviewee said 
there was no multi-hazard framework it was important to capture if it was a low, medium or 
high priority to establish one etc. The questions were initially examined by a social science 
PhD student with sufficient years of field work experience. The questions were further 
circulated among one or two close friends to have their input and comments on the overall 
presentation and clarity of the questions.  
The selection of the interviewees depended on a combination of factors such as the degree 
of involvement in the TEWS or DM in Indonesia. Secondly, it was important to select 
different actors in the chain from international level to local level and those with similar, 
deviant views. For example, groups not in favour of a technical TEWS contrasted with 
groups or individuals favouring social aspects of TEWS and typical critics of the TEWS based 
on different aspects or field impacting issues. However, the experts selected were not 
necessarily the top experts but a mixture, as the study interviewed actors at multiple levels 
and scales such that the likelihood of any expert lacking knowledge on the issue of interest 
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was minimised while some lower actors selected were committed and probably had much 
more detailed knowledge and more time available This ensured that the sample was as 
diverse as possible, representing the entire range of the actors involved. 
The actors selected were identified through a variety of methods but initially with 
specialised conference/ workshop and meeting reviews and then gradually shifting to the 
snowballing method. Very few actors were selected based on literature review in Indonesia. 
Most interviewees selected were either initially contacted by electronic mail and by phone to 
organise the interview. This ensured that interviewees were willing to openly corporate.  
The goal and scope of the interview was introduced and briefly discussed with each actor 
interviewed. It was firmly established that the research was purely academic with potential 
recommendations for further improvements of the system, but it was made clear that there 
were no direct benefits. The interviewers were free to indicate if they would remain 
anonymous, such that their names would not be passed to third parties when writing up the 
research. In reality, very few actors actually decided to remain anonymous. On the other 
hand, some actors have been critical on some issues and there can be consequences either 
within their own organisation or between actors of different organisations. Therefore, a 
decision was made to standardise the process of reporting the interviewee’s statements. 
Hence, the names of the interviewee’s are not listed; however their respective organisations 
are indicated.  
The author did not record the interviews because it was clearly outlined that the interview 
would take two-three hours or more and there was adequate time to write down the 
responses on paper. This was an advantage to the author because it prompted listening and 
understanding and the chance to interact and stimulate discussions with a view of going 
deeper into the different issues. Depending on a recording instrument would not have 
provided the same alertness and immediate grasp of the answers. 
The sample size of the survey depended on the overall number of actors in the action 
arena. The sample size was moderate in relation to the total number of potential actors 
involved in TEWS and DM. The sample size consisted of 29 institutional actors. The 
advantage of this moderate-sized group of interviewees is that detailed and qualitative data 
can be drawn to address the research questions. It was also fairly easy to follow up with 
certain interviewees, especially non-state actors while in Germany when writing up the 
research. The in-depth interview focused on generating information on a range of issues 
from risk knowledge, to response, governance and institutional aspects of the TEWS and 
DM in Indonesia. It is also highlighted that strength, weakness, opportunity, threat (SWOT) 
analysis was carried out during the in-depth-interviews.  
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Figure 20: Researcher at the National Tsunami Early 
Warning Centre, Jakarta 
Source: Author 2009  
Figure 21: Meeting with the local government authorities 
(right) in Kuta, Bali  
Source: Author 2009 
 
 
3.2.2 Key Informant Interviews 
Some actors were carefully selected as key informants. These were the main practitioners 
in the TEWS and DM process. They were familiar with the details of all elements of the 
TEWS and DM. At the national level the key resource persons were the actors carrying out 
capacity building in the pilot areas - policy makers, chairpersons, and those facilitating 
institutional development nationally. At the local levels, key informants were the actors 
leading the implementation of activities within the community. Key informant interviews 
were mainly carried out on the telephone and by electronic mail and consisted of several 
questions and sometimes further clarifications on ongoing and changing activities in the 
field.  
3.2.3 Focus Group Discussions 
Focus group discussions are an important form of qualitative methodology to collect data 
from a group of individuals and to discuss and comment on issues based on personal 
experience on the topic of the research. They can be used to explore a range of opinions 
and views on a topic of interest. They complemented the main in-depth interview by 
providing information based on the interaction through discursive short debates between 
different actors on the different issues raised. A typical criticism of focus group discussion is 
that the researcher has less control over a group and this causes more trouble than it is 
intended to solve with contributors aiming to please rather than offering their own opinions 
(Rushkoff 2005). 
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Focus group discussions were conducted only at the local level in Padang and Bali, involving 
three to six actors mainly from the local national disaster management agency, and the 
Emergency Operations Centre. It was a suitable method to discuss issues at ground level, 
for example in capturing the actual implementation and status of TEWS/ DM at the local 
level, and difficulties and challenges encountered derived from different angles of the 
people’s perspectives on different issues. In addition, it proved particularly useful when 
there were limitations in language communications. Other participants would help in the 
translation and communication of the discussion. In one instance, the head of the local DM 
agency requested further help from his daughter, a student from Andalas University, with 
the translation and communication during the discussions. In the end, it was an exciting 
experience and was very fruitful.  
3.2.4 Interviews with Some Deliberately Selected Coastal Inhabitants 
This research focuses on inter-institutional actors from the international level to the local 
level (i.e. districts). Therefore, it was not possible to conduct a comprehensive community 
survey to address various issues such as the community participation, cooperation and trust 
in the TEWS to capture the effectiveness and the legitimacy of the TEWS. Therefore, 
considering the limitations, interviews with some deliberately selected coastal inhabitants 
were carried out along the coast of Bali and Padang to try and capture the issues of 
community preparedness in terms of their risk concern, risk knowledge, questions on living 
with the risk, risk zoning and its enforcement. The number of questions was rather small, 
targeting the local fishermen, restaurant owners and coastal tourism-related shop owners 
etc. Recent literature on the subject will be used to triangulate on the issue.  
3.2.5 Electronic Mail Survey for the Tourism-Related Sector  
 
Tourism-related activities most often take place along the coast. These activities attract not 
only tourists but a diverse range of business such as restaurants, souvenir shops, boat 
charters, fishing etc. These structures and activities are widely exposed to tsunami hazard 
and automatically fall in the tsunami high risk areas. The main economy of Bali is based on 
tourism activities. Therefore, a quantitative survey was designed to capture the status of 
the last-mile part of the end-to-end TEWS along the coast. The selection process was 
simply based on the position of the establishment in the known tsunami hazard risk zone 
and whether the establishment had an active electronic mail system on their official 
website.  
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The survey consisted of 25 closed questions focused on tsunami perception and institutional 
preparedness covering issues of risk knowledge, education and awareness activities, tourist 
concern for tsunami risk, tsunami information delivered to the establishment from the 
authorities, accuracy, and whether information was timely and clear enough to make 
informed decisions. The most important questions focused on whether the establishment 
had a tsunami receiving information system and had evacuation plans and procedures in 
place coordinated with the local authorities, and what would be their interest in arranging 
these if there were none. Other questions related to private-public partnership in this 
national effort. The survey form was sent to 50 hotel tourism-related establishments 
between the months of July-September 2009. The hotel-related establishments were free to 
indicate whether their establishment wanted to remain anonymous. It was clearly indicated 
that the establishment name would not be passed to any other third party for any other 
purposes and the survey was only for academic research. Unfortunately, the feedback was 
fairly disappointing with only 16 establishments returning the questionnaire; nevertheless 
very useful and important information could be derived from the exercise. In Padang, 
tourism activities are very low. Therefore, a similar sector survey was planned for the 
industrial sector. However, following the major earthquake this survey was cancelled.  
3.2.6 Secondary Data Collection 
Secondary data were collected from various sources such as conference proceedings, 
papers, project and research documents and reports. Data were also extracted from various 
international (i.e. World Bank) and government databases (i.e. Ministry of Finance, BMKG, 
Statistical Bureau and the National Disaster Management Agency (BNPB)) etc.  
Furthermore, it was also decided to collect and employ media material for the study.  
Figure 22 shows the overall structure of the data collected, consisting of primary, 
secondary, qualitative and quantitative data for the research. 
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3.3 Difficulties and Challenges Encountered During the Field Research 
3.3.1 Access to the Research Areas 
The procedure to obtain a research permit in Indonesia was very long, consisting of a 
number of administrative steps involving different organisations at various levels and places 
all over Jakarta. The initial problem was aggravated by the challenge to find a local research 
partner in Indonesia relevant to the study which would also satisfy the authorities in 
Indonesia. The research permit process was a very time consuming one which almost 
derailed the whole study in Indonesia. 
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Figure 22: Overview of various data collected and their sources 
Source: Author 
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3.3.2 Funding Difficulties 
The research funds were only released by the project donors on an annual basis and 
covered a maximum of six weeks only per year. This implied that field trips could not be 
extended beyond two months for each field trip per year. The other challenge was that the 
research funds were limited and it was not possible to employ translators or research 
assistants.  
3.3.3 Difficulty in Maintaining Good Rapport with the State Actors 
The TEWS and DM process is a fluid and dynamically evolving matter. Many issues on 
institutional architecture such as local regulations and SOPs were still being addressed while 
in the field. Therefore, the researcher maintained communication with different actors 
throughout the study period; however feedback was poor from national state actors once 
back in Germany but was excellent with non-state actors.  
On the other hand, one problem which emerged in the later part of the study was that on 
31st September 2009, Padang was hit by a major earthquake that killed many people and 
caused widespread damage. Much of the city was in a crisis-like situation. The local DM 
authorities, local Emergency Operations and partners’ priorities changed from preparedness 
to response and recovery following the earthquake. This disrupted normal life for many 
people, hence communication with partners deteriorated. It was rather difficult to contact 
the informants and have timely feedback as their priorities had changed, but the rapport 
from the local level gradually improved after some time.  
3.4 Data Analysis Techniques and Tools 
 
3.4.1.1 Qualitative Data Analysis 
 
A category system is first developed according to the researcher’s existing theoretical 
knowledge, concepts and research questions which are not empirically tested but have a 
heuristic function, background knowledge for a specific research situation, and empirically 
verified social theories (Kelle and Kluge 1999). However, more categories and codes 
emerge during actual data analysis.  
The data analysis process is based on the qualitative data analysis process as described by 
Powell and Renner (2003). It consists of five steps. After examining the data collected, the 
second step of the analysis focused on how all actors responded to each question within 
each topic (risk knowledge as part of the TEWS, participation as part of governance, legal 
arrangement as part of architecture etc). 
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All the data from each question was organised together by paying close attention to the 
actors’ operational level (i.e. international, national, province, district etc). As the analysis 
progressed further, a combination of techniques by either time period or event (specific 
earthquake-tsunami event) or by case (i.e. such as non-government organisations) was 
required. The third step of the analysis involved categorising the information. This involved 
identifying or grouping themes or patterns and organising them in coherent categories.  As 
the categorisation progressed, new themes were identified and were treated as sub-
categories. The fourth step included identifying patterns, connections, and relationships 
between categories and importance. The last part of the analysis involved pulling together 
all the analysis for final interpretation of the data and proposing new concepts and ideas 
(i.e. chapter 9). Since the data collected was relatively small, the software used to analyse 
and categorise the data was Microsoft Access. 
3.4.1.2 Quantitative Data Analysis 
 
Apart from the primary data collected, secondary quantitative data were also collected from 
the World Bank. Governance Indicators (WGI) based on several hundreds of individual 
variables measuring perceptions of governance, drawn from 35 separate data sources 
constructed by 33 different organizations from around the world, were also used in the 
research. Simple analysis was carried out using either SYSTAT (Statistical Analysis 
Software) or Microsoft Excel software. 
3.5 The Role of the Researcher  
 
According to Lee-Treweek and Linkogle (2000), the process of collecting data in empirical 
social science risks four key categories of danger, namely physical, emotional, professional, 
and ethnical. In regard to the fieldwork conditions concerned, the latter issue is found to be 
of particular relevance, basically due to the development-oriented project approach, the 
focus on qualitative research techniques. Each empirical social science development 
research in (and on) other cultures raises ethical problems. Hence, ethical concerns have to 
be considered fundamental when conducting intercultural development research in any 
region of the world. 
 
It is also unavoidable that the researchers incorporate their own “personal potential” into 
the research (Seiffert 2003: 257). However, subjectivity of a researcher is not viewed as an 
alarming variable which impairs research results; rather, it is part of the research process. 
Therefore, the researcher in that case exercise diligence to reduce such risks in collecting 
and in the interpretation of the data collected.  
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4. Tsunami Warning Capacities before 2004, and Governance 
in Indonesia 
 
This chapter examines a number of questions, namely: (1) What were the prevailing 
tsunami capacities before the December 2004 tsunami and how were these capacities 
exceeded? How and why were the existing coping capacities severely exceeded? 
Understanding the existing and entry conditions prior to a major disaster is important (IRG 
2009) because the resilience and vulnerability of socio-ecological systems surface during 
these critical times and analysing them closely determines to a considerable extent how 
well the socio-ecological system in question will be able to deal with shocks in future. In 
order to answer these questions a review and a detailed analysis of the UNESCO-IOC report 
document for Indonesia is revisited. The questionnaire was initially completed by diverse 
institutional actors involved in the different components of the TEWS through electronic 
communication. The questionnaire15
To capture and analyze tsunami EWS capacities, the ISDR effective EWS framework and the 
attributes of the resilience framework (Lebel et al., 2006) are employed by revisiting the 
IOC-UNESCO (2005) tsunami survey questionnaire in Indonesia. The third step analyses the 
consequences of non-operational TEWS in Indonesia in terms of impacts, while the last 
section analyses the macro level systems of governance using the World Bank’s (2008) KAM 
database and other sources.  
 was finalized through a stakeholder workshop in 
Indonesia from 29th August-2nd September 2005. The other questions addressed are (2) 
What were the hindering factors and driving forces for institutional change? (3) What are 
the environmental consequences of lack of TEWS governance, and (4) What are the 
prevailing macro level systems of governance to support the TEWS in Indonesia? 
4.1 Early Warning Capacities Perspective  
4.1.1 Risk Knowledge 
ISDR outlines risk knowledge as the systematic collection of data and the undertaking of 
risk assessment. Risk assessment and maps are common forms of risk knowledge creation. 
The risk assessment and knowledge creation process has three steps: (i) identifying the 
nature, location, intensity and probability of a threat (hazard assessment); (ii) determining 
the existence and degree of vulnerability and exposure to those threats (e.g. the physical 
and socio-economic spheres), and (iii) identifying the coping capacities and resources 
available to address or manage threats. Risk knowledge allows decision-makers and the 
                                                            
15 The document consists of 137 questions and answers from diverse institutional actors in Indonesia. 
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community to understand their exposure to various hazards and their social, economic, 
environmental and physical vulnerabilities. The question is, what was known in terms of risk 
knowledge before the tsunami disaster.  
 
Most of the destructive tsunamis (90%) in the Indonesian region have been caused by 
earthquakes (Hamzah et al., 2000). Few of them were actually caused by volcanic eruptions 
and landslides that occurred in the sea. On the other hand, a rather unique, and interesting 
trans-oceanic tsunami occurred in 1883, killing more than 36,000 coastal inhabitants 
following the violent eruption of the Krakatau volcano. Indonesians have a relatively good 
historical record of past earthquakes and tsunamis. Therefore, tsunami sources and history 
were fairly well known by Indonesian scientists before the recent major tsunami disaster.  
 
On the other hand, tsunami characteristics were not adequately studied by the local 
scientists in Indonesia before 2004. Nevertheless, although there was a lack of accurate 
and high resolution bathymetry and topography data for the coastlines, some numerical 
modelling studies have been carried out to calculate tsunami inundation along certain 
selected coasts in Indonesia. Tsunami modelling was initiated as part of the collaboration in 
modelling the 1992 Flores tsunami. The Indonesian scientists have successfully modelled 
several tsunamis that occurred before and after the 1992 Flores tsunami. Clearly, the 
Indonesian scientists had scientific capabilities in tsunami hazard identification and 
modelling.  
Vulnerability and risk assessment for tsunami hazard were scarce in Indonesia. The ones 
that existed include the study of Flores which was hit by the 1992 tsunami, and that in 
Banyuwangi in 1994. The survey suggests that in reality the risk assessments were more 
hazard-specific assessments with limited focus on vulnerability.   
The communities in Indonesia were largely unfamiliar with tsunami hazards and risk 
knowledge, although there is an interesting traditional tsunami story from Simeulue Island 
(UNESCO 2005). Therefore, the existing tsunami hazard-risk knowledge was poorly 
communicated to the communities at risk but had circled around academic circles at 
universities, workshops and conferences only.  
4.1.2 Monitoring and Warning of Tsunami Hazards 
The core responsibilities of BMG (now BMKG) are to assess, formulate and facilitate a 
national policy and coordinated activity in the field of Meteorology, Geophysics, Climatology 
and Air Quality. BMG consisted of three divisions under the Deputy for Data and 
Information System, namely (1) the Division of Earthquakes (2) the Division of Engineering 
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Seismology and Tsunamis, and (3) the Division of Geophysics. BMKG had an operational 
seismograph network to monitor local and regional seismicity and evaluate earthquakes 
using conventional methods. The only near real-time seismological equipment in Indonesia 
capable of providing an early warning was on the island of Java, installed in 1996, but it had 
no telephone line following office relocation in 2000. In addition, BAKOSURTANAL operated 
a network of 60 permanent sea level stations under the Global Sea-Level Observing system 
(GLOSS) programme in cooperation with the National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Administration (NOAA). However, the sea level stations were not in real-time mode, only 
transmitting by Global Telecommunication System (GTS) every 15 minutes to the central 
monitoring site. BAKOSURTANAL carries out data processing and analysis based on the 
GLOSS standard; however during that time there was no capability at BMKG or 
BAKOSURTANAL to download GTS transmitted data, and decode and display them in real-
time. Furthermore, BMKG did not have tsunami operational warning levels and basic criteria 
to determine whether a tsunami warning should be issued or not. 
4.1.3 Dissemination and Communication 
The dissemination and communication phase is to ensure the community at risk are warned 
in advance to explicitly and implicitly promote appropriate protective behaviour (Rodriguez 
et al 2004) and this measures the efficiency and effectiveness of the EWS. Dissemination 
and communications systems are critical to ensure that people and the communities are 
warned in a timely manner of the impending risk. As indicated above, Indonesia and all the 
Indian Ocean Island countries were not institutionally linked in real time with the existing 
tsunami warning centres such as the Pacific Tsunami Warning Centre (PTWC) and the Japan 
Meteorological Agency (JMA). Hence, it is well known that failure of regional dissemination 
and communication was the key reason that Indonesia and all the Indian Ocean countries 
were not alerted in a timely manner. 
On the other hand, in Indonesia, the survey indicated that internal communications 
between key BMKG staff were activated during extreme events using unregistered 
commercial cell phones. However, there were no internal dedicated notification systems or 
backup systems such as through radio links. For external communication to other 
authorities there were no dedicated and reserved telephone lines for dissemination and 
communication. BMKG issues marine forecasts and warnings (e.g. storm and gale warnings, 
weather bulletins, etc) to the Port Authority of the Department of Transportation, and 
Directorate General for Sea Transportation, and also broadcasts through the radio system 
of the Department of Fisheries to mariners and coastal zone users in their region using the 
International Maritime Organisation (IMO) standard. Weather information is routinely 
dispatched to newspapers on a daily basis. In the context of tsunamis, there was no proper 
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language format for tsunami warnings or guidelines on how to issue a warning to the 
general public. There were no coastal sirens for alerting people about incoming tsunamis 
anywhere in Indonesia.  
4.1.4 Emergency Response Capability 
The survey also indicated that there was no designated agency for receiving and acting 
upon any local or international advisory message from any tsunami warning centre. 
However, BAKORNAS at the national level was involved, but was not legalised by law in 
providing information and actions to be implemented down at provincial level by 
SATKORLAK and district level by SATLAK in the case of a disaster. Inter-institutional roles 
and responsibilities were absent and there were no criteria to be used by the existing 
emergency authority (i.e. SATKORLAK and SATLAK) to determine whether an evacuation 
should take place or not.  
In addition, actors indicated that no critical infrastructure or lifelines were identified to 
support minimal government services after a destructive tsunami or other natural disaster. 
It is also clear that drills, simulations and exercises were not part of the Indonesian culture 
to prepare for disasters. Media-related interactions in sharing knowledge of tsunami 
hazards; mitigation and preparedness were rather ad-hoc and limited to tsunami disaster 
reporting only. According to the survey, awareness through tsunami memorials, museums, 
interpretative signs or other public reminders of past tsunami impacts had never been 
realised.  
It is important to highlight at this point that Symonds (2005) pointed out that in the few 
countries in which contacts were established to alert to the possibility of a wide scale 
tsunami on the 26th December 2004; the actual response was disorganised and lethargic. 
The few who were aware of the dangers were hampered by lack of preparation, 
bureaucracy and inadequate infrastructure. Others either did not know how to interpret the 
warning signs, or were indifferent to them. 
4.1.5 Governance and Institutional Arrangements  
The 1945 constitution of the Republic of Indonesia forms the basis of providing public 
welfare to the people of Indonesia. On the other hand, the national coordinated 
arrangements for natural disasters emerged back in 1966 by the establishment of an 
Advisory Board for Natural DM. Its activities were focused on emergency relief for disaster 
victims (see figure for the evolution of institutional change in Chapter 5). In 1979, a decree 
transformed the Advisory Board for DM to the National Natural DM Coordinating Board 
known as BAKORNAS PBA. It was directly responsible to the President and chaired by the 
Tsunami Warning Capacities before 2004, and Governance in Indonesia 
 
 
64 
 
Coordinating Minister for the People’s Welfare. The 1979 Decree also included the 
establishment of a similar arrangement at the provincial (SATKORLAK) as well as district 
levels (SATLAK). A Presidential Decree No. 43/1990 was issued as an amendment to the 
previous decree (28/1979) to improve and facilitate integrated sectors related to disasters, 
including back-up from the armed forces. The organization was called BAKORNAS PB. On 2 
September 1999, Presidential Decree No. 106/1999 was issued as an amendment to the 
previous Presidential Decree No. 43/1990, which had not included the management of 
human-induced disasters or social unrest. In order to facilitate this additional scope, 
BAKORNAS PB became BAKORNAS PBP and the number of members of the BAKORNAS PBP 
was extended to 13 ministers and related governors. As the coordinating body, it is 
important to underline that BAKORNAS did not have direct implementation or policy-making 
functions.  
The Disaster Management and Coordination by Presidential Decree No.111/2001 was 
intriguingly chaired by the army commander at the respective level. He reported directly to 
the governor or the district/county head or the mayor. The actors and agencies of the 
committee are composed of representatives of the relevant sectors, such as the Police, 
Public Works, Health Service, Social Welfare, Civil Defence, Local Logistics Service, Water 
Supply Company, Electricity Company, Telecommunication Company, etc.  The authority of 
the committee in terms of decision-making, policy-making, and advice were on the 
shoulders of BAKORNAS, who had the decision-making and policy-making authority with 
three main tasks: (1) policy formulation (2) coordination and (3) providing guidelines and 
directives to SATKORLAK and SATLAK to implement the decisions of BAKORNAS at 
provincial and local levels. However, the survey clearly shows that there were no legitimate 
laws, local regulations, standard operating procedures, or a legitimate warning chain in 
Indonesia for managing hazard risks prior to the December 2004 tsunami disaster.  
4.2 Capacities from a Socio-Ecological Resilience Perspective  
 
The TEWS should not only be designed according to the four main elements, but must also 
satisfy the attributes of socio-ecological resilience capacities (Lebel et al., 2006). Therefore, 
the attributes of resilience from the socio-ecological perspective (i.e. knowledge, 
uncertainty, threshold, scale, self organisation, fit, learn and adapt) are also examined and 
discussed. 
Very often individuals or groups of people including scientists are ridiculed for their 
knowledge and for warning about ‘uncertain’ risks at global, national and local levels. This is 
captured by a statement made to the media by a leading tsunami researcher Vasily Titov in 
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the US following the tsunami disaster, “Tsunami is always on the agenda... Only two weeks 
ago it would have sounded crazy. But it sounds very reasonable now” (New York Times 
31.12. 2004). In October 2003, Australian-based seismologist Dr. Phil Cummins requested 
the International Coordination Group for the TWS in the Pacific to extend its reach to the 
Indian Ocean. However, he was ‘rebuffed’ in a meeting in New Zealand with a rapid 
declaration that such an expansion would mean redefining the group’s terms of reference 
(ToR) and instead the group voted to  establish a “sessional working group” to study the 
problem (New York Time 31 .12. 2004). Furthermore, at the national level and sub-national 
levels, Samith Dhamasaroj, then Director General of the Thailand Meteorological 
Department, was branded “crazy” and sidelined and banned in some provinces from 
entering their territories by senior officials as they claimed he was damaging their image 
with foreign tourists for suggesting an EWS (The Internationalist 2005). Interestingly, the 
outcome also highlights the issue and question of how to achieve successful risk 
communication governance under knowledge uncertainty as outlined by the Integrated Risk 
Governance Framework (2005). 
On the other hand, theoretical academic knowledge and understanding did not clearly 
capture the issues of knowledge uncertainties and critical thresholds of ecological systems. 
For example, the famous Ruff and Kanamori earthquake models (1980) indicated that the 
Sumatra subduction zone’s maximum earthquakes were predicted to be of around 8.3 
moment magnitude based on the age of the subducting plate in millions of years and the 
convergence rate in centimetres/year. This theoretical earthquake threshold was 
surprisingly exceeded on 26th December 2004.  
Furthermore, even estimating earthquake size in real time is also an uncertain science. For 
instance, even the initial earthquake size of December 2004 was estimated at only 8.0 
moment magnitude. Consequently three minutes later a message was sent to other 
observatories in the Pacific notifying all countries that the quake posed no threat of a 
tsunami to the Pacific. An hour later, the centre revised its initial estimate of the size of the 
tremor from 8.0 to 8.5, and issued a second alert, warning of a possible tsunami in the 
Indian Ocean. It took several days to estimate accurately the real size of the earthquake at 
9.2 moment magnitude. The estimation depends on a number of parameters ranging from 
the density of the network seismographs and the details of the earthquake size estimation. 
This clearly suggests the operational limitations and uncertainties which need to be 
addressed in developing a TEWS.  
On the other hand, scale as an attribute of resilience is understood as the ability to engage 
effectively at multiple scales and is crucial for regional systems because they are invariably 
subject to powerful external influences, including changes in regulations, investments, and 
Tsunami Warning Capacities before 2004, and Governance in Indonesia 
 
 
66 
 
the environment (Berkes 2002, Young 2002). There was little exchange and effective 
interaction between Indonesia and the countries involved in the Pacific tsunami warning 
system. This partly explains why TEWS proposals for the Indian Ocean were simply shelved 
or stalled for lack of funds and due to technicalities (New York Time 31 .12. 2004). In 
Indonesia, institutional actors were not actively engaged and collaborating vertically and 
horizontally on the issues of tsunami risk and disasters.  
A TWS has existed in the Pacific Ocean since the late 1940s. The NOAA Pacific Tsunami 
Warning Centre (PTWC) was established in 1949, following the 1946 Aleutian Island 
earthquake and a tsunami that resulted in 165 casualties in Hawaii and Alaska. In 1964 
another earthquake generated a tsunami killing hundreds of people in Alaska. Soon after, 
the TEWS was substantially upgraded. Therefore the Pacific countries have self organised, 
learned and adapted their developments to their surrounding environmental tsunami risks. 
In contrast, the Indonesian people did not self organise, learn and adapt from their many 
past tsunami experiences (Tables 2 and 3). This implies that the existing system did not get 
better at pursuing a particular set of management objectives over time and at tackling new 
challenges.  
On the other hand, the traditional knowledge about tsunamis among certain islanders was 
not replicated and shared in Indonesia. The capacity to translate traditional experiences 
(i.e. knowledge domain diversity) of the islanders into formal knowledge to fit and adapt 
into formal institutions (i.e. disaster management structures, schools) and the wider society 
about the ecological processes has been neglected. 
The question is how to build such resilience capacities against the uncertain tsunami risks in 
Indonesia. Symonds (2005) argued that the Pacific region enjoys the presence of the 
superpowers such as the United States and Japan which have huge resources and social-
political economic order to deal with the tsunami risk, which is in great contrast to the 
Indian-Asia region where the same social and economic and political order condemns 
billions of people to wretched daily poverty. It is indeed highlighted that Section 4.5 
explores the governance system that will implement and support the TEWS in terms of 
socio-technological, economic and political dimensions in comparison with that of Japan and 
the United States, two countries with decades of operational tsunami warning systems. 
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4.3 The Hindering and Driving Forces for Institutional Change  
4.3.1 The Hyogo Framework for Action (2005-2015) 
According to UNDP (2009), discussions on legal reform on DM were well underway in 2003 
between UNDP, OCHA, BAKORNAS PB and MPBI. However, at this time, UNDP was dealing 
with conflict-affected areas in Indonesia. UNDP clearly points out that “Political will was not 
yet conducive... and interest in resolving national security in the form of regional conflict 
and acts of terrorism”. 
However, in early 2005, the Indonesian-ASEAN foreign minister ‘initially’ signed the Hyogo 
Framework for Action (2005-2010) in 2005. The Hyogo Framework is the global governance 
framework for DRR. It is reported that donors such as UNDP subsequently realigned their 
programmatic priorities and contributed substantial funds specifically for DRR within their 
portfolios parallel to this process (UNDP 2009). UNDP initially provided support from 2005-
2009 to the legal reform process through its Emergency Response and Transitional 
Recovery (ERTR) programme. This allowed the drafting of the DM law and familiarisation 
workshops for parliamentary committee members and a deliberation process. However, the 
question is, what motivated actors and the people of Indonesia to officially sign the HFA and 
subsequently institutionalise changes in DM?  
4.3.2 An Extreme Shock 
Extreme catastrophes provide opportunities for change, and create long-term resilience 
(Birkmann et al., 2009). The 26th December 2004 tsunami was a catastrophe in terms of 
lives lost and coastal damage in Indonesia, thus clearly qualifying as an extreme shock.  
To understand the impact of the tsunami disaster a statement of UNISDR is revisited: 
 “... ten Southeast Asian countries, including Indonesia, have finally completed the HFA 
agreement after five years of negotiations since it was initially signed by the ASEAN foreign 
minister in 2005, just a few months after the tsunami struck the Indian Ocean into a 
binding agreement....Political will is decisive to reduce disaster risks...”. The statement 
suggests that the HFA was only officially signed just a few months after the tsunami 
disaster because at that time there was political commitment.  
In addition the Indonesian DRR platform also outlines that “the initial idea to form a DRR 
platform (PRB Planas) in Indonesia emerged after 2006, because many people realized that 
as a nation living in disaster-prone areas, Indonesia needs a vehicle to integrate the 
knowledge of government and disaster management stakeholders....”  
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It is also clear that “domestically, Indonesia’s impetus for legal reform for DM and DRR was 
drawn from the coalescence of actor’s perceptions in the post-tsunami emergency response 
and subsequent rehabilitation and reconstruction phase”(UNDP 2009).  
Furthermore, in a report on evaluation and strengthening of Early Warning Systems in 
countries affected by the 26 December 2004 Tsunami, ISDR (2006) underlines that “the 
strategy aims to capitalise on achievements to date and ensure the continuation of 
collective inter-agency efforts and enhanced linkages and partnerships..... the future 
strategy identifies specific outcomes, building on the ongoing tsunami early warning 
initiative, and addressing the needs and gaps identified in the national needs-assessment 
reports, as well as areas that require further enhancement on a long-term basis. 
In this context, it is argued that the extreme shock had a significant influence and impact 
on the actor’s perceptions and decision-making process. It helped a decisive and swift final 
agreement to be reached on the HFA. This consequently allowed donors to change project 
priorities and shift funds for DRR, hence providing new incentives for actors in order to 
speed up the DM reforms not only in Indonesia but also in India, Sri Lanka etc.  
4.4 Consequences of Lack of Governance in Disaster Risk Preparedness 
 
The Grand Scenario (RISTEK 2005) reports on the destructive tsunamis caused by 
tsunamigenic earthquakes while Tables 2 and 3 lists the number of fatalities and the level of 
destruction from earthquake-tsunami. A recent record from BAKORNAS PB for the period of 
2003-2005 shows that the geological tsunami-related disasters comprise only 6.4 % of the 
total; however, they are high impact disasters causing tremendous loss and fatalities. The 
official statistics in Indonesia show that more than 128,728 people were killed, 179,312 
houses destroyed, 500,970 people were displaced, with total, economic losses of US$4,270 
million from the December 2004 tsunami only. This highlights the consequences of lack of 
governance in disaster risk preparedness characterised by persistent failures in minimising 
damage costs and safeguarding human security, with far reaching impacts on sustainable 
development.  
4.5 Systems of Governance Perspective in Indonesia  
Symonds (2005) argued that the Pacific region enjoys the presence of superpowers such as 
the United States and Japan. According to Symonds these two countries have great 
resources and the social-political economic order to deal with the tsunami risk which is in 
great contrast to the Indian-Asia region where the social and economic and political order 
condemns billions of people to wretched daily poverty. Hence, this section examines this 
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argument which is also a central question in this study about the systems of governance 
that will implement and sustain TEWS in Indonesia. In order to investigate the political, 
socio-technological and economic dimensions of governance in Indonesia,  macro level data 
from the World Bank KAM (2008) database16
4.5.1 Political Governance System in Indonesia 
 and other sources are employed to analyse 
the three dimensions of governance systems (i.e. political, economic and socio-
technological). World Governance Indicators (WGI) of the World Bank KAM (2008) database 
provide a useful tool to assess governance challenges and monitor reforms, and understand 
the causes and consequences of good governance. 
4.5.1.1 Decentralisation  
 
It is very important to grasp the merits and notion of decentralization as part of the political 
governance system and how it is being implemented in Indonesia, along with the existing 
challenges. Firstly, decentralisation supporters point out that the decentralisation process 
will result in greater efficiency and equity and responsiveness centred on local people’s 
participation in local decisions on programs, projects, investment and management and 
ultimately more socially and environmentally sustainable development (Blair 1998, Manor 
1999, Oates 1972, Tiebout 1956, Webster 1992). Decentralisation increase government 
decisions making the process closer to the citizens (Fox & Aranda 1996, World Bank 1997). 
Decentralisation is fundamentally a strategy of governance to facilitate transfer of power 
closer to the people (Ribot el al., 2006) and is therefore closely linked with democratic 
mechanisms and processes (Smoke 1999) such that aspirations of people are met. 
Decentralisation enhances the ability to solve regional and local problems while central 
government will have more time and energy to deal with globalisation and promote the 
interests of the country. However, case studies reveal that most decentralisation reforms 
suggest that the institutional arrangements to meet such a desired outcome are rarely 
observed (Agrawal 2001, Agrawal & Ribot 1999, Larson & Ferroukhi 2003, Ribot 2002, 
2003, 2004; Ribort & Larson 2005). Ribot et al., (2006) underlines that most 
decentralisation is either flawed in the concept or faces strong resistance from diverse 
actors, mainly from state central actors and agencies which make policy and 
implementation choices that serve to preserve their own interests and powers.  
                                                            
 
16 http://info.worldbank.org/etools/kam2/KAM_page3.asp?default=1 
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The notion and goals of decentralisation are the political acts whereby the central 
government formally transfers powers to actors and institutions at lower levels in a 
political–administrative and territorial hierarchy (Mawhood 1983, Smith 1985); such that 
local actors can exercise a certain degree of autonomy (Booth 1985, Smoke 1993). 
Decentralisation is therefore characterised by a significant transfer of power, and downward 
accountability of local authorities is central to it (Agrawal & Ribot 1999, Ribot 1995a, 1996). 
Any power-related strategies used by the central government to undermine, obstruct or 
weaken the ability to transfer power, resources, and local capacities are viewed as 
authoritarian-centralised behaviours. 
However, prior to the late 1990s, under President Suharto’s leadership, Indonesia ensured 
highly central domination in a single or unitary state. The main focus was on developing 
and maintaining a sub-national administration and government which could be controlled by 
central agencies. Devas (1997) points out that the Indonesian governance was not only 
highly centralised but also highly complex.  In 1974 the government introduced a policy of 
gradual decentralisation with Law No.5; however, in reality it was viewed mainly for further 
maintenance of control and could be termed as devolution in which political power was not 
decentralised (Rohdewohld 1995, Devas 1997). Such governance was instrumental and 
supported national development for three long decades. The sub-national territorial 
divisions of Indonesia are the province, the district and the sub district. The central control 
was under the responsibility of the Ministry of Home Affairs, a national ministry with a local 
agenda (Morfit 1986). Accountability was upward and was obscured from the public view. At 
the sub-national level, the heads of regions were simultaneously heads of central state 
agencies and were appointed and responsible to the President rather than elected by sub-
national assemblies. The assemblies of the provinces and districts operated more as a 
deliberative decision-making body of popularly elected representatives. Members were not 
accountable to the electorate. 
However, the once rigid and highly centralised system ultimately proved itself unable to 
cope and respond to the financial and economic crises that swept across Southeast Asia in 
1997 (Rasyid 2004, Mera 2004). In 1998, real GDP contracted by 13.7 %. This resulted in 
widespread and uncontrollable social unrest, with anti-government demonstrations by 
students. Nationwide rejection of the regime emerged. Suharto’s unitary authoritarian rule 
came to an end when students were killed in the social violence in Jakarta. Rasyid claims 
that the failure of the government was mainly caused by the lack of time to observe, learn 
and understand the global financial and economic crises as the central government was 
wasting time dealing with provincial and local problems.  
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His vice-president, B. J. Habibi, succeeded Suharto and quickly endorsed the policy of 
decentralisation by passing two laws which would have the most profound effect on 
governance in Indonesia. They were approved by parliament to empower provincial and 
local governments. These are Law No. 22 on Regional Autonomy and a supporting Law No. 
25 on the financial balance between central and regional government. In principle, the law 
No.22/1999 on Regional Autonomy allows all authorities to be decentralised, except security 
and defence, foreign affairs, fiscal and monetary, justice, and religious affairs. The 
exception added to this law is found in Article No.7, Law No.22/1999 which states that the 
central government is also responsible for policies to organise national planning and 
development, allocate financial subsidies to the regions, strengthen the national system of 
economic institutions and public administration, promote human resource development, 
control the exploitation of natural resources, and determine the use of high technology and 
national standardisation.  On the other hand Article No. 11 of Law No.22/1999  ensures that 
municipalities and regencies are obliged to execute authority in the fields of public works, 
public health, education and culture, agriculture, transportation, trade, and industry, 
investment, environment, land administration  and labour affairs. Only Aceh and Papua are 
exempted from the two laws, and are given status through special autonomy. Furthermore, 
decentralisation has been regulated through the Law No.32 /2004. 
These two laws fundamentally reversed three decades of centralism and authoritarianism 
and had the potential to transform the country completely (Turner 2001).The 
decentralisation was notable for its scale and speed and was known as the “Big Bang”. 
Another reason for the sudden “Big Bang” seems to be linked with the desire of resource-
rich provinces such Aceh to break away from the control of Jakarta, and such a strategy 
was decisive in keeping all regions of the country united (Mera 2004).  
The implications of the decentralisation in Indonesia include the dissolution of the 
hierarchical relationship between the province and the districts, implying they are 
autonomous regions with a wide range of functions and can communicate directly with the 
central government and responsible sub districts (Turner 2001). In this context the local 
assemblies are locally elected with more legislative powers and an expanded role. Heads of 
regions are now elected and accountable to the local assemblies and the local citizens 
rather than the central agency or President as in the past, with the responsibility to foster 
democratic governance and encourage participation and partnership with the civil society. 
The head of the district government ceases to report to the governor of the province and is 
elected by and responsible to the locally elected assembly. Provincial governments, i.e. 
governors, continue to report to the central government.  The district government absorbs 
most of the de-concentrated central government functions. The autonomous regions can 
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structure their organisations according to their own preferences. In order to deal with the 
consequences of Law No.22, Law No. 25/1999 abolishes two leading transfers from central 
government for paying public servants and routine expenditures and the funds for 
development projects are replaced by a General Allocation Fund which is at least 25% of 
domestic revenue, where 90% is budgeted for the districts and 10% to provinces according 
to a formula. A special allocation fund may be used to fund special initiatives in the region 
and loans.  
It was feared the bold decentralisation initiatives would fail on a number of critical issues 
due to the brevity of the two laws, rapidity of implementing them, and the context into 
which they were introduced. The problems most feared included (1) revenue-expenditure 
imbalance since new sources of revenue were given to local governments, (2) insufficient 
local government capacity to deliver services, (3) unwillingness of central civil servants to 
work for local governments, (4) accountability of elected local officials, (5) central 
leadership in fiscal relations, and (6) the lack of implementing regulations. However, 
nothing dramatically catastrophic happened (Mera 2004) but there were various forms of 
misunderstanding and uncertainty about the powers in the light of the long history of 
centralised government, conflicting interpretations of the law, conflicts in natural resource 
management etc.   
These two laws leading to decentralisation have had enormous implications and 
consequences in the way disaster and risk management have evolved in Indonesia, 
especially in the context of how new laws, legislation and policies of disaster risk reduction 
are developed, enacted, implemented, and enforced and how actors and institutions at 
various levels come together to deal with hazards, risks and disasters. At the same time the 
most important concern is how the decentralisation policies affect and determine the 
institutional arrangements and hierarchy structure of the DRR and the TEWS chain process. 
On the other hand there are specific indicators that define the political dimension, and these 
include accountability, political stability and absence of violence, government effectiveness, 
regulatory quality, rule of law and corruption. These political governance indicators are 
therefore explored.  
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4.5.1.2 The Voice of Accountability17
 
  
Since 1999, Indonesia has had a multi-party system. Twenty-seven new political parties 
were registered at the department of Law and Human Rights in the 2009 election18
One of the most promising aspects of Indonesia in the post-Suharto era is the birth of 
hundreds of new print and broadcast media throughout the country during the past five 
years. The passing into law of Press Law No. 40/1999 represented a positive move away 
from the formerly restrictive legislation governing the Indonesian media. However, legal 
cases recently brought against media professionals highlight continuing flaws in the 
Indonesian legal system and indicate disturbing attempts to restrict fundamental rights to 
freedom of expression
. Local 
assemblies are locally elected with more legislative powers and an expanded role while 
heads of region are now elected and accountable to the local assemblies and the local 
citizens rather than to the central agency or President as in the past. The emergence of civil 
associations in Indonesia on a national scale (Faud 2002) is believed to be an important 
ingredient for a healthy, democratic and sustainable society. The voice of accountability has 
improved greatly in recent years, as evidenced by the smooth passage of the 2004 and 
2009 elections (Jakarta Post 29.08.2009).  
19
 
 and opinion and the public's right to access to information 
(Amnesty International 2003). Media-Press Freedom can be viewed as ‘partly free’, rated as 
4.14 out of 10 compared to Japan and United States at 8.14 and 9.14 respectively 
according to World Bank KAM data (2008). Media–press freedom is very important because 
it provides the opportunity to cover various angles of view and is a tool for pressing for 
transparency and accountability. The media impacts on risk perception and policy, and 
communication between risk assessment and risk management. However, despite the 
apparent success, World Bank KAM (2008) data shows Indonesia is ranked with a voice of 
accountability of 4.29 compared to Japan and the United States with 7.57 and 8.29 
respectively. In this context, the voice of accountability is just below the average level in 
Indonesia.  
 
                                                            
17 Voice and Accountability captures perceptions of the extent to which a country's citizens are able to participate in selecting their 
government, as well as enjoy freedom of expression, freedom of association, and a free media. Ten represents the highest voice of 
accountability while one is the lowest on the scale. 
18 http://www.indonesiamatters.com/723/new-political-parties/. 
19 Amnesty International believes that these cases represent the most serious threat to press freedom in Indonesia for almost a decade, and 
is urging the Indonesian government to take the steps necessary to uphold fundamental rights and avert  backsliding into a more restrictive 
environment. 
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4.5.1.3 Political Stability and Absence of Violence20
 
 
In the post-Suharto era, the stability of Indonesia's political and civil institutions has been 
strengthened. This has resulted from the devolution of political power to local governments, 
implementation of a well-managed system of fiscal decentralization and a deepening of 
democracy within an ethnically and religiously heterogeneous state. Indonesia’s politics 
have become much more stable in recent years. The public are satisfied with elections and 
they perceive them as fair, as indicated in a recent exit poll survey of 92% from the 
Indonesia Survey Institute's (LSI) in 2009. The overwhelming satisfaction rate is imperative 
to give legitimacy to the ruling government for the next five years and this suggests that 
“the threat of political instability going forward is minimal” (Jakarta Post 29.08. 2009).  
However, conflicts such as the terror threat of the early 2000s continue to exist from 
separatist and sectarian groups (Business Monitor International 2009). The latest terrorist 
attack on July 17 in 2009 at Jakarta hotels after four years of quiet are shocks, but not 
excluded in the overall risk estimation in Indonesia (Moody's Investors Service 2009). The 
latest actions do not reflect widespread political instability since the political and security 
responses to several large scale incidents of terrorism, from earlier this decade, have 
eroded21
 “In many terms, the Indonesian politics is highly volatile especially when it comes to 
human rights and issues of separatism and independence. There are political struggles 
going on in Papua, Aceh, Central Sulawesi, West Kalimantan, and many other places like 
Maluku province” (Interview 29, 23 May 2010).  
 the lethal terror network, but the risk of sporadic incidents, as is evident, has not 
been fully eliminated. It is found that political stability is Indonesia is rated fairly low at 
1.57 compared to Japan at 9.21 and the United States at slightly above the average at 
6.36. Further, questioning of the very poor political stability is examined. One social 
scientist from Indonesia argues: 
Violent conflicts continue unabated. Very recently, the military killed one pro-independence 
leader of West Papua22
                                                            
20 It is understood as capturing perceptions of the likelihood that the government will be destabilized or overthrown by unconstitutional or 
violent means, including politically-motivated violence and terrorism 
. Indonesia has made attempts to reform the army. However, the 
army General Djoko Santoso warned that “the greatest threats to Indonesia’s security are 
domestic issues and maintaining unity" (Reuters 24.01.2008). Hence, this explains the low 
ranking of political stability in Indonesia by the World Bank in 2008.     
21 Terrorists targeted the President of Indonesia due to the government's decision on the execution of three Bali bombers 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2009-08/08/content_11848477.htm 
22 http://www.etan.org/issues/wpapua/2010/10012wpap.htm 
Tsunami Warning Capacities before 2004, and Governance in Indonesia 
 
 
75 
 
Political stability should be viewed as an important element here because it is a social 
practice where human needs and securities are constantly contested and fought over (Bohle 
2007) and it has strong links to the other elements of good governance such as 
participation, mediation, negotiation etc. In these struggles, the relationship between any 
victims or acts of agency in the context of tsunami resilience building could become a 
central issue.  
4.5.1.4 Government Effectiveness23
 
 
The World Bank rated Indonesia’s government effectiveness at 3.79, compared to Japan 
and the United States with 8.66 and 9 respectively.  McLeod argues that a return to 
sustained, rapid economic growth will require an overhaul of Indonesia's bureaucracy and 
judiciary, along with the legislatures, the military and the state-owned enterprises. To 
reform the civil service it will be necessary to undertake a radical overhaul of its personnel 
management practices and salary structures, so as to provide strong incentives for officials 
to work in the public interest. Government effectiveness is a very important issue which will 
be elaborated on further in this research.  
4.5.1.5 Regulatory Quality  
 
In the context of regulatory quality24, the McKeever Institute of Economy and Policy 
Analysis (2006) argues that the Government of Indonesia can say all it wants to attract new 
businesses, but the bottom line is that people will always be reluctant25
 
 to do business in 
Indonesia knowing that they must deal with a highly corrupt government system. These 
conditions are based on laws and regulations that are often vague and require substantial 
interpretation by implementing offices, leading to business uncertainty for all (McKeever 
Institute of Economy and Policy Analysis 2006, Embassy of the United Sates, Jakarta 2000).  
Extensive red tape makes it very time-consuming to set up a business in Indonesia. 
According to World Governance Indicators, the time taken to start a business is 105 days in 
Indonesia compared to 6 days in the United States. The issue of regulatory quality is 
important when considering developing partnership programs and cooperation with the 
various partners such as the private sector and International actors. 
                                                            
23 Captures perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence from political 
pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the government's commitment to such policies. 
24 Captures perceptions of the ability of the government to formulate and implement sound policies and regulations that permit and promote 
private sector development 
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4.5.1.6 Rule of Law 
 
Since 1998 the Indonesian constitutional order has undergone an almost complete 
transformation characterised by four constitutional amendments which have laid solid 
foundations for the rule of law, including a human rights catalogue, judicial and 
constitutional review of legislation, and independence of the judiciary. However, 
enforcement of the law is vaguely tarnished by corruption. The judiciary is still notorious for 
corruption, and human rights violations are common. In short, there is no 'living' rule of law 
culture26. This is reflected closely in the low rating of the World Governance Indicators of 
2.07 in the rule of law. However, according to the University of Indonesia27
4.5.1.7 Corruption  
, the rule of law 
situation differs widely from one district to the other and there is in particular a lack of 
knowledge of the way in which actors at regional and local levels use the legal avenues 
opened up to them by the recent reforms. 
 
Corruption28
                                                            
26 http://www.knaw.nl/indonesia/pdf/Rule_of_Law.pdf 
  in Indonesia deserves very close attention because it is the indicator with the 
lowest governance rating of 1.79 out of 10 in Indonesia (World Bank KAM 2008)  having 
diverse negative impacts on all levels of governance. It also affects development assistance 
by causing severe social and economic costs and lack of confidence in the government. 
According to a report from World Bank on fighting corruption in Indonesia, Enhancing 
Accountability for Development (2003) Indonesia suffers from a very poor international 
reputation regarding corruption, ranking near the bottom alongside the most corrupt 
countries in the world. It is also perceived as doing worse over time in controlling 
corruption. The new openness of a democratic Indonesia may have overly influenced 
current corruption perception; however the corruption originates from colonial times and 
became institutionalized under the New Order of President Suharto which now continues to 
flourish by exploiting the many new opportunities in the fluid environment of Indonesia’s 
simultaneous political and economic transition (World Bank East Asia Poverty Reduction and 
Economic Management Unit, 2003). New laws and a more vigilant parliament are beginning 
to strengthen the hands of those politicians who wish to control corruption in the ministries 
and agencies of government. Nevertheless, the efforts have dissipated because of poor 
reflective credibility on corruption among the political parties. Indonesia’s strongly party-
orientated political system means that accountability is to party bosses rather than to 
constituents, and the high cost of campaign finance now drives the corruption beast (World 
27 As above 
28 Captures the perceptions of the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand forms of 
corruption, as well as "capture" of the state by elites and private interests. 
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Bank East Asia Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Unit 2003). Meanwhile, even 
the World Bank questioned corruption in Indonesia in the context of “Development 
Assistance: Part of the Problem or Part of the Solution?” Fortunately, the World Bank has 
revisited its own strategy for development assistance to Indonesia by improving project 
design to empower those fighting corruption in Indonesia. Clearly, corruption may reduce 
development assistance for an EWS and DRR and have deeper consequences on various 
services such as institutional enforcement of rules, as will be shown later.  
4.5.2 Economic Governance System in Indonesia 
There is a general consensus (Kahn 2005, Raschky 2008) that economic development 
mitigates the effects and impacts of natural disasters, especially in reducing death. If 
economic development is exclusively planned and has a collective social purpose with due 
consideration of widespread security of livelihoods and environmental enhancement then 
the result can be a reduction in disaster risk (Wisner et al., 2004). The investment climate 
indicator covers institutional rules such as the risk of expropriation or contract laws. The 
main reason to include this indicator (Raschky 2008) stems from the idea that property 
rights are key determinants for an efficient allocation of resources, which is also important 
to natural hazard management. Globally, much work is now devoted to a societal risk-
transfer mechanism through disaster insurance and relief to reduce financial losses. In 
regions without institutionalised insurance regimes, risk-transfer against natural hazards 
depends on the individuals and politicians and on where government disaster assistance can 
lead to the problem of “charity29
4.5.2.1 The Gross Domestic Product (GDP) Growth 
 hazard” management (Raschky 2008). 
 
The GDP is a good indicator of a country's overall economic development. Indonesia has the 
largest economy in Southeast Asia, and is one of the emerging market economies30
 
 of the 
world. Its normalised GDP growth between 2002-2006 was 5.76%, outperforming the 
United States and Japan with their GDP growth of 2.45 % and 0.86 % respectively (World 
Bank KAM 2008). Indonesia is rich in a variety of commodities, ranging from agricultural 
products to metals and natural gas. Indonesia’s per capita GDP is US$2,000. In addition, 
private consumption as a percentage of GDP in Indonesia is around 65%, which is greater 
than in India (around 60%). It is important to highlight that Business Monitor International 
(2009) forecasts Indonesia’s per capita GDP rising to around US$6,200 by 2018.  
                                                            
29 Depending on foreign aid 
30 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Indonesia 
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4.5.2.2 Composite Risk Rating, Local Competition and External Debt 
 
On the other hand, the Composite Risk Rating, from September 2006-August 200731 based 
on an overall index of 22 components of political, financial and economic risk shows that 
Indonesia’s composite risk rating is moderate32
4.5.3 Social and Technological Governance System in Indonesia 
 at 69.76 while the intensity of local 
competition in Indonesia is remarkably high in comparison to the United States and Japan 
(World Bank KAM 2008). On the other hand, Indonesia is rated as a good debtor nation, 
always finding a way to service its debt (McKeever Institute of Economy and Policy Analysis 
2006). The government debts totalled 61.04 billion USD up until December 2005. The 
country’s total external debt has been steadily decreasing since 2002 from about 65.7% of 
GDP to a projected 41.6% by the end of 2006.  
4.5.3.1 Public Health and Education 
 
Public health and safety is also of concern due to the increasing number of factories with 
poor environmental policies (McKeever Institute of Economy and Policy Analysis 2006). 
There has been a rise in tuberculosis, with at least half a million new cases of tuberculosis 
per year in Indonesia. Indonesia’s HIV/AIDS crisis is threatening to become a full-blown 
epidemic, while malaria affects up to 20 per cent of Indonesians. More than 100 million 
people lack adequate sanitation, and more than 40 million people do not have access to 
safe drinking water sources (UNICEF 2006). The level of infant mortality has been cut in 
half from 60 per 1000 in 1990 to about 30 per 1000 in 2004. On the other hand, the 
prolonged economic crisis in Indonesia plus the limited availability of funds caused the 
Indonesian Government not to implement its nine-year compulsory education program for 
elementary and junior high school children.  This has resulted in a decreasing number of 
students of school age actually attending school, and even fewer making it to college. In 
1998-1999 the percentage of school age children (13-19) not in school rose from 33 to 
38%. The adult male literacy rate is reported to be 92%, and for females it is 83%. 
 It is widely established that poverty is related to vulnerability; however the concept of 
vulnerability has a broader remit that also embraces cultural and social components 
(Chambers 1989). Other social factors of exposure such as living in a nation with a higher 
level of educational attainment and openness for trade are less vulnerable to disaster 
(Skidmore and Toya 2007). 
                                                            
31 See International Country Risk Guide 
32 Composite Risk Rating: Very high risks (00.0 to 49.9), high risk (50.0 to 59.9), moderate risk (60.0 to 69.9), low risk (70.0 to 79.9), and 
very low risk (80.0 to 100). 
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4.5.3.2 Income Level 
Officially, the income level for government jobs is low. The McKeever institute of Economy 
and Policy Analysis suggests this is part of the reason many people turn to corruption. 
Additionally, any small increase in wages has been offset by the high inflation in recent 
years. Salary is an important incentive to the actors of the TEWS because it determines how 
actors of various specialisations change jobs or migrate between institutions which could 
have critical impacts on the efficiency and sustainability of the TEWS. Actors commented 
that their salaries had not increased despite new responsibilities. In addition, some actors 
pointed out that the state actors are very ‘volatile’ in job positions; however it was found 
that the brain drain is surprisingly quite low. 
According to the World Food Program33 (WFP), out of a population of over 245 million 
people, 52 percent live on less than US$2 per day with an estimated 35 million poor people 
who live on less than US$0.65 per day. The number of the ‘near poor’ in Indonesia is 
estimated to be 115 million. Approximately 28% of children under the age of five are 
malnourished. Despite steady progress being made on the UN Millennium Development 
Goals, Indonesia is still designated as a low-income, food-deficit country. Overall, Indonesia 
falls slightly below the poverty line in terms of the poverty index34
4.5.3.3 Transportation and Communication System 
 with a normalised value 
of 4.31 out of 10 (World Bank KAM 2008) while the Human Development Index is low at a 
normalised value of 3.62 compared to the high HDI of the United States and Japan ranked 
above 9.0 (World Bank KAM 2008). Indonesia was ranked 107 out of 177 countries in the 
UNDP’s 2007/2008 Human Development Index. 
The road network and traffic are important indicators of how fast the community at risk can 
be evacuated in case of emergency and also how rapidly the emergency authorities can 
attend to the impacted population facing a crisis. Only 57% of the roads35
In a country survey
 are paved in 
Indonesia, while traffic jams have emerged as a key problem in the big cities of Indonesia. 
In an earthquake in 2005, KOGAMI, a local NGO, reported a traffic jam even three hours 
after a warning and evacuation guidance was issued in Padang city. 
36
                                                            
33 http://www.wfp.org/countries/indonesia 
, Britannica Almanac in 2003 claims that most parts of the country 
have reasonable access to a variety of media and communication systems. Radio broadcast 
 
34 The Poverty Index measures deprivation in three essential dimensions of human longevity, literacy and decent standard of living (% of the 
population without sustainable access to improved water resources and children underweight for age. NB: The poverty index is different in 
developed countries, where it accounts for social exclusions such as unemployment etc. 
 
35 Source: World Development Indicators database, April 2009 
36 http://www.country-data.com/  
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stations and radio sets were numerous in Indonesia in the early 1990s. There were some 
530 medium-wave, around 140 short-wave, and 28 Frequency Modulated (FM) privately 
owned stations and some 26 million radio receivers. Recent World Bank KAM data from 
2008 indicates that 360 out of 1000 people have telephones, while 290 have mobile 
telephones, and Indonesians are buying new cellular phones at a growing annual rate of 
11%37
4.5.3.4 Innovation Systems  
. The number of computers and internet users is very low at 10 and 70 per 1000 
people respectively. The percentage of households with a TV is reasonably high at 65.4 %. 
The electronic communication system is rated at 2.78 compared to electronic 
communication governance of 6.7 and 9.04 in Japan and the United States. The 
communication system of governance is a key element which needs to be improved in the 
context of end-to-end EWS.  
The number of scientific and technical journal articles38
By considering a composite (See Figure 23) of the World Bank KAM (2008) indicators across 
the three governance dimensions (i.e. political, economic and socio-technological) it is 
found that economic governance (i.e. GDP growth, Composite Risk, External Debt etc) is 
the strongest governance dimension in Indonesia while slightly below average in the socio-
technological governance system (i.e. Poverty Index, Human Development Index health 
and Innovation systems). The political governance dimension (i.e. Voice and Accountability, 
Political Stability, Control of Corruption, Regulatory Quality, Rule of Law Government 
Effectiveness, Press Freedom) is the weakest governance system in Indonesia. However, 
the important issue to note is that Indonesia is moving up in all the key indicators of 
political governance (i.e. Political stability, Voice and Accountability, Control of Corruption 
and Government Effectiveness, Rule of Law etc) and in fact now outperforms other 
countries in the region on voice and accountability. Indonesia’s ranking shows that the fight 
against corruption, terrorism, and poverty is a long-term effort. Overall, there is a relatively 
wide governance gap between Indonesia compared to the United States and Japan, who 
have managed to run TEWSs for decades. It is clear that the economic dimension is the 
most promising; however for maximum positive impacts on the effectiveness and 
sustainability of the TEWS, all three governance systems need to be addressed collectively.  
/million of people plus University-
Company Research Collaboration should help in boosting the country’s innovativeness. 
Currently, Indonesia is rated fairly low in both areas compared to the United States and 
Japan (World Bank KAM 2008).  This partly explains why Indonesia relies heavily on 
imported technology and expertise from other countries to build its own TEWS. 
                                                            
37 McKeever Institute of Economy and Policy Analysis, 2006 
38 There are many local publications  
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Figure 23: Systems of governance between Indonesia, the United States and Japan 
Source: Author 
 
4.6 Summary of Chapter 4 
It has been established that the existing coping capacities of Indonesia were severely 
exceeded on the 26th December 2004 due to a combination of factors ranging from lack of 
attention to issues such as knowledge, uncertainty, critical thresholds, and the element of 
surprise. Consequently, different scales of governance also failed. The Indonesian people 
generally did not reorganise, learn and adapt from many of their past tsunami experiences. 
Experience and traditional knowledge were exclusive and not replicated informally or 
formally to fit into the national institutions. Risk knowledge was limited to only hazard 
assessment, and communicated only among academics and practitioners in the rooms of 
universities, workshops and conferences. Observation and warning methods were too slow 
to fit and match the ecological challenge. There were no operational warning alerts while 
risk communication and dissemination systems and standard formats were lacking both 
externally and internally. Disaster preparedness organisational activities and efforts were 
rather ad-hoc, fragmented, and uncoordinated while cooperation across levels and scales 
was lacking. Clearly, there were no institutional and governance frameworks to deal with 
tsunami risks and disasters and consequently the community at risk were totally 
unprepared even if they could have been alerted in a timely fashion. 
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The main factors which have inhibited institutional progress in EWS/DRR in Indonesia 
include the issues of national security and social conflict, the challenges of implementing 
the decentralization policies and the subsequent lack of political commitment, funding and 
resources. It is argued that the extreme shock and scale of the tsunami disaster provided 
the impetus and opportunity for the actors to negotiate for the final settlement of the Hyogo 
Framework for Action (2005-2015) providing the key driving incentive mechanism towards 
the enactment of the DM law including an EWS. The usual path dependency characterised 
by persistent failures was no longer accepted as a way to live with the risk. 
There is a relatively wide governance gap between Indonesia compared to the United States 
and Japan which have had operational TEWSs for decades. This underlines the challenge 
Indonesia has to face to support and sustain such an effective TEWS. It is clear that the 
economic dimension is the most promising system of governance if could also serve for a 
social purpose; however for maximum positive impacts, all three governance systems need 
to be addressed collectively. The exiting decentralisation system will strongly determine and 
shape the architecture of the EW chain and DRR in Indonesia.  
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5. Emerging Architectures for the Tsunami Early Warning 
after 2004 in Indonesia  
 
In this chapter the emerging designs and architectures supporting the TEWS in Indonesia 
after the 2004 tsunami disaster are examined and discussed. In order to address the issues 
above, this chapter raises questions relating to (1) What is the emerging TEWS design 
strategy and what are main weaknesses? (2) What are the key multi-level institutional-
governance arrangements, frameworks and structures to support TEWS in Indonesia (3) 
How is performance of institutions affected by their embedding in larger architectures? 
5.1 The Grand Scenario and the German Concept of the Tsunami Early Warning 
System 
 
In 2005, following the IOC-UNESCO survey visit and recommendations, the Ministry of 
Science and Technology of Indonesia-RISTEK with the participation of various Indonesian 
Institutions (i.e. RISTEK, ITB, BAKOSURTANAL, BMKG, and BPPT) spearheaded the design 
concept of the Indonesian Tsunami Warning System known as the Grand Scenario (RISTEK, 
2005-a). Ideally, the Grand Scenario would consist of three main components: (1) the 
monitoring of earthquakes through a seismic network, (2) oceanographic monitoring system 
through a network of buoys of different types to detect abrupt changes in pressure at the 
ocean bottom or changes in the level of the surface, and (3) database and tsunami 
modelling. The Indonesian Grand Scenario considers dissemination of information as a 
supporting component of the TEWS. In addition, the Indonesian Grand Scenario mentions 
risk knowledge in the broader context of preparedness, but is rather limited in details.  
 
On the other hand the German Indonesian Tsunami Early Warning System (GITEWS) is one 
of the major projects to implement part of the concept of the Indonesian Grand Scenario, 
especially in adopting the novel technology from Germany for the monitoring and 
forecasting component of the TEWS. The GITEWS project concept is shown in Figure 24. 
The conception integrates terrestrial observation networks of seismology and geodesy with 
marine measuring processes and satellite observation. It is pointed out that the GITEWS 
project concept did not explicitly address risk knowledge and communication, or 
communication and dissemination and response as central elements of the TEWS. 
Nevertheless, substantial project activities have focused on tsunami modelling, and risk 
map preparation and capacity building program for preparedness spearheaded by GTZ-IS at 
the local level. In the following section, the GITEWS concept is elaborated.  
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Figure 24: Concept of the GITEWS component parts 
 
 Source: GITEWS39
5.1.1 The New Monitoring and Warning System  
  
5.1.1.1 Tsunami Observation and Operational Procedures 
A two-step procedure will be used to forecast tsunamis due to the speed of travel of seismic 
waves and the challenge of detecting any sea level deformation to confirm any tsunami 
generated. In the first step process, in the event of an earthquake in the region, a network 
of seismic in-situ instruments (Figure 25) will record and send fast seismic wave data to a 
central station at BMKG40
 
 in Jakarta. 
Figure 25: Indonesian seismic network  
 
 Source: BMKG 2010 
                                                            
39 http://www.gitews.org/index.php?id=22&L=1 
40 Change of name from BMG to BMKG. The new responsibility is in climatology 
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The seismic processing is carried out via a new processing and forecasting procedure in an 
automatic fashion using a novel expert Decision Support System (DSS) as illustrated in 
Figure 26. It is developed by the German Aerospace Agency (DLR) to compute key seismic 
parameters of the earthquake such as epicentre, location, magnitude, depth and focal 
mechanism via an integrated new software programme called SeisComP3 developed by 
scientists at the GFZ in Germany. In addition, the expert Decision Support System (DSS) 
which is at the heart of the technical warning system will be used at the time of an 
earthquake to match and compare the signature and consequence of the real earthquake 
with the database of hypothetical earthquakes of different sources and its simulation 
scenarios to decide whether to issue a warning or not, and to assess inundation and impact 
areas. In addition, new software known as “TsunAWI” has been developed at the Alfred-
Wegener Institute for Polar and Marine Research in Germany. It depicts the wave 
propagation and tsunami inundation in a novel and rapid way based on an unstructured 
triangular finite element method, which allows for a very flexible discretization and which 
does not need a nested model like other mainstream models (Chaeroni, Pranowa and 
Behrens 2008). A multitude of scenarios covers the possible tsunami events, so that in the 
case of an emergency a pre-computed scenario approximates the actual situation.  
 
 
 
Source: DLR in the framework of the GITEWS project 2008 
 
 
Figure 26: TEWS Decision Support System (DSS) 
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A match can be made within seconds while the ever improving data availability during a 
tsunami event continuously stabilizes and completes the picture of actual prevailing 
conditions. A rapid overview is gained and a visual display of the situation is shown on 
several monitors, together with recommendations for action. The DSS is geared for 
application in a crisis situation to enable fast and reliable decisions to be made under high 
time pressure and stress conditions.  Extensive databases hold, in addition to general geo-
data, advanced processed risk information and hazard maps. If a close match is identified, 
according to the Grand Scenario an initial warning is issued within five minutes. 
5.1.1.2 The Tsunami Operational Warning Alert Levels  
 
Within the tsunami operational warning procedures, a warning segment system of the 
coastline defined according to administrational boundaries is used as the smallest warning 
unit for which tsunami threat information is aggregated and for which warning products 
may be available (Figure 27). The 
current definition of warning 
segments for the coastline of 
Indonesia along the Indian Ocean 
covers 125 warning segments for 
Sumatra, Java and Bali. 
Warning segments can be set to 
specific states of warning levels in 
connection with the dissemination of 
warning products (e.g. warning 
messages). The warning levels 
depend on the expected or confirmed 
tsunami threat. Which warning level is assigned during the decision proposal generation 
process depends mainly on the height of the wave at the coastline. The tsunami warning 
computed on the DSS has three grading levels consisting of: (1) advisory for tsunami in the 
range 0-0.5 meter, (2) warning for likely tsunami in the range 0.5 -3.0 meters, (3) major 
warning for likely tsunami greater than 3.0 meters. 
Therefore, the warning centre issues tsunami information based on the predicted tsunami 
height at the coast in under 10 minutes (T41
                                                            
41 T: Time period 
<10 min). The second step of the warning 
procedure takes several more minutes and involves measuring and processing the ocean 
parameters from several deep sea buoys positioned along the coastline (Figure 28 upper 
 
Figure 27: The tsunami warning segments in Indonesia 
Source: BMKG 2009 
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panel). It is the responsibility of BPPT to determine if a tsunami has been generated or not, 
and communicate the information to BMKG.  
If a tsunami passes the 
underwater pressure gauge the 
data are sent to buoys at the 
surface and passed on from there 
to the central warning centre. At 
this point, for a period between 
10-30 minutes, (10<T<30 min) a 
second message would 
theoretically be disseminated and 
communicated to confirm or 
cancel the first message. If a 
tsunami has been confirmed, 
citizens should execute partial or 
full evacuation depending on 
whether it is a warning or a major 
warning. Once the offshore waves 
are measured by the tide gauges42
If a tsunami is detected by a buoy, in line with the Grand Scenario, it is foreseen that 
international warnings will be dispatched to the neighbouring countries and a confirmation 
of a warning will be sent to the coastal communities at risk and areas to be impacted within 
ten minutes of earthquake generation (RISTEK 2005). Information on potential impacts of 
the tsunami is also assessed using the expert decision support system.  
 
(lower panel of Figure 28) located 
near the island before they reach 
the mainland, a third tsunami 
message will be disseminated and 
communicated within a period of 
30-60 minutes (30<T<60 min) after the occurrence of the earthquake. A fourth, all clear 
message from BMKG will be disseminated and communicated within a period of 1-10 hours 
(1.0<T<10.0 hours). 
 
                                                            
42 A new feature (not available in the US and Japanese TEWS) of the TEWS is that all tide gauges have been equipped with GPS receivers – to 
detect and determine the vertical and horizontal displacement immediately, including the mechanism of the earthquake ground displacement 
and possible tsunami to be expected 
 
 
Figure 28: Tsunami meters (top) and regional sea level monitoring 
networks (bottom) 
Source: BMKG 2009, Tsunami meter network redrawn by Author 
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After much effort, the monitoring and forecasting part of the TEWS, which was spearheaded 
by GITEWS, was inaugurated on 11th November 2008, less than four years after the 
catastrophe of 2004 in which approximately a quarter of a million people lost their lives. 
The system was officially handed over to the BMKG by the President of Indonesia, Susilo 
Bambang Yudhoyono, in the Indonesian capital, Jakarta.  
5.1.2  National Dissemination and Communication Systems 
 
According to the Grand Scenario, the Information and Communication Technology (ICT) 
comprises two main bases: (1) upstream43 data communication (UDC); and (2) 
downstream44
By focusing our attention on the (DIC), the process includes the management of 
information among regional centres, national centres, and government and authoritative 
officials in the local and national levels. Observed data transmitted to the national centre 
will be conveyed to the president, ministers, police stations, local government officials, 
mosques, churches, temples, army stations, post offices, cellular operators, TV stations, 
and radio stations.  
 information communication (DIC). The UDC has five main components: an 
equipment sensor, data submission, a regional centre, a national centre, and media 
transmission. The equipment used for data acquisition may be located in the sea or on the 
land.  
Currently, the warning message consists of information on location, depth, size of 
earthquake and information on whether a potential tsunami has been generated or not. 
According to BMKG, through standard operating procedures, the tsunami information is to 
be disseminated through various communication and dissemination systems such as 
terrestrial line radio link, Global System for Mobile Communications (GSM), terrestrial line 
satellite, and fibre optic and wireless local area network (WLAN) to the interface institutions 
such as police headquarters (POLRI), governors, DEPDAGRI, BAKORNAS, TV stations, radio 
stations and harbour authorities. The interface institutions will disseminate information 
further downwards to the community through a series of standard operating procedures. 
The community can receive information through sirens, radio, TV, Short Message Service 
(SMS), Frequency Modulation Radio Data System (FMRDS), electronic mail, speakers, police 
sirens etc. It is noted that BMKG will also issue tsunami information such as warnings 
directly to the community through the different media outlets. 
 
                                                            
43 Observation and Forecasting  
44 Communication and dissemination system to the public 
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There are currently a total of 140 radio internet (RANET) stations that can receive tsunami 
information in Indonesia. There are a total of 44 tsunami sirens (Figure 29) of which 19 are 
government owned while the rest belong to a private company (i.e. Sanken/Milano-
Telekomsel). This implies that non-state actors have contributed significantly to establishing 
the siren network along the tsunami-prone coast. 
 
 
 
The major weakness identified at this point is that both the Indonesian Grand Scenario and 
the GITEWS project treat dissemination of information as a supporting component of the 
TEWS. As indicated in the effective EWS framework, dissemination and communication 
(Figure 5) is a key element of the EWS. The implications of such an approach will be further 
explored in the following chapters. 
5.1.3  Response Strategies 
In the Grand Scenario, the response strategies are captured in terms of the nine major 
components involved in disaster preparedness. The Grand Scenario points out of a plan, 
response mechanisms, public education and training, rehearsals etc; however no details are 
provided for each component. The Grand Scenario itself recognises that these components 
provide a basis upon which a national disaster preparedness strategy can be developed.  
Figure 29: National network of coastal sirens in Indonesia 
Source: BMKG 2009 
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5.2 The Institutional Legal System in Indonesia 
 
At this point, it is necessary to first introduce the history and institutional legal system in 
Indonesia before examining the DM and TEWS-related architecture. Before the Dutch 
colonization in the sixteenth century, indigenous kingdoms ruled the archipelago 
independently with their own traditional laws, known as adat. Foreign influences from India, 
China and Arabia have not only affected the culture, but also impacted on the customary 
adat laws. The Dutch presence and subsequent occupation of Indonesia for 350 years has 
left a legacy of Dutch colonial law, largely in the Indonesian civil code. Following 
independence in 1945, Indonesia began to form its own modern Indonesian laws based on 
the precepts of existing laws. As a result, these three components (adat, Dutch-Roman law 
and modern Indonesia law) still co-exist in current Indonesian laws. 
Indonesian legislation takes different forms. According to Tabalujan (2002) the official 
hierarchy order of Indonesian legislation (from top to bottom) is enumerated under Law No. 
10, Year 2004 on the Formulation of Laws and Regulations. The 1945 Constitution (Undang-
Undang Dasar 1945 or UUD'45)  is the highest in the order, followed by  the Law (Undang-
Undang or UU) and Government Regulation in Lieu of Law (Undang-Undang), Government 
Regulation (PP); Presidential Regulation (Perpres) and at lower level are the Regional 
Regulation (Perda). In practice, the formal legal system also includes Presidential 
Instruction (Inpres), Ministerial Decree (Kepmen) and Circulation Letters (Surat Edaran), 
which sometimes conflict with each other.  
 
The 1945 Constitution emerged after the end of the Japanese control during World War II. 
It is the highest legal authority in Indonesia, and executive, legislative and judicial branches 
of government must refer to it. It was abrogated by the Federal Constitution of 1949 and 
the Provisional Constitution of 1950, but restored after President Sukarno's decree on July 
5, 1959. During the 32 years of Suharto's administration, the constitution remained 
unchanged, but the People's Consultative Assembly passed a law in 1985 requiring a 
national referendum for constitution amendments. In 1998, after Suharto's fall, the People’s 
Consultative Assembly amended the constitution four times in 1999, 2000, 2001 and 2002. 
The significant amendments included direct presidential election by the people (third 
amendment) and changing the presidential office term from being unlimited to only two 
terms (first amendment). The fourth amendment gave more power and control to the 
People's Representative Council over the executive branch, and the Regional 
Representatives Council was established, regional government was recognized, and an 
expanded section on civil rights was introduced. Currently, the constitution consists of 16 
sections and 36 articles.  
Emerging Architectures for the Tsunami Early Warning after 2004 in Indonesia 
 
 
91 
 
On the other hand, Undang-Undang is simply the laws that can only be established by the 
People's Representative Council or DPR. The executive branch (the President) can propose a 
bill (Indonesian: Rancangan Undang-Undang or RUU) to the DPR. A small task group is 
created by the DPR to discuss the bill as part of the process to turn the bill into law. Once 
an agreement is reached, the President should endorse a bill into law. If the President does 
not endorse the bill that has received joint agreement the bill is automatically enacted as 
law in thirty days and can be promulgated as such. When an agreement cannot be reached 
to enact a bill into law, the bill cannot be proposed again during the current term of the 
legislative members. 
5.3 Multi-Level Architecture for Disaster Management in Indonesia 
5.3.1 The National Mechanisms for Multi-Sector Participation 
The Global Governance Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR) is the Hyogo 
Framework for Action (HFA) 2005-2015. HFA was adopted by the member states of the 
United Nations in January 2005 in Kobe, Hyogo, Japan. Its overarching goal is to build 
resilience of nations and communities to disasters by achieving a substantive reduction of 
disaster losses by 2015. The HFA offers five areas of priority for action - guiding principles 
and practical means for achieving disaster resilience for vulnerable communities in the 
context of sustainable development. These are:(1) Ensure that disaster risk reduction is a 
national and a local priority with a strong institutional basis for implementation, (2) 
Identify, assess, and monitor disaster risks, and enhance early warning, (3) Use knowledge, 
innovation, and education to build a culture of safety and resilience at all levels, (4) Reduce 
the underlying risk factors, and (5) Strengthen disaster preparedness for effective response 
at all levels. 
The United Nations General Assembly has called for the implementation of HFA and 
reconfirmed the multi-stakeholder participation system of the ISDR and the Global Platform 
for DRR to support and promote it. Many regional bodies have formulated strategies of 
regional scale for disaster risk reduction in line with the HFA.  More than 100 governments 
have designated official focal points for the follow-up and the implementation of the HFA 
(March 2007). Some have taken action to mobilize political commitment and establish 
centres to promote regional cooperation in disaster risk reduction. 
 
In this context, the Indonesian-ASEAN foreign minister initially signed the HFA in 2005. 
However, it was only recently that all the countries in the region, including Indonesia, 
agreed to the leading framework in DRR that will enhance regional cooperation and nations’ 
capacities. It will also increase the technical cooperation among member states and 
establish an ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance on DM.  
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The establishment of the DRR platform in Indonesia (PRB Planas) was initiated in 2006. The 
DRR platform45
5.3.2  Regional Architecture for Tsunami Early Warning System Coordination  
 in Indonesia was declared official in November of 2008 to operate as a 
national mechanism for multiple stakeholders, acting as an advocate of DRR at different 
levels. The platform for DRR is currently being familiarised in Indonesia through public 
exposure. It is clear that the HFA is a non-binding international legal agreement while DRR 
platforms can be viewed as a mechanism to support the HFA goals.  
The IOC General Assembly XXIII in Paris, 21-30 June 2005, confirmed the immediate action 
and response to the 2004 tsunami and adopted resolutions to create three46
Together with the existing system for the 
Pacific and other relevant UN bodies they will 
also contribute to the work of a global 
coordination group on tsunamis and other sea-
level related hazard warning systems (TOWS). 
The Intergovernmental Oceanographic 
Commission of UNESCO (IOC-UNESCO) 
received a mandate from the international 
community to coordinate the establishment of 
the system during the course of several 
international and regional meetings, including 
the World Conference on Disaster Reduction 
(Kobe, Japan, 18 – 22 January 2005).  
According to UNESCO, the IOC Assembly, during its twenty-third session (21-30 June 
2005), formally established the ICG/IOTWS through Resolution IOC-XXIII-12.  
 new regional 
Intergovernmental Coordination Groups (ICGs) for the Indian Ocean, the North-East 
Atlantic and Mediterranean as well as the Caribbean to establish a basin-wide TWS (Figure 
30).  
The ICG for the Indian Ocean Tsunami Warning System ICG/IOTWS is a primary subsidiary 
body of the IOC, which was created and governed by the governing body comprising 28 
member states from countries bordering the Indian Ocean. Thus, the IOC provides 
secretariat support to the ICG/IOTWS. Membership of the ICG/IOTWS is open to member 
states bordering the Indian Ocean, other interested IOC member states as observers, and 
                                                            
45 During the field survey, I attended a DRR platform meeting where the debate and discussions were focused on developing mission and 
vision statements for the DRR platform in Indonesia. 
46 In addition to the TEWS in the Pacific Ocean 
47 http://www.ioc-tsunami.org/content/view/34/1034/ 
 
Figure 30: Global-regional governance of tsunami 
Source: IOC-UNESCO47 
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invited NGOs and other organizations. The system is fully owned by Indian Ocean countries 
and based on international and multilateral cooperation. It facilitates open and free data 
exchange and is transparent and accountable to all the countries. The IOTWS function is 
based on joint operation of international networks of observation connected with the 
national tsunami warning centres.  
5.3.3 The Disaster Management Law and Regulations in Indonesia  
As indicated in Chapter 4, the disaster management (DM) Law No.24 was enacted in 2007 
in Indonesia. According to UNDP (2009) as early as 2005, it was reported that the DM law 
was ranked priority 55 of 234 pieces of legislation for the parliament. Later in 2005, the DM 
law which also covers early warning was elevated rapidly to the seven top national 
priorities. It was introduced to the Indonesian House of Representatives by the legislature 
where it was approved and enacted on 27th April 2007 with an unusually smooth passage 
and only limited opposition.  
The DM law 24/2007 provides a comprehensive basis on the rules of the game in disaster 
management in Indonesia. The key highlight of the law is that it provides protection as part 
of the people’s basic rights, and designates the government to be the duty bearer. It 
expresses the State’s constitutional duty to render protection from disaster risks. It 
provides for DM to be an integrated part of development and governance. This is to be 
accomplished through reducing risks, mostly when there is no disaster, while at all times 
the system is charged to be better prepared to respond to and recover from the impacts of 
disasters. In addition, the law makes provision for the establishment of DM agencies at 
different levels to be equipped with a robust mandate, authority and resources. When a 
state of emergency is declared, these agencies are to be provided with special access to 
wide-ranging special powers including mobilization of response assets, influencing customs, 
immigration and quarantine and, when necessary, exerting “command” over sectors and 
locales.  
To this end several regulations have been enacted to support the DM law No 24/2007. The 
deliberations which followed on the enactment of the DM law 24/2007 in working groups 
consisting of UNICEF, OCHA and IFRC were encapsulated in the Government Regulation 
(PP) 21/2008 on International Cooperation in Disaster Management. The other derivatives 
of law are three additional Government Regulations (PP) and one Presidential Regulation 
(Perpres). These are PP 21/2008 for DM arrangements, PP 22/2008 for DM financing and PP 
23/2008 which deals with DM external support. The Presidential Regulation, Perpres 8 / 
2008 stipulates the creation of the National DM Agency. Other regulations include the 
Minister of Home Affairs Regulation No.46/2008.  
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5.3.4 Early Warning and Risk Reduction Institutional Arrangements 
It is underlined that in the context of the INATEWS, the Indonesian actors had previously in 
2006 provided a legal framework for INATEWS development through decree SK: 
21/KEP/MENKO/KESRA/IX/2006 enabling progress in the TEWS development even in the 
absence of the DM law which was enacted in 2007. Of major importance to this research is 
article 46 of Law 24/2007 which stipulates that EW shall aim to take quick and appropriate 
DRR actions to prepare emergency response actions, and which refers to observation of 
disaster signs, analysis of results from disaster sign observation, decision-making by the 
authorities, dissemination of disaster warning information and community actions. This 
implies that EW should be integrated into the Indonesian DM system. These legal 
instruments highlight the government’s intended commitment and prioritisation towards 
DM.  
Another very important legal instrument of the DM law and one that is closely linked to the 
EWS concerns the planning and management of human settlements which incorporate DRR 
including enforcement of building codes. According to the DM law No.24/2007 article 32 
paragraph 1, the government may determine that the disaster-prone areas shall come 
under prohibition for settlement, and or revoke, in part or completely, anybody’s propriety 
right in accordance with legislation, although they will have the right to compensation. 
BNPB is the legitimate authority to prepare and stipulate disaster risk analysis requirements 
according to Article 41(1) and carry out monitoring and evaluation (i.e. Article 41(3)). The 
implementation and enforcement of spatial structures is underlined in Article 35 (f) and 
aims to reduce disaster risk including the applications of the regulations of the spatial 
structure, safety standards, and the imposition of sanctions on violators. Separate legal 
arrangements also exist specifically for spatial planning and will need to be addressed later 
in the study. In the penal provisions, Article 75 of the DM law details the penalties for 
negligence in failing to carry out disaster risk analysis in the event of a disaster later on.  
5.3.5 The Hierarchy and Evolution of Institutional Arrangements  
It is noteworthy to understand the hierarchy of the DM in the context of the legal system in 
Indonesia. Figure 31 shows the hierarchy structure of the institutional arrangements related 
to DM from the 1945 constitution of Indonesia which represents the highest legal system of 
the land, DM law, supporting regulations and Decrees. It is pointed out that the 
Government Regulation is of higher order compared to Presidential Regulations or Decrees. 
On the other hand, Figure 32 maps out the key institutional changes related to DM since the 
1945 constitution of Indonesia up to 2009. In appears that there is a decadal pattern of 
institutional reform related to DM in Indonesia prior to 2005. It is observed that from 1999-
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2004, institutional development in DM was lacking, overshadowed by the “big bang” 
decentralization challenges in Indonesia; however there have been constant legal 
arrangements to support DRR since 2005.  
 
          
 
Figure 31: The hierarchy order of the DM legal system in Indonesia 
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5.3.6 Institutional Financial Arrangements and Frameworks for Disaster 
Management 
Adequate financial arrangements are a key indicator of the government’s priorities and 
political commitment. According to the transportation minister the installation of a 
nationwide TEWS will cost about Rp1.3 trillion, equivalent to US$142 million (Antara 
20.07.2007). The international partners have committed tremendous financial support 
through multilateral and bilateral loans/grants to support not only the development of the 
TEWS (i.e. US$ 60 million from Germany, US$ 16.6 million from the United States and 
other significant contributions from the French and Japanese governments) but also major 
financial contributions were offered for the development of the legal reform and DRR. These 
funded activities included consultancy in drafting the law, workshops and deliberations 
between the years of 2005 to 2007. Furthermore, UNDP (2009) reports that their ongoing 
funding partners; the Australian Agency for International Development (AusAID) and the 
Department for International Development (DFID) are providing US$ 18 million towards the 
development and enactment of the subordinate ancillary regulations and to develop safer 
communities to strengthen DRR to achieve the HFA as part of a five-year program. Other 
substantial amounts include the US$ 42 million and another US$ 5 million from the AusAID 
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for disaster reduction activities and projects. The highest financial budget was contributed 
by 15 donors and managed by the World Bank following the December 2004 tsunami 
disaster, and these funds were especially for reconstruction and recovery. A comparison of 
financial expenditure between international actors and that of the Indonesian Government 
reveals a wide gap in disaster-related financing.   
Following the enactment of the DM law No 24 in 2007 there are two Government 
Regulations that define institutional financing of DM in Indonesia. These are the 
Government Regulation PP 22/2008 on DM Financing and PP23/2008 on DM External 
Supports in Indonesia (Figure 33). Therefore, the former regulation legitimises national 
financing while the latter deals with international support, either through multilateral and 
bilateral loans/grants. 
In addition, the current arrangement for DM financing defines where funds come from, i.e. 
the national budget (APBN), local budget (APBD), and the community budget. These in 
principle define the financial flow mechanisms and how to get access to them. Furthermore, 
the financial arrangement is characterised by three categories of funding known as (1) the 
contingency budget, (2) the on-call budget, and (3) the social assistance fund covering the 
DM cycle consisting of the pre-disaster, emergency response, and post disaster stages as 
shown in Figure 33. 
          
 
 
 
Source: Author 
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Figure 33: Institutional arrangement for DM financing in Indonesia 
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In the past, DM financing was not integrated in the National Development Plans (NDP). 
Currently efforts are under way to integrate the DM Plan into the National Action Plan for 
DRR financing. According to the framework, DM planning and coordination has to be 
addressed in the multi-level context from national, province and district level with respect 
to different development plans classified as the long-term development plan, the mid-term 
development plan, the sectoral strategic plan, the DRR action plan and finally into annual 
government work plans as shown in Figure 34. 
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Figure 34: Framework for DM Planning in Indonesia  
 
Source: Azis 2009, reproduced by author 
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5.3.7 Institutional Architectures and Coordination Mechanisms  
5.3.7.1 Policy and Coordination through and an Interim Body  
Following the formulation of the Tsunami Grand Scenario, the government quickly passed 
Decree SK: 21/KEP/MENKO/KESRA/IX/2006 to enable and shape the process of establishing 
the Indonesian tsunami early warning system (INATEWS) in the absence of the DM law. The 
Decree SK 21 also appointed RISTEK as the coordinator of the INATEWS with eight national 
state government tsunami focal point organisations as indicated in Figure 35.   
 
Source: RISTEK 2006, reproduced by author 
The above figure shows the tsunami focal points with their operational components (up-
stream) involving BMKG for seismic monitoring, dissemination, and as an operational 
centre, and BAKOSURTANAL for oceanographic monitoring and crustal deformation 
monitoring. The downstream component representing preparedness and mitigation aspects 
of the system such as capacity building includes organisation such as BPPT with tasks for 
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Figure 35: INATEWS Organisational Chart 
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earthquake and tsunami modelling. LIPI was appointed for research and development, while 
response and rehabilitation included LIPI, DEPDAGRI and RISTEK for community 
preparedness, public education and tsunami drill respectively. The supporting focal 
organisations, for example for information and technology and geospatial data and 
information, are KOMINFO and BAKOSURTANAL respectively. However, the organisation 
chart functionality was identified as having a number of working weakness (BGR 2009) 
relating working flow and decision-making processes. Therefore, the organisational chart 
was revised by BGR after a consultative process which included interviews and questions 
and two national institution building roundtables in June and August 2008 to reflect the 
current situation until the end of 2008. The revised interim organisation structure actors 
made an effort to clearly distinguish the organisational functions and responsibilities 
between the upstream technical component and the downstream emergency preparedness 
(Figure 36). It is noted that BGR was unclear about who is responsible for the operational 
centre. However, BMKG is regarded as the operational centre for tsunami warnings.  
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Figure 36: Revised INATEWS Organisational Chart  
 
Source: BGR, 2008, reproduced by author 
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In the revised organisation structure, BMKG is suggested to spearhead the technical 
upstream component while DEPDAGRI leads the emergency preparedness. The newly 
created capacity building unit (CBU) (see dotted link to the board in Figure 36) which 
includes twenty INATEWS stakeholder organisations is integrated in the process according 
to the Decree SK MENRISTEK No. 68/M/Kp/V2008. However, three main weaknesses are 
identified in this revised INATEWS organisation chart. Firstly, it is considered that the 
revised INATEWS organisation structure still does not actually show working flows as was 
intended. Secondly, the use of the term ‘emergency preparedness’ is not clear, as it does 
not differentiate between preparedness and response and the responsible institutions. 
Therefore, it does not show the institutions responsible for risk knowledge - a very 
important element of the EWS. The main weakness of the two organisation structures is the 
persistent lack of recognition of dissemination and communication as a core element of the 
EWS.  Nevertheless, a very recent informant interview with BGR suggests that the 
organisation structure has been legitimatised by a decree. KESRA assisted by RISTEK are 
mandated to lead the downstream culture part of the TEWS. RISTEK is a national institution 
with technical expertise mandated with formulating policies and coordinating research, 
Science and Technology. It is pointed out that RISTEK does not sound like the right 
institution to be assisting KESRA in the downstream-culture component of the TEWS as they 
have a small budget. Furthermore, according to SWOT analysis, RISTEK contribution would 
be most crucial in the technical component of the TEWS, especially in science and 
technology (i.e. dissemination and communication). It is recalled that Table 1 in the 
Appendix provides a profile on each of these key institutions with respect to the INATEWS.  
 
5.3.7.2 Formal Permanent Bodies: The New Multi-Level Disaster Management 
Agencies  
 
The Presidential Regulation, Perpres 8 / 2008 following the DM law No.24/2007 gives notice 
of the creation of the National DM Agency now known as BNPB in Indonesia. In addition, in 
line with article 18 of the DM law and article 55 of the President Regulation 08/2008, in 
order to carry out the tasks of DM in a province as well as a city, it is necessary to establish 
the DM Regional Agency referred as BPBD, stipulated by a Regional Regulation. This implies 
that at all levels there will be a steering committee and an executive body as shown in 
Figure 37. The regional DM agencies (BPBD) have to be established within a year, which 
was the end of the year of 2009. This implies that all local governments were responsible 
for finalising the local DM regulation (i.e. Perda) by the end of 2008. Furthermore, DM 
agencies must consist of a steering committee and an executive board as further stipulated 
in the Presidential Regulation 08/2008 of article 5.  
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5.3.7.3 The Steering Committee: Policy, Monitoring and Evaluation 
According to article 19 of the Presidential Regulation, the steering committee shall have the 
functions of formulating policy on national DM and monitoring and evaluation of DM. The 
role of the steering committee is of the utmost importance because it is the forum through 
which stakeholders shape the whole legal, political and operational process on improving 
the INATEWS and DRR in Indonesia.  
The major change in membership to reflect a people-centred EWS is outlined in article 11. 
The new 19-person membership structure does not only consist of the government officials 
from the Coordinating Ministry for People’s Welfare, Home Affairs to the Army (TNI) and the 
police (POLRI) as in the old BAKORNAS structure, but also includes diverse institutions such 
as the department of social affairs, health etc, and nine professional community members 
are also included who can be a mixture of experts and community leaders as shown in 
Figure 37.  
 
It is highlighted that the membership 
participation of the nine professional 
community leaders was indeed an 
outcome of intense debate and mediation 
between the Executive and Legislature 
which had been divided on the 
representation and composition of the 
steering committee. The Executive were 
trapped in their old paradigm structure of 
the bureaucratic members of the 
BAKORNAS PB while the legislative body 
were determined to change the 
domination of bureaucrats in the steering 
committee with a new image reflecting the 
paradigm shift in DRR to involve 
academics, experts, and other individuals 
outside the government. The legislature 
wanted to demonstrate the elimination of 
the old structure and replace it with a new 
one so that the international community 
would have more confidence in the system in Indonesia. The head of respective 
government institutions nominate their members to the head of BNPB while the head of 
 
Figure 37: Draft organisation chart of the BNPB steering 
committee and executive body 
Source: Updated version by author based on BNPB 2008 
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BNPB nominates members for appointment by the President (Article 55 (1), but all are 
subject to a test demonstrating they are fit and proper by the House of Representatives of 
the Republic of Indonesia in accordance with the provisions of legislation (Article 55(2)). 
The selection mechanism and criteria for members of the steering committee emanating 
from the professional community is said48
“The assessment of the prospective members of the steering element includes three 
aspects, namely communication skills, depth of insight, managerial experience and 
education” (Interview 1, 16 February 2009).  
  to be defined by a regulation from the head of 
BNPD. According to BNPB: 
On the other hand, the composition of the official government membership has also been 
challenged. For instance, BGR (2009) identified that the steering committee of the new 
Disaster Management Agency (BNPB) lacks the membership of key INATEWS stakeholders 
such as RISTEK, the Ministry of the Environment and the official presence of BMKG as the 
TEWC. BGR argues that BMG is not a ministry but forms part of the parent Transport 
Ministry and it not clear who is responsible for tsunami early warning in the steering 
committee. The role of BMKG in the steering committee is without any doubt not to be 
neglected. The Ministry of the Environment is viewed as a critical partner in natural disaster 
reduction and environment security. 
 
5.3.7.4 The Executive Body: Coordination, Command and Execution  
 
On the other hand, the executive body consisting of professional and expert staff is 
mandated in article 15 of paragraph (2) of the DM law for coordinating, commanding and 
executing functions in DM.  
 
The Regional DM Agency BPBD49
                                                            
48 Article 58 of Presidential Regulation No8/2008 
 will comprise a provincial level agency presided over by an 
official who ranks second to the governor or equivalent, and a regency/city level agency 
presided over by an official whose rank is second to regent/major or equivalent. All will be 
established in coordination with the National BNPB and also have steering and executive 
bodies. The heads of the DM Office employed by BPBD at the province and local level will 
function below the governor and mayor respectively, with some autonomy in their 
responsibilities in DM planning, prevention and mitigation. Figure 37 also shows BNPB at 
national level under the authority of the President, while BPBD at provincial and local level 
fall under the overall authority of the governor and mayor respectively. BNPB shall hold 
49 Article 19 of the Disaster Management Law 
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coordination meetings50 with the provincial, Regency/City at least twice a year and the 
steering committee at all levels shall hold meetings regularly or any time according to the 
need51. In addition, the National BNPB may invite regional government institutions, 
business, and international institutions to the session52
This clearly indicates a polycentric and multi-layered architecture which matches closely to 
the decentralisation system in Indonesia and would offer favourable conditions for multi-
level work procedures and a coordination mechanism. This being the case, the polycentric-
multi-layered architectures would help in building resilience and coping capacities to 
hazards and disasters at all levels. However, the polycentric-multi-layered architectures 
indeed represent the real challenges for full implementation across Indonesia and will be 
discussed in greater detail in the forthcoming chapters.  
. However according to a recent 
informant interview BGR has indicated that KESRA will supervise and monitor BNPB in their 
progress (e.g. INATEWS coordination meetings). 
 
5.3.7.5  The Local Government Operational Body: The Multi-Level Emergency 
Operation Centres 
The fact that the DM law stipulates under article 46 paragraph 2 of (d) that early warning 
includes dissemination of disaster warnings implies that BMKG is the responsible institution 
for tsunami warning only while local government is mandated to issue guidance and 
evacuation orders  to the communities at risk. This leads to a number of institutional and 
organisational implications apart from the impacts on the people’s reaction and response 
behaviours (see chapter 8).  
In order to fulfil their responsibility, local governments would have to establish 24/7 
tsunami warning services (i.e. Emergency Operations Centres (EOCs)) in order to be able to 
provide guidance to the community at risk. Ideally, the EOCs will be separate from BNPB 
working structures and facilities but would be the operational arm at national, provincial 
and local level on a 24/7 basis. EOC will receive tsunami information from BMKG or 
interface institutions for local decision-making through local established SOPs and 
guidelines.  
 
The EOCs at provincial and local level will have an Incident Commander and Emergency 
Officer who is expected to press the alarm (i.e. siren) button to effect a response (i.e. 
evacuation). However, it is not very clear if the Incident Commander will have the mandate 
                                                            
50 Article 64 of the Presidential Regulation 08/2008 
51 Article 41 (1) of the Presidential Regulation 08/2008 
52 Article 41 (2) of the Presidential Regulation 08/2008 
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and responsibility to make critical decisions without political approval of the situation and if 
equivalent actions to be taken by the governor or mayor. A recent informant interview with 
BGR suggested that inter-institutional procedures for evacuation are now secured by SOP. 
This implies the mayor is pre-authorised to order an evacuation. BGR also states: 
 
“In a round table discussion policy-makers for disaster management discussed and clarified 
the institutional coordination for the warning chain by considering experiences and 
perspectives from other areas. A key output of this meeting was that the participants 
agreed on the need for holistic and integrated SOPs for Tsunami Early Warning, which 
should be implemented by provincial and municipal/district governments. It was agreed 
that all municipalities and districts that are able to implement the tsunami early warning 
services on a 24/7 basis are authorized to call for evacuation. For cities and districts that 
are not able yet to implement tsunami early warning services, the authority to call for an 
evacuation lies with the provincial government” (Interview 2, 25 January 2010). 
 
RISTEK published a “guideline on tsunami drill implementation for city and Regency” in 
2008 which also addresses issues on guidelines on EOC establishment and operations with 
the support of GITEWS partners. The guideline was distributed to all 33 provinces by 
DEPGADRI and must be implemented by the local government (PEMDA). Temporary EOCs 
have been established in Jakarta, Bali and Padang. A new EOC is under construction in Bali. 
The establishment of local 24/7 EOCs for tsunami warning services requires trained 
personnel and significant resources on a sustainable basis. The establishment of the EOC is 
being financed by the French Red Cross while the maintenance plus staffing are expected to 
come from the local government (PEMDA). 
5.3.8 Institutionalising the Tsunami Early Warning System within a Larger 
Architecture  
As stipulated by article 46 of Law 24/2007, the EWS needs to be integrated or embedded 
into the Indonesian DM system as shown in Figure 38. This implies the EWS is indeed 
regulated by the law (UU) which is higher than the ministerial level regulation, as was 
previously the case in 2005 through the ministerial decree SK21/2006.  
Recent developments for institutionalising the INATEWS with the DM agency (BNPB) 
prevention and preparedness structure followed a consultation process between BGR and 
BNPB (Deputy for Prevention and Preparedness) and Indonesian partners in October 2008. 
It is expected that the upstream part of the INATEWS (i.e. the EWC) and warnings will flow 
and link to BNPB under the Deputy for Prevention and Preparedness Directorate as part of 
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the executive body or operations. However, the INATEWS (i.e. the EWC) should link 
simultaneously to both prevention and preparedness and emergency response directorates 
as indicated by the dashed line in Figure 38, as there would be a very rapid shift in 
responsibility from preparedness to response in the case of tsunami hazard and disasters.   
The directorates under the Deputy for Prevention and Preparedness are Disaster Risk 
Reduction with two further sub-directorates in Prevention and Mitigation (not shown). The 
other Deputy directorates of BNPB include the Deputy of Emergency Management, 
Rehabilitation and Reconstruction, Logistics and Equipment, and the Technical Operation 
Unit.  
 
Figure 38: INATEWS embedded within BNPB 
Source: Author 
 
5.3.9 The Emerging National Institutional Tsunami Early Warning Chain in 
Indonesia 
A TEW chain from the national level down to the local level at the coast is the key element 
of an effective EWS. However, at this point there is still no final agreed national tsunami 
warning chain or early warning process in Indonesia. Nevertheless, much progress has been 
achieved at different levels. Figure 39 maps out the TEW chain from the author’s 
observations and findings. For example, it is now clear that BMKG’s institutional role is to 
monitor earthquake data and issue tsunami warnings shortly after an earthquake. BMKG is 
also responsible for the technical upstream component of the INATEWS. This also implies 
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that BMKG is the legitimate agency for receiving and acting upon any international advisory 
message from any tsunami warning centre (i.e. PTWC, JMA).  
In the event of a significant earthquake with a moment magnitude greater than a critical 
threshold (i.e. 6.5 Mw), an alarm would be triggered in BMKG. Once the seismic data is 
processed and matched with the best tsunami prediction in the database, considering the 
operational warning alert levels (i.e. tsunami advisory 0-0.5 m, tsunami warning 0.5-3.0 m 
etc), BMKG should disseminate the tsunami information (i.e. a potential tsunami) through 
the Decision Support System (DSS) to the interface institutions and directly to the 
community through electronic institutions such as the media (TV, radio), INDOSAT (Mobil 
text) and TELECOMSEL. The key interface institutions consist of the DM agency, department 
of home affairs, national police, army, department of information, communication and 
technology, provincial government, city and district (i.e. Padang and Bali), Port Radio, 
Provider GSM/CDMA. The interface institutions will communicate and disseminate the 
potential tsunami information to the sub-national government and the response institutions. 
The sub-national (i.e. province and district) government operational arm in DM is the EOC. 
However the legitimate functioning of the EOCs is in the process of final agreement by 
actors. The inter-level operations depend on specific local arrangement between province 
and district. Province and districts with EOCs may make own local decisions. It is the 
responsibility and mandate of the local governments, i.e. province, district or city to 
interpret the potential tsunami information through SOPs and make final decisions on 
whether to sound the siren and call for public evacuation because of the impeding tsunami 
hazard. Chapter 7 describes further specific local arrangements between sub-national levels 
in the case of Padang and Bali.  
On the other hand, the potential tsunami information will reach the response institutions 
through the interface institutions. The institutions involved in the emergency response, 
mitigation and rehabilitation include the DM agencies (provincial, districts), department of 
internal affairs, department of public welfare, department of public works, agency for 
rehabilitation and reconstruction, department of health, police and the army.  According to 
the revised organisational structure of the INATEWS, the Ministry of Home Affairs 
(DEPDAGRI) is the response leader.  
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Following the first potential tsunami message, BPPT is mandated to provide BMKG with GPS 
buoy data to confirm or deny if a tsunami has been generated in the deep ocean within a 
period of less than 10-20 minutes after the earthquake event. If a tsunami has been 
generated (i.e. Yes) a second tsunami message in the form of a confirmation is 
disseminated and communicated again downstream to confirm partial or full evacuation 
with the response institutions.  If no tsunami is detected, in the deep ocean, (i.e. No), 
ideally the whole process is cancelled, while BMKG, BPPT and BAKORSUTANAL continues 
with the monitoring process. BAKOSUTANAL is mandated to monitor and provide sea level 
data and GPS crustal deformation to BMKG to confirm if, for example, a tsunami has been 
observed along the coast from the tide gauges. The institutional agreement between the 
three monitoring organisations is based on the MoU agreement founded on the legal 
framework of the Ministerial Decree SK21/2006. 
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Figure 39: Emerging national institutional tsunami warning process in Indonesia 
Source: Author 
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5.3.10  Sector Institutional Interplay and Interactions  
The DM legal framework is not the only institutional arrangement to govern the 
environmental risks such as tsunamis in Indonesia. In Indonesia there are a number of 
sector specific legislations such as the spatial planning Act No.24/1992, law number 23 / 
1997 on the Environment Management law number 23/1997 and the coastal and small 
Island Management Law No.27/2007. For instance, the spatial planning regulation 
addresses spatial planning and development in all conservation and protected areas which 
may also be at risk to natural hazards while the Law Number 23 / 1997 on the Environment 
Management governs the development activities in terms of license issuance, preventive 
regulation development or prohibition to any parties who engage in activities in relation to 
the environment. Furthermore, the relatively new Coastal and Small Island Management 
Law No. 27/2007 is a very strong sector-specific law for integrated coastal zone 
management including mitigation of coastal hazards such as tsunamis. To reduce the 
impact of coastal disasters in Indonesia, the Ministry of Marine Affairs and Fisheries 
(MoMAF) is also proactive in minimizing the impact of coastal disasters on coastal 
communities and on aquaculture activities. The MoMAF are emphasizing the implementation 
of Integrated Coastal Zone Management (ICZM) with the objective of achieving balance 
between the natural resources, human utilization, and disaster mitigation aspects to 
enhance coastal socio-ecology resilience. A healthy coastal ecosystem condition helps in the 
sustainability of exploitation activities by humans while ecological conditions due to the 
exploitation by humans will decline in the absence of a disaster mitigation concept in coastal 
areas. In this respect, MOMAF has reformulated the building code for earthquake and 
tsunamis to include the existing traditional design with some modern building techniques.  
However, an exploration of the issue and interplay between sector institutional 
arrangements in environmental governance and development also points to situations of 
conflict and lack of governance effectiveness between different institutions; between the 
overarching norms and principles that govern these interactions. For instance, in Bali, 
development in the restricted areas is an ongoing challenge, a battle between rapid 
tourism-related developments that often infringe on protection and conservation areas. The 
main problem is that developers do not wait for permit approval or have none, while others 
build in the restricted zones which are either conservation areas or violate local zoning rules 
such as the 100-meter no-build zone from the high water mark. These illegal and rapid 
developments are likely to generate new risks. The enforcement problems are due to 
overlapping institutional mandates and lack of cooperation among actors, and long 
bureaucratic procedures leading to bribes and corruption. These experiences provide useful 
insights into the challenges and implications of tsunami risk zoning and enforcement. 
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5.4 Summary of Chapter 5 
 
The Grand Scenario strategy was ambitious while the GTEWS project with partners has 
spearheaded a novel tsunami observation and forecasting system in Indonesia. However, in 
the case of the GITEWS project, inadequate attention was paid to risk knowledge, 
dissemination and communication, and response as key elements of an effective EWS 
because it was not explicitly designed to address that.  
There have been substantial multi-level institutional-governance arrangements and 
structures to support a TEWS in Indonesia. The DM law No. 24/2007 and auxiliary 
regulations and decrees provide a comprehensive basis for the rules of the game in DM 
supporting the paradigm shift from disaster response to preparedness and mitigation in 
Indonesia. Article 46 of the DM law governs the EWS and stipulates its integration as part of 
the Indonesian DM system. Supporting legal instruments are the risk reduction institutional 
frameworks concerning prohibition of settlement in disaster-prone areas, the 
implementation and enforcement of spatial structure, and the imposition of sanctions on 
violators. A separate interim institutional ministerial decree SK 21/2005 has provided the 
momentum and coordination mechanism for developing the INATEWS despite many 
practical weaknesses. A revised institutional structure proposed BMKG leading the technical 
upstream component while DEPDAGRI would lead the emergency preparedness. However, 
the latest development legitimatized by a decree suggests KESRA assisted by RISTEK 
should be mandated to lead the downstream culture-preparedness of the TEWS. However, 
questions arise of whether an institution such as RISTEK is fit for this responsibility.   
The three important auxiliary Government Regulations namely PP 21/2008, PP 22/2008 and 
PP 23/2008 have been enacted to regulate DM arrangements, financing and external 
support respectively. The Presidential Regulation, 8 / 2008 is in the process of transforming 
the old BAKORNAS PBP into the National DM Agency. The two DM financial institutional 
arrangements define where funds come from and further categories of funding covering the 
DM cycle. 
The major architectural change is the creation of permanent new multi-level DM agencies 
for policy, monitoring and evaluation. A major development reflecting the paradigm shift 
towards preparedness is the new steering committee composed of membership participation 
from diverse institutions, the professional community and the state institutional actors; an 
outcome achieved through intense debate and mediation. Currently, there is a lack of direct 
participation of key state stakeholders in the steering committee. 
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The fact that the DM law stipulates that EW includes dissemination of disaster warning 
implies the local government is mandated to make their own local decisions of what to do. 
Thus, local governments are establishing 24/7 EOCs as a separate but operational arm of 
the BNPB in order to provide guidance to the community at risk.  However, institutional 
mandates and clear SOPs at multiple-levels are still under development. It is agreed that 
areas with EOCs have the legitimate authority to make local decisions. Hence, a formal 
institutional TEWS chain is gradually emerging in Indonesia.  
In general, the institutional change has progressed remarkably from an emergency relief, 
armed forces type of leadership and participation towards multi-stakeholder participation 
through the steering committee and DRR platform. The multi-level-polycentric 
architectures, frameworks and structures consisting of the HFA, IOC-UNESCO regional 
governance framework and multi-level-polycentric architectures and structures are ideal to 
cope and build resilience for local and trans-boundary risks such as tsunami hazards and 
disasters in Indonesia. However, it is becoming very clear that the full implementation of 
such architectures represents the central challenge in Indonesia. 
The interplay between institutional architectures (i.e. DM law and the Coastal and Small 
Island Management Law) and actors are very important to finally build national resilience to 
tsunami hazards and disasters in Indonesia. 
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6. Actors’ Interaction and Perspectives  
 
Understanding effective governance requires understanding the actors-agents that drive 
and shape the outcome. The main questions asked include who are the actors of TEWS 
governance in Indonesia? What are their roles, interest, agendas and incentives? What are 
these strategies, tactics, and coping capacities? Are there any potential conflicts, trust and 
cohesion among the diverse actors? How are the actors participating and exercising agency 
to shape the outcome? What are the diverse views of the actors on the TEWS-related 
architecture and frameworks?   
6.1 Actors’ Participation, Networks, Roles and Responsibilities   
6.1.1 Actors at the International Level  
As indicated in Chapter 5, the leading global actor in the TEWS is the IOC-UNESCO, 
consisting of an Intergovernmental Coordination Group for the Indian Ocean Tsunami 
Warning and Mitigation System (ICG/IOTWS).The Intergovernmental Oceanographic 
Commission of UNESCO (IOC-UNESCO) is mandated by the international community to 
coordinate the establishment of the Indian Ocean Tsunami Early Warning System in the 
Indian Ocean.  
 
On the other hand, at the national level, the development of the Indonesian TEWS has been 
supported by several foreign countries and international agencies such as Germany, the 
USA, Japan, China, France etc. Germany spearheads the largest group of external scientists 
and researchers and is the largest financial contributor in developing the German 
Indonesian Tsunami Early Warning System (GITEWS). The German Federal Ministry of 
Education and Research (BMBF) funds the GITEWS project. The official institutional 
partners53
 
 of the German project include the German Research Centre for Geosciences 
Potsdam (GFZ), Consortium Leader, the Alfred Wegener Institute for Polar and Marine 
Research (AWI), Bremerhaven, the Federal Institute for Geosciences and Natural Resources 
(BGR), Hannover, the German Aerospace Centre (DLR), Oberpfaffenhofen, Deutsche 
Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ), Eschborn, GKSS Forschungszentrum, 
Geesthacht, Konsortium Deutsche Meeresforschung (KDM), Berlin, Leibniz Institute of 
Marine Sciences (IFM-GEOMAR), Kiel. 
                                                            
53 http://www.gitews.org/index.php?id=13&L=1 
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All these organisations are leading centres of excellence in Germany in their respective 
fields. They are all technical scientific actors, with the exception of GTZ.  For instance, the 
Alfred Wegener Institute for Polar and Marine Research is Germany's leading institute for 
polar and marine research (AWI) with the responsibility of developing a modern tsunami 
modelling component. DLR is Germany's national research centre for aeronautics and 
space, with the responsibility of providing the Decision Support System (DSS). On the other 
hand, GTZ is a federal-owned organisation. It is an international cooperation enterprise for 
sustainable development. It offers sustainable solutions for political, economic, ecological 
and social development in a globalised world and promotes complex reforms and change 
processes, often under difficult conditions. Their goal is to improve the living conditions of 
people. The GTZ core competence is in capacity development.   
 
Apart from the German partners involved in the GITEWS project, the United Nations bodies 
include UNDP, UNOCHA, and UNESCO-IOC. Their specific roles and responsibilities include 
facilitation and coordination throughout the process. The United Nations University Institute 
for Environment and Human Security (UNU-EHS) contributes particularly in the last mile 
component of the TEWS, focusing on vulnerability assessment and capacity development in 
terms of doctoral programmes in Germany.  
6.1.2 Actors at the National and Sub-National Level 
There is a wide range of actors involved in the TEWS and it is not possible to detail each 
player’s roles and responsibilities. Therefore, for simplicity, Table 1 in the Appendix list 
summarises the INATEWS main national institutional actors, their corporate responsibilities, 
executive, operational functions, and specific mandate.  
 
The key national institutions and actors are concentrated mostly in Jakarta. The eight 
official partners of the GITEWS  include the State Ministry of Research and Technology 
(RISTEK), the Meteorological and Geophysical Agency of Indonesia (BMG), the National 
Coordinating Agency for Surveys and Mapping (BAKOSURTANAL), the Agency for the 
Assessment and Application of Technology (BPPT), the National Institute for Aeronautics 
and Space (LAPAN),  the Department of Communication and Information Technology of the 
Republic of Indonesia, the National Board for Civil Protection (BAPPENAS) and the Technical 
University Bandung (ITB). It is noted that GITEWS official partners54
                                                            
54 http://www.gitews.org/index.php?id=13&L=1 
 are indicated in italics. 
On the other hand, other actors involved are the Secretariat of National Board for Disaster 
Management (BAKORNAS PBP), the Ministry of Home Affairs and Fisheries, the National 
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Planning Agency (BAKORNAS PB), the Ministry of Home Affairs (MoHA) and the   House of 
Representatives (DPR).  
 
At the sub-national levels the state actors include the army, police (POLDA), local disaster 
management agency (BPBD), Emergency Operation Centres (EOCs), provincial governors, 
and the district mayors. Other partners involved include the academic institutions, 
universities such as the Indonesian Institution for Sciences (LIPI), the Institute for 
Technology Bandung (ITB) and the Anadalas University in Padang.   
 
Important civil societies and associations involved in TEWS development include KOGAMI, 
the Indonesia Society of Disaster Management (MPBI), the Indonesian Red Cross (PMI) and 
IDEP. KOGAMI is a student-based NGO headed by an executive director in Padang 
consisting of around 12 students with affiliations and links with faculty members of the 
Andalas University of Padang. Their special interest and agenda is in community 
preparedness.  MPBI (a Community Disaster Preparedness Organization) is based in Jakarta 
and was founded one year before the tsunami disaster. MPBI is an association of 
professionals in the area of DM having an interest in DM legal arrangements and with wide-
reaching impacts on the development of a more appropriate DM strategy for Indonesia. For 
example, MPBI was the key actor at the forefront in strengthening the civil society and 
wider public support for the DRR legal reform in Indonesia (UNDP 2009). On the other 
hand, the Indonesian Red Cross is an important actor with over 850,000 volunteers and 
members participating in disaster preparedness and response all over the archipelago. It 
represents a huge resource for civil society in Indonesia. IDEP is an Indonesian non-profit 
foundation that was formally established in Bali in 1999, at the height of Indonesia’s 
economic crisis. IDEP’s objective was to respond to urgent needs for sustainable food 
production and resource management, while conveying the importance of environmental 
education for sustainable living. IDEP has good links with MPBI and PMI, although not 
officially listed55
Major public-private actors include the Bali Tourism Board and the Bali Hotel Association 
(BHA). At the local level in Bali, religious, cultural and traditional village leaders are also 
participating and influencing the outcome. Finally, the communities at risk are also 
participating in the TEWS and preparedness. There are about 125 provincial communities at 
risk of tsunami hazard in Indonesia. 
 yet. 
 
 
                                                            
55 http://www.idepfoundation.org/idep_partners.html 
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6.1.3 Actors’ Participation Dynamics 
Most of the external researchers are highly scientific-technical actors participating mainly in 
the upstream component of the TEWS (Figure 40). Most of the state actors with technical 
and policy backgrounds situate themselves at the national level of the tsunami EWS 
development. At the sub-national levels, the state actors tend to have a broad range of 
backgrounds. They also include the local political and decision-makers such as governors, 
mayors etc. Ideally, the DM authorities operate at all levels with various domains of 
knowledge and expertise. On the other hand, the civil societies and NGOs such as KOGAMI 
and PMI pay more attention to preparedness, carrying out education, awareness and 
sensitisation at the local level within the community. Some actors tend to be more flexible 
in their participation, operating at multiple levels, such as LIPI, MPBI and GTZ-IS.  
 
Figure 40: Key institutional actors’ participation in the TEWS  
Source: Author 
 
The sheer number of actors participating in the whole process reveals a high degree of 
multi-stakeholder participation differentiated by various domains of knowledge and 
backgrounds operating vertically and horizontally at different levels and scales throughout 
the process. Highly scientific and technical actors tend to situate themselves at the national 
level with priorities in the technical EWS while other actors of various domains of knowledge 
and expertise tend to operate at multiple levels with much focus and interest in community-
related activities. Hence, it is clear that there exists a hierarchical participation dynamics 
related to authority in technical knowledge and expertise that contrasts with the authority 
of hierarchy and discipline. Consequently, the participation structure creates a fluid and 
dynamic action arena shaping the actions and outcomes at all levels. For example, the high 
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interest in developing a sophisticated technological approach is driven by the national 
technical actors (i.e. BMKG, BPPT, RISTEK and the German partners etc) while the civil 
societies such as KOGAMI at the local level advocates for people-centred EWS through 
strong education and preparedness.  
Collective participation is more successful among the national actors compared to the sub-
national level actors. This is not to say that actors are simply unwilling to participate 
collectively at these lower levels but rather there are far greater challenges, and this will be 
addressed progressively in this study. This is captured by the statement made by several 
actors. For instance UNESCO said: 
“...if there is a lack of collective participation it is perhaps due to specific technicalities and 
internal issues involved.... and there are so many players operating in a vast country 
especially in the downstream culture part of the EWS “( Interview 3, 27 October 2008). 
6.1.4 Actors’ Participation through Capacity Building  
Almost all actors in Indonesia engaged in the TEWS/DM have participated in the different 
capacity building initiatives. The Indonesian Tsunami Grand Scenario strategic plan, the 
GITEWS project and other capacity building initiatives have recognised the need to support 
the local community, local decision-makers, and local disaster risk management 
organizations as well as executive agencies and scientific institutions for TEWS 
sustainability, as well as the establishment of the requisite technological bases to 
implement the end-to-end system throughout Indonesia. The German cooperation 
contribution also includes training of scientists and staff on how to operate the various 
components of the TEWS. In addition, there are three work packages of the GTEWS project 
targeting capacity building at various levels focusing on (1) building individual organisation 
capacities, (2) executive agencies' capacities, and (3) inter-institutional and organizational 
capacities in the fields of preparedness and EW respectively. There has also been some 
exchange of visiting scientists between Indonesia and Germany.  
The unique component of the GITEWS project differentiating it from other initiatives in 
Indonesia, the Indian Ocean and Southeast Asia is the PhD program consisting of nine 
active experts around the Indian Ocean rim. The high level academic training56
 
 program is 
coordinated by UNU-EHS in Bonn Germany, involving various organisations that will become 
the future generation of scientists in charge of operating and improving the system.  
 
                                                            
56 This PhD research forms part of this academic training 
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It is difficult to measure the impact and success of the actors’ participation in the various 
capacity building programmes in Indonesia. However, a GTZ-IS project evaluation during its 
first phase (2006-2008) at the community level in the three pilot areas suggested a wide 
range of achievements in the fields of knowledge and awareness, hazard and risks, warning 
services, and reaction with regard to the end-to-end Indonesian TEWS. The project’s 
intervention suggests an impact at national and local levels. At the national level the project 
contributed significantly to the discussion on issues related to the warning chain, reaction 
schemes and decision-making (on evacuation), addressing questions like standard reaction 
schemes, SOPs for local warning services and the delegation of decision-making from the 
local regent or mayor to local warning centres (in the context of very short warning times). 
A total of at least 28 separate capacity building-related activities have been developed by 
the German project while 15 activities were reported for the US contribution in the period of 
2005-2009. A comparison of the clustered activities according to the TEWS shows that the 
GITEWS concept is well spread over the TEWS elements while the US IOTWS is less intense 
on the warning and dissemination but more focused on reaction, response and public 
outreach. Both programs apparently focus relatively equally on the response and public 
outreach. 
In this context, most actors indicated that capacity building has increased in all institutions 
covering all domains of knowledge and expertise. However, capacity building has also been 
heavily criticised by many. The main argument raised is that the percentage contribution for 
capacity building is marginal compared to the amount spent on the technical TEWS. It is 
reported that the GITEWS budget for capacity building is about 5% of the close to US$60 
million project. On this note, InWent pointed out that:  
“Capacity building needs to be improved for sustainability. We are working with a tight 
budget and there is a lack of integration in the Indonesian planning cycle, and the problem 
is that the people involved change quickly” (Interview 4, 28 October 2008).  
Similar arguments are emphasised by MPBI who said: 
“...there is a lack of permanent training facilities and integration in the Indonesian planning 
cycle.... we do not have a comprehensive capacity building sustainability plan; however we 
have plans to develop a training centre related to disaster’’(Interview 5, 3 November 2008).  
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6.1.5 Actors’ Cooperation-Multi Lateral and Bilateral 
The current effort to establish the Indonesian TEWS was initiated through several 
international meetings following the tsunami disaster, including the Tsunami Summit held in 
Jakarta on the 6th January 2005. This was followed by the World Conference on Disaster 
Risk Reduction held in Kobe, Japan in January 2005 and the IOC (Intergovernmental 
Oceanographic Commission) meeting held in Paris in March 2005; and the IOC Meeting held 
in Mauritius in April 2005. During the special sessions of the Hyogo, Kobe World conference, 
the Indian Ocean countries agreed, based on national and regional cooperation, to design 
and establish the Indian Ocean Tsunami Early Warning System (IO-TEWS). Furthermore, to 
great surprise, it was during the World Conference in Kobe, Japan 2005 that Germany 
announced it would contribute US$ 60 million over the next five years of 2005-2009 to 
assist Indonesia in establishing a tsunami early warning system, now known as the 
German-Indonesian Tsunami Early Warning System (GITEWS) project, as discussed in 
chapter 4.  
In 2005, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) spearheaded the 
US IOTWS Program with a direct contribution of $16.6 for two years to the international 
IOTEWS effort led by the IOC. The project initiative helped US scientists and experts share 
technical expertise, provided guidance, and helped build a multi-hazard warning system 
capacity within the Indian Ocean region. The American experts have worked through 
strategic collaboration and partnership with the international community, host country 
governments, and private sector and non-governmental organization (NGO) partners and at 
the community levels. Overall, working through the IOC and the ICG/IOTWS, the US IOTWS 
Program provided substantial input into shaping the overall design of the IOTEWS and links 
with INATEWS.  
On the other hand, Japan is cooperating and assisting in strengthening INATEWS centre 
while the Republic of China has also installed seismometers.  The Government of France has 
worked in partnership with the PMI (Indonesian Red Cross) and the French Red Cross to 
reinforce the capacities of Indonesia in coping with disasters focusing on a community 
awareness project on disaster preparedness and risk reduction using a participatory 
approach. The French Red Cross is also funding the establishment of the EOCs in ten 
provinces in Indonesia.  
6.1.6 Actors’ Agenda  
All actors have a specific interest and agenda in the TEWS in Indonesia. According to the in-
depth interview there are three main agendas of interest set by the actors. For international 
actors the agenda is primarily driven by the desire to innovate, carry out research and 
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development, and by human security issues. In contrast, all national actors including civil 
societies in Indonesia have priority agendas on human security, reducing damage from 
disasters, and institutional and capacity development. The third group, mainly private 
actors, are simply driven by the incentive to protect and sustain existing and expected 
future economic gains.  
6.1.7 Actors’ Priorities: Institutional Change, Words and Real Budget Allocation 
The actor’s priorities in the TEWS/DM have constantly been argued by actors at all levels. 
In-depth interviews suggest that most actors perceived that DM and EW became national 
priorities following the tsunami disaster, and this is exemplified in the new DM law and 
supporting regulations. For example UNESCO highlighted: 
“The government has the TEWS as a priority because they have legally allowed national 
actors to collaborate with international actors through Government Regulation, PP 23/2008 
and their commitment in the tsunami drills” (Interview 3, 27 October 2008).  
Furthermore, according to the state actors, the President’s speeches and the recent 
inauguration of the TEWS in November 2008 demonstrate clearly the government’s 
priorities are the TEWS and DM in Indonesia. For instance, the National DM Agency (BNPB) 
said: 
“The President in a recent monthly meeting requested the local government to prepare an 
evacuation route as it was a pending matter. We have consequently dispatched letters to all 
local governments for implementation” (Interview 1, 16 February 2009). 
On the other hand, some actors commented that the rather early launch of the TEWS by 
the President and the government was simply a politically opportunistic strategy57
6.1.7.1 Priorities in terms of Real Financial Commitment 
 since the 
TEWS is not really complete yet. 
An important indicator of the government’s real engagement with its priorities is not only 
measured in terms of the institutional financial arrangements developed but also by how 
much is actually budgeted and equitably distributed among actors at all levels to implement 
activities. The financial expenses allocated by the Indonesian Government as indicated in 
Figure 41 show that that government national budget spending58
                                                            
57 Fresh elections were scheduled in early and mid 2009 
 on DRM quadrupled from 
US$0.06 million (569 million Rupiah) to US$ 0.25 million (2459 million Rupiah) between 
2001 and 2007 in response to two major disasters in Aceh (2004) and Java (2006). The 
58 Data from BAPPENAS 
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total national expenditure on prevention and preparedness slightly increased after 2004. 
However, the total amount, including for early warning, is less than US$26,315.00 (250 
million Indonesia Rupiah) representing 10% of the expenditure. Most of the funds have 
been allocated to response to floods (i.e. flood controls).  
 
 
Figure 41: Disaster expenditure in Indonesia 
 
Source: Ministry of Finance, Indonesia 2009 
In comparing the program proposal of the National Action Plan-Disaster Risk Reduction 
(NAP-DRR 2006-2009) and the government budget allocation for 2007-2009, BAPPENAS 
pointed out that the government has already allocated enough funds, even exceeding the 
program proposal for the five key programmes on the National Action Plan for DRR (NAP-
DRR 2006-2009). In total the government has allocated six times more compared to the 
proposed budget allocation. Indonesian DRR financing has reached 2.1% of the total 
national budget. However, it is underlined that the post-disaster expenditure is an 
overwhelming US$1094.73 million (10.4 trillion rupiah) compared to US$ 258.94 million 
(2.46 trillion rupiah) spent on disaster risk reduction. What is interesting is that spending 
post disaster is more than four times the spending devoted to DRR.  
6.1.7.2 Declining Sector Budget and Far from Expected Budget Allocation 
 
According to BAPPENAS, more detailed sectoral budget analysis indicates that the amount 
allocated in the last three years from 2007 to 2009 actually decreased with the budget for 
2009 back to one third of the spending in 2007. The Disaster Management Agency (BNPB) 
proposed US$ 16.11 million (153 billion Rupiah) for the year 2009 but initially received only 
US$ 6.28 million (Rp59.7 billion Rupiah). A hearing of BNPB with the House of 
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Representatives Commission was heard. In the end BNPB was further approved US$5.15 
(Rp49.0 billion Rupiah). This amounts to a total of US$ 11.44 million (108.7 billion Rupiah), 
and represents a deficit of US$ 4.66 million (44.3 billion Rupiah).  It is underlined that the 
council members argued that the budget was not appropriate to the real needs of DM, 
noting that the largest portion of the budget of US$ 10.32 million (98 billion Rupiah) went 
to emergency response. This statistically represents 90% of the disaster budget for 
emergency response. The BNPB national budget for DM for the year 2010 is US$ 18.1 
million (172.062 billion Rupiah) which is a relative increase compared to the year 2009. The 
House of Representatives Commission VII approved the Work Plan Budget Ministry/Agency. 
However, BNPB complained that: 
“The budget is far from the expected.... the budget should be adjusted to the real priority 
needs in DM including those pre-disaster, during, and post-disaster” (Interview 1, 16 
February 2009). 
In this context the Commission VII BNPB plans to immediately apply to the Ministry of 
Finance to narrow down the gap in the budget. This shows that expenses for DM have 
increased; however sector-specific funding has recently decreased, probably because the 
approved budget is consistently lower than the proposed budget for DM financing. In 
addition, most of the spending was for response and recovery rather than for preparedness. 
6.1.7.3 Shift in Contingency Budget from Central to Local Government? 
 
The contingency budget of the local and national government clearly shows that there has 
been an increase from US$ 0.52 million (5 Billion Rupiah) to US$ 2.63 million (25 Billion 
Rupiah) from 2007 to 2009 as shown in Figure 42. In 2007, the local and the national 
contingency budgets were of relatively equal amounts. In 2009, the local contingency 
budget went up by 8.5 times from USS 0.22 million to US$ 1.83 million (2.05 to 17.47 
billion Rupia) while the national budget only doubled. This is an important financial 
arrangement indicator of increasing distribution of financial resources to the local 
government to help cope with and manage the hazards locally. However, the DM agency 
BNPB is not satisfied with the financial arrangements. This is exemplified by the statement 
made by BNPB: 
“...this has not been balanced with decentralisation or delegation of authority and 
resources, which actually is very much needed by local authorities to perform functions 
well....much of the existing resources are still concentrated at the National Level” (Interview 
1, 16 February 2009).  
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It is also observed that the planned contingency budget (i.e. for pre-disaster preparedness) 
is consistently slightly lower than the approved disaster risk reduction contingency budget. 
There was a gradual convergence between proposed and actual allocated budgets in the 
years 2006, 2007 and 2008. 
 
Figure 42: Contingency budget of local and national government 
 
Data source: Ministry of Finance, Indonesia 2009 
 
6.1.7.4 Unjust Allocation of Funds 
Further analysis shows that almost all the districts and provinces had an increase in their 
contingency budgets for DM; however the allocation per district and province varied 
significantly. For instance, Java Barat, Java Tengen, Katim, Sulteng, Bali and Papua 
received  more than +3% increase in the local contingency budget59
An informant interview on the differential contingency budget allocation reveals key 
institutional weaknesses in the national DRR financing.  The Co-Chairman of the Parliament 
Budget Committee of the Republic of Indonesia said: 
 (APBD) for the year 
2009 compared to 2007, while Maku reported a decrease of about -1% in 2009 compared 
to 2007.  
“...up to now, the contingency budget has more or less depended on the political judgement 
of the government and the budget committee of the DPR (i.e. House of Representatives). 
The government has the power to propose which districts it prefers to allocate; this could 
                                                            
59 Budget allocation ratio is accumulation of contingency budget region (Provinsi and Kabupaten/Kota)  to  total  APBD 
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depend on the amount requested from the local government, but in many cases not all the 
requesting proposals from local government are accepted... it could also depend on the 
budget committee's judgement, mostly because a mayor from a certain district can strongly 
defend and win the arguments over the debate in the committee session” (Interview 6, 15 
October 2009).  
In a separate discussion, BNPB mentioned that: 
 
“Financial resources for DRR also depend on the local government’s financial capacity..... for 
instance in Jakarta the local government is rich and can afford to allocate adequate funds 
for preparedness if they are committed, compared to some less rich cities, and it is for that 
reason that some local governments can only ask central government for recovery funds 
rather than for preparedness” (Interview 1, 16 February 2009).  
Therefore, although all the districts and provinces had an increase in their contingency 
budget for DM, the allocation per district and province vary significantly. This suggests the 
ongoing multi-level institutional financial weaknesses and challenges in Indonesia despite 
the disaster management regulations on DM financing (i.e. PP22/2008). The contingency 
budget financing depends on the political judgement of the government of the day and the 
abilities of local leaders to propose and defend their proposed budget at the budget 
committee rather than on a clear institutional set-up and mechanisms. Therefore, provinces 
and districts with lower abilities in proposing and defending proposed budgets can be left 
behind in DRR, and this reveals unjust prevailing conditions in budget allocation. BNPB also 
stated that: 
  
“There is inconsistency in the framework and lack of an integrated mechanism to allocate 
resources for every region” (Interview 1, 16 February 2009).  
6.1.7.5 Perplexing Multi-Level Bureaucratic Mechanisms and Delayed Funds 
 
Another issue raised by BNPB is the absence of a mechanism for technical implementation 
for rapid resource mobilisation. There are problems with emergency funds or on-call funds. 
It is argued that: 
“...fund distribution was slow due to perplexing bureaucratic mechanisms from the national 
level to the provincial level and regional level. It took months after the emergency response 
was over until the on-call funds arrived at the disaster–affected regions” (Interview 1, 16 
February 2009).  
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Moreover, detailed mechanisms, standard frameworks and criteria need to be developed to 
effectively support the institutional financing for DRR. The major advantage of well defined 
criteria is that they will save time in debating such budget allocating issues and potential 
inequitable, unjust and very slow distribution of funds for DM between districts and 
provinces. 
6.1.7.6 Securing Disaster Management Budgeting  
 
The critical elements identified by actors are that budgeting for DM planning is a very 
complex issue, particularly as there was no DM plan, which is an essential document 
needed as the basis for budgeting. However, actors indicated that very recently BAPPENAS 
has successfully completed a DM plan and a National Action Plan for DRR (NAP-DRR 2010-
2014)60
6.1.7.7 Distribution of Funds across the Tsunami Early Warning System 
 to be integrated into the National Development Plan (NDP) as well as a mid-term 
Government Plan. This will ensure that DRR is included in the Government Annual Plans and 
that DM budgeting becomes the priority for the next development program in Indonesia.  
The other issue that actors have complained about is the fact that most funding was heavily 
focused on the technical development of the technical TEWS and much less was allocated 
for the downstream culture component. UNESCO and RISTEK point out that as the technical 
upstream warning system is being established, funds are reducing but there is a shift in 
allocation from upstream to the downstream culture component of the EWS. In reality, it is 
obvious that both financial resources and priorities are reducing and gradually shifting. This 
is very well captured by the statements made by RISTEK who said that: 
“TEWS is no longer a government priority in disaster management because the upstream 
component is close to completion and there is a parallel shift in interest to climate change 
issues and adaptation which are also attracting potential external funds. In addition, we 
have even covered the financial gap and pledged DRR related budget for LIPI for the year 
2009.... it is now becoming difficult to get new funding and quite difficult to push the TEWS 
as a sustained national priority” (Interview 7, 24, 25 and 26 October). 
6.1.8 Actors’ Conflicts and Coping Strategies 
In the action arena, it is not surprising to uncover that there are instances of both synergy 
and conflict between different actors; between the overarching norms and principles that 
govern these interactions, and between norms and principles that run through distinct 
institutions. In the following sections, discussions focus on the relatively mild conflicts which 
                                                            
60 Expected to be endorsed by the President 
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emerged between key international actors, between actors in the observation and risk 
knowledge production, and over financial resources, and how actors managed those 
conflicts. It is underlined that conflict is an integral part of social life (Galtung 2003) and 
when constructively managed, can be even considered a dynamic force of social 
development (Dahrendorf 1992). Violence is what has to be prevented (Bohle 2007). 
At the international level, following the tsunami disaster, international actors such the 
United States and Japan with many years of experience in operational TEWS were 
confronted by the fact that Germany was interested and would spearhead TEWS in 
Indonesia. Germany was formally recognised as an inexperienced actor in the TEWS 
compared to the traditional experienced actors such as the United States and Japan who 
have decades of operational TEWS. An article highlighted “The job of detecting the next 
wave in time now falls to the Germans, a move that brought them little more than 
widespread derision at first” (Der Speigel  11.06. 2008). According to the Der Spiegel61
On the other hand, a reasonable criticism was also put across by prominent international 
experts concerning the development of a new TEWS in terms of the time needed to develop 
a new technology and fine tune it. It was reported that “ the director of the Tsunami 
Research Centre at the University of Southern California, is also frustrated that India, 
Indonesia and Germany are wasting time developing their own buoys and pressure sensors, 
which will require time to fine-tune, when effective technology already exists” (Der Speigel  
11.06 2008). However, it is reported that the so-called criticisms and concern have grown 
silent since then. "The design of the system seems sound," says Vasily Titow, a tsunami 
researcher in the United States, while Costas Synolakis of the University of Southern 
California has almost paternal words of praise for the Germans, saying: "While I was one of 
the early critics, I have to admit that German scientists have made incredible strides 
towards developing the system" (Der Speigel 11. 06. 2008). 
   
“experts in Japan and the United States claimed that the German tsunami neophytes had 
too little experience with monster waves...the Germans faced malicious criticism when early 
measuring buoys were torn from their moorings and ended up adrift off the coast”.  
On the other hand, there is a general perception that there is some duplication and conflicts 
among actors in the seismic observation which involves different countries such as 
Germany, Japan, and China. In addition, duplication and conflict have emerged in the risk 
knowledge component of the TEWS. GTZ-IS points out: 
                                                            
61 http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,588919,00.html 
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“Hazard and tsunami risk maps were being prepared by different actors and there were 
conflicting results. In the end, the key decisions were delayed until a convergence and 
standardised result was agreed by all” (Interview 8, 29 January 2009). 
Furthermore, it is not surprising to find that the underlying causes leading to conflicts 
between actors are related to the distribution of donor funding, particularly at the local 
levels. The two key issues outlined are how funds are distributed between different 
stakeholders to carry out activities and resulting potential conflicts from duplication in 
activities.  
However, conflicts have often been well managed by actors at different levels. According to 
BMKG, the German EW system technology was carefully designed to allow some synergy 
and integration for seismic and tsunami monitoring such that potential conflicts in common 
interest areas were minimised. The Decision Support System (DSS) can accept data signal 
input from different sensors from different countries, individually process the signal and 
display the analysis results simultaneously for comparison. The INATEWS design 
architecture minimises conflicts of interest by employing a seismic integration system as 
indicated in Chapter 3. However, the system integration is also acknowledged by BMKG as a 
challenge in terms of training experts for each individual seismic system, and also the 
problem of maintaining different components from different countries. Therefore, while the 
seismic system integration has literally galvanised the immediate risk of conflicts and serves 
as an important backup system, the long-term sustainability of the separate imported 
technologies is the challenge.   
On the other hand, at the sub-national levels, decision and policy-makers requested actors 
to collaborate and avoid conflicting results in risk mapping. In other cases, civil societies are 
often exercising the win-win or mutual gains bargaining strategy as an alternative approach 
to dispute resolution. This is reflected closely in the response of MPBI who stated:  
“...although there are certain duplications which result in potential conflicts they are 
actually minimised by first carrying out an initial assessment of the situation and if 
necessary, cooperating and working with other actors” (Interview 5, 3 November 2008).  
6.1.9 Actors’ Transparency, Social Cohesion and Trust 
It is important to understand if actors are satisfied with the level of transparency, social 
cohesion and trust in building the TEWS in Indonesia.  The international actors including 
GTZ-IS, InWent, UNESCO and local actor KOGAMI perceived that there was a lack of 
transparency, mainly linked with financial resources and information sharing.  In contrast, 
most state actors thought there was a reasonably high degree of transparency among 
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actors in the context of the TEWS. The issue of lack of transparency is exemplified by GTZ-
IS who argued: 
“Indonesia received different financial resources from different donors, but how much has 
been received is not clear among all the stakeholders” (Interview 8, 29 January 2009).  
Interestingly many actors have realised that being well informed is strategically important 
and there is sufficient competition in the action arena even in the TEWS. KOGAMI argued: 
“...Sharing of information is not really transparent between NGOs because of the potential 
competition among so many local actors here in Indonesia” (Interview 9, 3 March 2009).  
Surprisingly, it is interesting to find that cohesion and trust among the actors was perceived 
as high. This agrees well with the UNDP report which underlined that the fast pace of the 
legal reform in Indonesia and the formation of the National Platform for DRR was based on 
the strong collegial bond and high trust between actors, which attracted additional actors to 
the cause (UNDP 2009). The mechanisms described by actors of encouraging social 
cohesion and trust worked through regular contacts such as meetings at the national level, 
music, sports and tsunami drills in the local community. Many actors stated that the best 
time of social harmony and trust building was actually during and following tsunami drills in 
the local communities where new things were discovered collectively. However, it was also 
found that social cohesion and trust were not institutionally based but rather personal. 
KOGAMI points out:  
“Social cohesion and trust is strongly personal rather than institutional... I can easily 
contact and discuss issues with certain officials of different organisations ’’ (Interview 9, 3 
March 2009). 
6.2 Actors’ Perspectives of the Tsunami Early Warning System Architecture  
 
In this section, the actor’s perspectives of the TEWS architecture are examined and 
described. Actors were questioned on the issues of the difficulties, challenges and 
implications of implementing the new architecture. Furthermore actors were specifically 
questioned on formal and informal rules and whether there were conflicts between informal 
and formal rules ranging from risk knowledge to response phases of the EW process. Other 
questions related to their perceptions of roles and responsibilities and if these were clear 
and working. Furthermore, actors were asked if the rules were appropriate, who was 
disregarding rules, if rules were enforced and whether there were capacities for 
enforcement and monitoring. Lastly, actors were questioned on the perceptions of 
modifying the rules (i.e. institutional change) where they were identified as not working. 
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6.2.1 Challenges in Implementing the Polycentric-Multi-Level Architectures  
6.2.1.1 Local Regulations to Transform the Local Disaster Management Agencies 
Firstly, the completion of DM local regulation (i.e. Perda) according to the DM law 24/2007 
which would transform the previously coordinating and implementing unit of SATKORLAK 
and SATLAK in the provinces and regencies/cities respectively to BPBD is still an ongoing 
challenge. The actual reality on the ground shows that only few provinces and districts have 
completed the Perda disaster management local regulation to allow the transformation to 
take place. The head of BNPB outlined that:  
“In our department, we have members of the BARKONAS team in the central government, 
a lot of personnel that are experts in their own particular fields including the ones 
developing the network with universities to create applicable technologies.... The regional 
governments have been unresponsive and unwilling to accept these experts to look into 
such matters in helping them to formulate their local regulations and other issues. This 
rejection has been looked into, but we are still not sure why it happened. I have requested 
the regional governments to take these experts as consultants. It will benefit their areas, 
because we do hope that all development in the country will be based on disaster risks” 
(Interview 1, 16 February 2009). 
6.2.1.2 Few Provincial and District Disaster Management Agencies and Emergency 
Operation Centres 
 
Secondly, actors pointed out that in reality, so far only the National DM Agency has been 
established at national level while only six out 33 provinces have established disaster 
management agencies. At lower levels, only six out of 450 districts and municipalities have 
DM officers (BPBD).  UNESCO comments: 
 
“The disaster management law mentions a National Disaster Management Centre can, if 
necessary, be a local centre; however local disaster centres have not been established yet” 
(Interview 3, 27 October 2008).  
 
Thirdly, actors indicated that only Aceh has a complete EOC at the provincial level, which 
proved to be successful during the Aceh tsunami drill of 2008; however the emergency 
system at lower levels was reported to be ineffective (BGR 2008). In this context, actors 
such as GTZ-IS (2009) have questioned “whether smaller and economically weaker districts 
have the financial and human resources to implement and operate this kind of service”. 
GTZ-IS also points out that “even in the pilot areas it wasn’t possible yet to establish these 
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services in a reliable way”. It is also unclear who will provide the financial support to set up 
all the EW structures at provincial and local levels.  
6.2.2 Implications of Embedding the INATEWS System in a Larger Architecture  
The most important implications of embedding the INATEWS within BNPB and using the 
EOCs as part of the operational arm of BNPB is that it is an important step towards effective 
governance of hazards through a multi-hazard approach (i.e. tsunamis, floods, volcanoes, 
landslides etc) by optimising existing resources to effectively respond to local ecological 
challenges. The concentration of responsibilities offers a great chance to back up and 
empower levels below the national level which depends on the support from the top.  
However, the key negative implications to be cautious about in embedding the INATEWS 
structure in the BNPB structure are bureaucracy and ineffective governance resulting from 
the creation of a larger structure, noting that Indonesia already suffers from bureaucracy 
and corruption. For instance BGR points out: 
“There is a concentration of mandates, and BNPB is emerging as a rather complex super 
organisation with challenging tasks and  responsibilities, considering BNPB will have to deal 
with multi-hazards, not only tsunami”( Interview 2, 3 March 2009). 
Similarly, apart from the questions of how to support and maintain financially the multi-
level EOCs, there is a real danger that such architecture may be ineffective if not properly 
resourced. This is exemplified by the argument made by GTZ-IS: 
“Such a centralized local 24/7 service might represent a deadly bottleneck in the warning 
chain if it fails to take a decision and to communicate guidance messages on time” 
(Interview 8, 29.01.2009).  
Similar concerns actually surfaced in a recent and final GITEWS capacity building workshop 
hosted by INWENT in Jakarta from 21-22nd April 201062
                                                            
62 Participated in the GITEWS Capacity Building Unit final workshop 
. The agenda of the workshop was 
to examine the achievements and the way forward for sustainable capacity building in the 
INATEWS and beyond as the project has formally ended. Interestingly, the deliberations of 
the workshop indicated that the legitimate actor, i.e. the DM agency BNPB, was unwilling to 
take responsibility and leadership in future capacity building. It is pointed out that capacity 
building for disaster preparedness and response is a mandate of BNPB through the DM law 
No.24/2007. BNPB argued that their hands were already full with many responsibilities. 
From an institutional perspective it is difficult to enforce rules and have a successful 
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outcome if actors do not agree. Hence, actors who wish to lead capacity building until BNPB 
is capable of taking that role do not have the official institutional mandate and resources to 
do so. It is pointed out that RISTEK no longer has the legitimacy to accept the responsibility 
as the Ministerial Decree SK21/2006 mandating such responsibility has expired. It appears 
there is no continuity and immediate leadership in capacity building which is an essential 
element for sustainability of the INATEWS and DM in Indonesia.  Nevertheless, actors have 
agreed to have more consultations to address the problem. The outcome clearly 
demonstrates the implications of embedding the INATEWS into a larger structure with 
increasing responsibilities for all hazards and disasters.  
6.2.3 Formal, Informal Institutional Arrangements and Potential Conflicts  
 
It is important to note that all actors were aware of the official rules such as decree 21 and 
the DM law No.24/2007 and the ongoing process of implementation at different levels 
across Indonesia. The main issues raised are discussed further. 
6.2.3.1 Local Reaction and Response Behaviours 
 
It was remarkable to observe the diversity of discussions among actors in relation to 
informal rules, yet these converged on the local reaction and response behaviours 
distinguished by scientific and non-scientific approaches and their potential advantages and 
disadvantages created. For example UNESCO comments: 
“In some areas, informal rules are part of the traditional knowledge such as the ‘Smong 
story’ in Simelue Island, Aceh, underlying the importance of traditional informal knowledge 
as an important institutional norm” (Interview 3, 27 October 2008).  
Lassa (2009) reported that only seven people died from the 26 December 2004 tsunami on 
the island because the community ran to high ground following the earthquake and draw 
down of the tide. The possible reason for the low number of deaths is the Smong story 
which was documented by UNISDR in the context of ‘The Power of Knowledge’. The local 
leader of the Simelue district reports that ‘In 1907 a smong (i.e. tsunami) happened here in 
Simuelue, and so our grandmothers always gave us the following advice: if an earthquake 
comes, we must go and look at the beach: if the sea is at low tide the smong or tsunami 
will be coming and we must look for higher ground.’ Based on knowledge developing in the 
Simeulue community, the earthquake and tsunami was known as the Smong of 07, an  
Acehnese term for tsunami, meaning ‘air bah dari laut’ (i.e. big flood from the sea)(Lassa 
2008).   
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Most people thought that the Smong was found only in the Simelue islands. However, it was 
also found on mainland South and Southeast Aceh. Lassa (2008) suggests that the Smong 
has been paternalistically shared amongst the locals through generations, exclusively in the 
Simelue islands and points out that the fundamental weakness of the traditional knowledge 
EWS is that it is rarely replicated in neighbouring districts and he suggests that it works 
best only where a formal EWS is absent (Gregg et al., 2007).  
On the other hand, the disadvantages due to conflicts between formal and informal 
approaches were outlined by many actors in diverse contexts. For example, UNESCO said 
that: 
“A volcanic threat was identified in west Java but the local leader ignored the threat, and 
the local community listens to their local leader. Fortunately nothing happened, but in the 
process the authorities were undermined” (Interview 3, 27 October 2008). 
In contrast, MPBI points out the mix of advantages and disadvantages of informal 
institutions.  It is argued that: 
“Some local leaders could be a problem in DRR.  In the Merapi mountains the local leader 
told the people to stay despite the danger of the volcano. In that case an earthquake 
happened and many people died, but on the other hand, in a different situation, the local 
leader asked the people to leave and many people left and as a result only one person died. 
In the end, the local leader was right and became an advertising model” (Interview 5, 3 
November 2008). 
6.2.3.2 Mysticism and Superstitious Norms 
 
The most concerning issue raised among diverse actors with reference to hazards and 
disasters affecting the community was linked with religious beliefs where people often 
perceive disasters are God’s way. In a Saturday sermon at Jakarta’s largest mosque 
following tremors felt in Jakarta on Monday, 19th July 2007, the President Susilo Bambang 
Yudhoyono of Indonesia was quoted as saying “Earthquakes are part of God’s creation to 
maintain the balance in the universe.... It is, therefore, up to us Indonesians, as a nation, 
to manage wisely both this God-given wealth as its disasters” KOMPAS (21.07.2007). 
KOMPAS reported that President Yudhoyono has been busy giving lectures to all levels of 
society, from evacuees of the most recent earthquake and tsunami in the south of Java to 
leaders in Jakarta, on geological realities in Indonesia. KOMPAS argues “the President is 
fully aware that, faced with continuous huge disasters during the past year, many if not 
most Indonesians will prefer to believe in mysticism if not in superstitious explanations, 
rather than seek scientific and rational clarifications”  
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This explanation is consistent with the findings of (Lavigne et al., 2008) who found that 
97% of those surveyed around the Merapi Mountains thought the eruptions were a reproach 
from the supernatural world and they did not see death as a negative event. It was rather a 
regenerative process that should be accepted with human humility. Both the environment 
and risk are based on social constructs, suggesting that individuals and groups with 
different world views will have different risk views (Wildavsky 1979). On the other hand, 
Douglas (1992) concurred from a more anthropological perspective, indicating different 
societies fear different sorts of threats which correlate with differences in social structure.  
6.2.4 Functionality of Institutional Arrangements 
6.2.4.1 Coordination 
It is generally perceived that coordination has improved and become more efficient both 
upstream and downstream of the INATEWS. Actors reported that the mechanisms that have 
helped improve coordination include the institutional formal appointment of RISTEK as the 
interim coordinator of the INATEWS through the Ministerial Decree 21/2005, regular 
monthly meetings, reporting, sharing and information exchange through mailing, workshops 
and conferences. In addition, RISTEK has prepared tsunami guidelines to help in better 
coordination. 
 
Defining roles and responsibilities at different levels among organizations and actors is an 
important element of improving the linkages and coordination for an effective TEWS. The 
actors’ responses on the issue reveal that multi-level roles and responsibilities are still 
lacking but are working better in the upstream technical component of the TEWS. Actors 
suggested that more time is required to properly define roles and responsibilities down to 
the local level.  These problems are highlighted by RISTEK who said: 
“According to the Ministerial  Decree No. 21 on paper, responsibilities are defined but there 
are still some overlaps and they are not always clear and working, especially in the 
downstream component... for instance each time there is a tsunami drill the procedures are 
different ..... in the last drill in December 2008 there was no Emergency Operations Centre 
for Gorontalo on 26th December 2008, an island located to the north. According to the rules 
and procedures there needs to be an Emergency Operations Centre for drill simulation. To 
solve the immediate problem, a temporary Emergency Operations Centre was quickly 
established by the local authorities just for the drill’’ (Interview 7, 15 January 2009). 
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In addition, RISTEK underlines:  
“Preparedness for the drill fell under the responsibility of the Indonesian navy and the 
concept was totally inappropriate. It seems there is little scope for much improvement....  I 
also think disasters should be managed at city level. The tsunami drill exercises were 
supposed to allow local authorities to prepare, but in reality the local people have no 
authority because the organisations who were supposed to be responsible for the tsunami 
drill are very problematic and there are often completely new faces’’(Interview 7, 15  
January 2009).  
The second problem of coordination is linked with the authority of RISTEK as the 
coordinator of the INATEWS according to Decree 21/2006. RISTEK is part of a ministry that 
is small relative to other government ministries, with inadequate authority and power 
across scales in Indonesia.  Some actors have criticised RISTEK for lacking leadership and 
authority in implementing activities. However, another RISTEK official clearly and strongly 
states: 
 
“We are the coordinator of the INATEWS by mandate of the Decree; however we are not an 
implementer of activities in the TEWS and disaster management” (Interview 10, 18 
February 2009).  
Thirdly, coordination has been affected in some cases due to lack of timely reporting and 
information sharing among actors at the local level. What NGOs are doing on certain remote 
islands is sometimes unreported and uncertain.  However, the other dimension of the 
problem is that there is a lack of structures to support communication throughout Indonesia 
at different levels. This is supported by UNESCO who clearly pointed out: 
“Indonesia is a big country and most of the national actors including the coordinating 
institution RISTEK are all located in Jakarta, therefore coordination is not easy” (Interview 
3, 27 October 2008). 
This suggests that coordination can be improved with multiple information and 
communication centres rather than having them concentrated at a single point in Jakarta. 
The EOCs or local DM Agencies are in a favourable position to support communication and 
coordination at the local levels within the community. This issue is further discussed in 
chapter 7. 
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6.2.5 Monitoring and Enforcement of the Institutional Arrangements 
6.2.5.1 A New Concept 
 
Clearly, institutional monitoring and enforcement either in the TEWS and DM is a new 
concept for the Indonesian authorities and the community. Therefore, it is not surprising to 
find that all actors indicated that it is rather too early to comment on the institutional 
monitoring and enforcement as the DM law and regulations has just been enacted. BNPB 
argues that: 
“Enforcement of the institutional arrangements including the disaster management law is 
rather new and is an ongoing process. However, it terms of the TEWS it is sometimes 
difficult to identify the mistake. When the Disaster Management Agencies and Emergency 
Operations Centres are fully established it is envisaged we will have the time and capacity 
for institutional monitoring and enforcement” (Interview 1, 16 February 2009). 
Although the institutional arrangements in DM and EW are new there are already some 
efforts towards the monitoring of procedures. For example, drills and table top evaluation 
have provided some opportunities to monitor operational rules but lack proper feedback and 
legitimate enforcement as no-one is punished for mistakes.  
6.2.5.2 Investing in DRR, Administration of Funds and Accountability 
 
An interesting problem which has emerged relating to the monitoring and enforcement of 
the rules of the game in DM and EW is that local authorities are simply not spending or 
investing in DRR because of worries about penalties. For example, the BNPB head states: 
“There are many regional governments reluctant to use their budgets because they are 
afraid of being audited.... Now the coordination has to be segmented. There has to be some 
sort of cost setting, some kind of sharing, and the disaster-struck regency can take on 
some of those responsibilities, at least in cases where they can contribute” (Interview 1, 16 
February 2009).  
By revisiting DM law No.24/2007, it is found that chapter XI, Penal Provisions, Article 78 
states that “anybody who deliberately misuses disaster aid management as referred to 
Article 65, shall be punished by life imprisonment or imprisonment of at least 4 years or at 
most 20 years and a fine of at least six billion rupiah or at most twelve billion rupiah”.  This 
partly explains why local authorities are unwilling to spend the DM budget despite the 
Government Regulation No.22/2008 concerning Disaster Aid Financing and Management, 
Chapter III Articles 10 to 23 clearly detail how, who, where, and when in regard to using 
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the  funds. It is would be interesting to find if the local authorities need familiarisation with 
the legal regulations or are simply evading legal risks associated with DM spending.  
Another major problem related to the issue of financial expenditure monitoring and the 
chance for enforcing rules relates to the lack of timely feedback and clear financial 
expenditure data from both the international communities and the central government. The 
existing database does not have specific data on DRR but rather sectoral and departmental 
spending. The data available are based on estimation and it is difficult to assess whether 
the spending meets actual needs. Of greater interest is that there is a lot of spending but 
no tracking is currently possible at the sub-national governments. The problems of proper 
documentation and expenditure tracing raise the questions of efficiency and possible 
corruption.  
6.2.5.3 Dynamic Pressures and Root Causes 
 
Currently BNPB is overwhelmed and confronted with the challenge of how to deal with 
existing settlements in the high risk areas. RISTEK pointed out that this goal is very difficult 
and challenging in developing countries. This is exemplified by the argument raised by 
RISTEK:  
“..the floods in Jakarta are perceived by the poor people as normal events and people do 
not really view them as disasters, particularly if you have a non-permanent house, because 
poverty is the real disaster…many times the government has destroyed the slums but 
people still return. People complain that within one year a flood occurs only in two weeks 
and they are not afraid of disasters because poverty is their disaster….enforcement of risk 
zones is very challenging and it is not easy to make people move’’ (Interview 10, 18 
February 2009).  
The other challenge is that reducing the underlying risk is not only a complex issue of 
extreme poverty, but also a problem associated with illegal development in restricted areas. 
For instance in Bali, development in restricted areas is an ongoing challenge, a battle 
between rapid tourism-related developments often infringing on protection and 
conservation areas. The main problem is that developers do not wait for permit approval or 
have none while others build in the restricted zones which are either conservation areas or 
which violate local zoning rules such as the 100-meter no-build zone from the high water 
mark. These illegal and rapid developments are likely to generate new risks. The 
enforcement problems are due to overlapping institutional mandates and lack of 
cooperation among actors, and long bureaucratic procedures leading to bribes and 
corruption. The emerging solutions identified are a cross-sector approach and public 
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accountability as observed in 2006 and again in 2009 when there were a large number of 
complaints from the general public and groups. BNPB argues: 
“Institutions have started to enforce policies on building codes, zoning, and building 
construction permits and there is a growing awareness of the need for earthquake-proof 
buildings and an effort to certify the quality of buildings” (Interview 1, 16 February 2009).  
These accounts highlight the relationship between the EWS, poverty and development. 
6.2.5.4 Infrastructure Security  
 
Maintaining INATEWS security is also an important issue raised at different levels by the 
actors. Following the tsunami disaster in December 2004, diverse actors cooperated to 
develop a TEWS. Part of the system is highly technical, requiring networks of complex and 
expensive instruments, from ocean sensors to sirens located along the coast as explained 
earlier.  However, it is evident that no-one really thought about securing the instruments 
and the infrastructure, which required additional logistical resources and financial 
arrangements. UNESCO reports: 
“In Aceh63
In addition RISTEK argues:  
 angry villagers stoned and damaged a tsunami warning siren after it accidentally 
went off, triggering panic in the region’’ (Interview 3, 27 October 2008). 
“Vandalism of buoys is a real challenge and there is a lack of knowledge and awareness in 
the local community, particularly among the local fishermen” (Interview 10, 18 February 
2009).  
Recently it was found that the towers of the recovered buoys, equipped with GPS, 
meteorological sensors and solar panels had been used by fishing boats as moorings, 
preventing data from being transmitted to the tsunami warning centre (GTZ-IS 2009). In 
early 2009, the Capacity Building Unit64 consisting of twenty stakeholder organisations of 
the INATEWS also debated65
                                                            
63 The region hardest hit by the 2004 killer waves 
 the issue of vandalism as it threatens the operations of the 
INATEWS. Actors agreed that there is a need for further education, awareness, sensitisation 
and more frequent coast guard patrols. However, the law and order enforcement actors 
(i.e. Police) pointed out that security and enforcement would require additional resources 
and financial arrangements. The same concern was also raised at the international level, 
where the intergovernmental oceanographic commission also urged member states to note 
64 As per Decree SK MENRISTEK No. 68/M/Kp/V2008 
65 Personnel attendance of the meeting 
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the impact of vandalism to Deep Ocean and other monitoring stations on the tsunami 
detection capacity of the IOTWS (ICG/IOTWS-VI/3s 2009). In this context, the EWS should 
also include additional financial arrangements and resources to secure the safety of such 
expensive technological devices. 
6.2.5.5 Capacities for Institutional Monitoring and Enforcement  
 
Indonesia has witnessed remarkable institutional change to manage hazards and disasters. 
However, monitoring and enforcement of the rules of DM is greatly lacking and this is linked 
to available human resources and capacities.  BNPB clearly pointed out that there is a lack 
of training and leadership in institutional monitoring and enforcement. It was suggested 
that further training is needed to support the monitoring and enforcement of rules, and this 
should be an important component of future capacity building program. Meanwhile, key 
actors indicated their interest in this area when rules are finalised. For instance, GTZ-IS 
pointed out: 
“Once the SOPs are developed we will be monitoring the implementation of the institutional 
arrangements” (Interview 8, 29 January 2009). 
6.2.5.6 Institutional Development / Change Process 
 
It is underlined that Indonesia has just experienced a major institutional change in terms of 
new laws, regulations and policies etc. However, not all actors are satisfied with the 
institutional arrangements for DM. There is a general consensus that the law, regulations 
and actions of the government pay less attention to preparedness and mitigation compared 
to response. Nevertheless, currently actors are not remarkably motivated to change 
existing process level institutional arrangements (i.e. DM law). Most actors suggested that 
more time is needed to observe and experience the strengths and weaknesses of the DM 
related rules before engaging in further institutional change. It is pointed out that lower 
hierarchy institutional arrangements such as regulations, SOPs and guidelines will dominate 
the arena for the next few years. These include the need to formulate new higher order 
institutional arrangements to create a culture of disaster preparedness starting at school 
level, new policies to help regulate multi-hazard governance, and  Presidential regulation 
through a participatory approach to tackle the issues of disaster status and thus allow funds 
and resources to flow as rapidly as possible and improve response. 
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6.3 Actors’ Interactions with the Tsunami Early Warning System Architecture  
 
In this section, focus is on the general interactions of the actors with the different elements 
of the TEWS in Indonesia, from risk knowledge, monitoring and forecasting, to response. 
Chapter 7 will focus on the elements of the TEWS at the level of Padang and Bali. 
6.3.1 Emerging National Approach in Risk Knowledge and Communication 
6.3.1.1 New Historical Tsunami Events Discovered and Characterized 
 
Risk knowledge creation has progressed very well in Indonesia on different levels.  On one 
hand, typical hazard assessment continues to be of key interest for some actors. For 
example, approximately 26 new tele-tsunamis66
The essential characteristics of tsunami hazard knowledge have also improved. For 
example, Puspito and Gunawan (2005) shows that tsunamigenic earthquake magnitude 
varies from 5.6 to 9.0 with focal depths of earthquakes ranging from 10 to 130 km in the 
Sumatra region. The findings also suggest that most of the tsunamis in the Sumatra region 
were generated by moderate to great earthquakes with 84 % of tsunamis in the Sumatra 
region generated by earthquakes with a moment magnitude greater than 6.0, while about 
32 % were generated by moderate earthquakes of a moment magnitude between 6.1 to 
7.0, and about 30 % were generated by large earthquakes with a moment magnitude 
between 7.1 to 8.0. Great earthquakes of moment magnitude greater than 8.0 contributed 
to 22% of the tsunamis generated.  
 have been discovered (Macquarie 
University 2006). In terms of frequency of tsunamis, Puspito and Gunawan (2005) have 
shown that historical records indicate that a total of 163 tsunamis caused by earthquakes 
occurred in the region for a period from the year 1801 to 2006 (RISTEK 2005). There are 
records of around 135 such events over the last 400 years. Diposaptono (2008) shows that 
from 1960-2007 there have been 22 significant tsunamis. 
6.3.1.2 Vulnerability Analysis and Multidisciplinary Approach 
 
In addition, the emerging trend shows that risk knowledge has progressed beyond simple 
hazard assessment, with more focus on vulnerability and risk assessment. Risk knowledge 
creation ranges from a regional to local scale in geographical resolution. For instance, at 
regional level, a recent study based on a tsunami inundation deterministic scenario67
                                                            
66 Tele-tsunamis travel thousands of kilometres from source before reaching land 
 and 
population exposure shows Indonesia is exposed to the highest wave run-up ranging from 
67 No probabilities are associated with the scenarios which are important for effective risk assessment 
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5-20 m over most parts of the coast facing the Indian Ocean with an exposed population of 
1.5 million people (OCHA 2009). In some cases, vulnerability has been analysed over the 
components of the EW chain using criteria of potential vulnerability indicators derived 
through literature analysis as well as consultation with the local actors (Birkmann et al., 
2009). In addition dynamic vulnerability in terms of detailed population distribution for day 
and night time exposure to tsunamis along the southwest coast of Sumatra, Java, and Bali 
has also been addressed ( Rokhis et al., 2008).   
 
Another interesting development which has emerged is the combined use of remote 
sensing, GIS, satellite imagery, tsunami modelling, relevant geo-databases and socio data 
(Rokhis et al., 2008, Riedlinger et al., 2008, Konko 2008). For example in a study, 
integrative remote sensing and GIS approaches based on VHR Satellite Image (i.e. 
Quickbird) were employed to study building vulnerability in urban areas for the city of 
Cilacap. Results suggest Cilachap is highly vulnerable to tsunami hazard due to its poor 
buildings. Konko et al., (2008) shows that tsunami hazard potential covers 11.2 km
2 
of 
Cilachap for the worst-case scenario and there are twelve villages affected by tsunami. 
Villages at highest risk are identified and recommended as priority villages for 
preparedness. More complex work on risk has been carried out by international actors from 
DLR and partners and integrated in the database of the INATEWS for decision support and 
DM for the entire coastal area of Sumatra, Java and Bali. 
 
6.3.1.3 Tools, Standard Methodologies and Capacities for Risk Analysis   
 
Despite these achievements, it is clear that risk assessment has focused mainly on high 
hazard impact areas only. In certain regions and districts there is a lack of tools, 
standardised methodologies and capacities to carry out risk analysis and assessments. 
Therefore, there is insufficient interest to conduct risk assessment in most areas. BNPB 
states:  
 
“The core problem identified is the lack of awareness of the importance of disaster risk 
analysis while multi-risk assessment is poor due to lack of tools and their use especially at 
the local levels. A broad range of methods and techniques are being employed and there is 
lack of standardisation” (Interview 1, 16 February 2009).  
 
 
Actors’ Interaction and Perspectives 
 
 
141 
 
It is reported that a team consisting of experts from various institutions commissioned by 
the BNPB and RISTEK are currently preparing to formulate guidelines and standards for 
multi-risk assessment.  Formal agreements on hazard data have been produced by different 
sectoral ministries such as (BNPB), PIRBA (Ministry of Research and Technology/Menristek), 
and the National Agency for Space and Aeronautics (LAPAN). The Ministry of Home Affairs, 
mandated with regulation No.46/2008 has asked districts/city government to collect and 
report on occurrences of hazards in their areas. Several regions are meeting the 
requirements. There is an effort between various government and non-government 
organisation to develop a disaster information system to reach out to other actors and the 
community; however the existing information system is not user friendly and is difficult to 
access, and there should be increased data sharing among actors.  Currently, much of the 
data collected are being under-utilised at all levels.  
 
6.3.1.4 Institutional Authority and Multi-Sector Participation 
 
The International Strategy for Disaster Reduction (ISDR) advocates that DRR should start at 
school. In this respect, a Presidential Decree was issued to the Ministry of National 
Education and Ministry of Home Affairs to integrate DRR in school curricula; however actors 
reported that although there has been some formal and informal implementation, the 
Decree has not been implemented because the policy implementation instrument has not 
been devised at the national level. In other words it requires a higher order legal framework 
to effectively integrate DRR education in school curricula.  On the other hand, a national 
disaster day is generally observed in Indonesia, but multi-sector participation is described 
as very low. The business sector remains largely uninvolved in risk knowledge.  
6.3.2 The National Tsunami Warning Centre  
6.3.2.1 Observation and Monitoring 
 
The Grand Scenario strategic plan and the GITEWS design concept were very ambitious 
despite their weaknesses as discussed in Chapter 4. However, the actual ground realities 
suggest key ongoing challenges, for example in the monitoring and forecasting component 
of the TEWS. In the area of seismic observation the actors have so far completed only 
about 20% of the entire plan, even though it has been operational since November 2008. 
The entire Indonesian system needs 160 seismographs, and 500 units of accelerographs 
(i.e. to measure the speed of waves), as well as other supportive equipment. Recently, at 
the ICG/IOTEWS International Conference, BNPB reported major progress in installing a 
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total of 158 seismographs but only 112 accelerographs. Only a small percentage of these 
seismographs are actually capable of going online with the BMKG.  
A greater challenge has affected the ocean component of the TEWS. An in-depth interview 
with BMKG in January 2009 revealed that only two buoys have been installed in the deep 
ocean. There were problems in mooring the buoys, therefore they had to be recovered for 
repair. Deeper questioning on the issue also revealed that during the retrieve and repair 
there were no replacements for backup. This is a critical operational weakness should a 
significant earthquake occur. Later in April 2009, a further eight GPS-buoys were deployed 
along the Indian Ocean coastline off Sumatra and Java, by a German research vessel. The 
ocean monitoring planned to have 25 Dart buoys and currently there are close to twenty, 
but it is reported that very few are online or fully operational. In the case of sea level 
monitoring, only about half of the total expected 80 tide gauge stations have been installed. 
Similarly, in the context of GPS observation of the earth deformation only half of the targets 
of 50 stations have so far been accomplished.  
What is also revealing is that although there are formal agreements in terms of MoU 
between institutions for observing respective parameters and sending the data to BMKG as 
the mandated tsunami warning centre, there have been some problems with data sharing 
between the institutional actors, at least in the period of late 2008. There is a general sense 
of confusion among actors. Actors indicated that it is not clear what is going on in the 
upstream technical part of the TEWS. Apparently, there is either a lack of transparency on 
the ongoing technical challenges faced by the respective institutions or there is a lack of 
clear communication and understanding on what the problems between the actors are, 
given that the explanations may be technical in nature. 
6.3.2.2 Technical Capabilities and False Tsunami Alerts 
 
In terms of warning accuracy, BMKG acknowledges that there are many false alarms. BMKG 
explains that the main reason for the relatively high number of false alerts is that there is a 
lack of compromise between the present technical capabilities and political goals which 
demand a warning to be issued within five minutes. Firstly, it is argued that the seismic 
network is not dense enough, especially to the east of Indonesia. Secondly, the earthquake 
moment magnitude threshold to issue potential tsunami messages is too low at 6.6 Mw.  
BMKG said: 
“...there is a need to reach a technical-socio-political balance to minimise false alerts” 
(Interview 11, 19 February 2009). 
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In other words, this statement can be interpreted as showing the need to engage less in 
politics and more in science to 
reduce false alerts. 
However, such balance has political 
and social consequences. To partly 
address the problem rather than 
increase the time taken to evaluate 
the earthquake event, BMKG states 
that they are in the process of 
elevating the threshold level for 
potential tsunami warnings to 7.0 
Mw with the objective of minimising 
the rate of false alarms. Figure 43 
shows the gradual improvement in 
the tsunami warnings characterised 
by fewer false tsunami alerts. 
However, what has to be realised is that by elevating the threshold to 7.0 moment 
magnitude, there will be a compromise between achieving higher levels of accuracy 
compared to a complete miss. It is recalled that 32 % of tsunamis are generated by 
moderate earthquakes of moment magnitudes between 6.1-7.0 (Puspito and Gunawan 
2005).  
6.3.2.3 Uptaking Imported Technology and Human Resources 
 
The Tsunami Early Warning Centre is now a highly technical institution with diverse and 
sophisticated novel technologies, mostly imported from Germany, Japan and China etc.  
Actors have been trained to operate and run the system. However, more specialised 
dedicated human resources are required to operate such complex systems. Actors are very 
concerned about the ‘jack of all trades and master of none’ mentality developing because 
technicians and IT personnel are always on the move in the different sections of the 
organisation. It is argued that it is difficult to specialise. On this note, to exemplify the 
concern, BMKG said: 
“Due to the complexity of the tsunami observation and forecasting system it is vital to have 
separate dedicated staff to specialise in the areas of information and technology, and 
engineering in the TEWS” (Interview 11, 19 February 2009). 
 
 
Figure 43: Percentage of false tsunami warnings from INATEWS 
2007-2010 
Source: BMKG 2010 
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6.3.3 Dissemination and Communication 
Chapters 7 and 8 will provide further details on the actual status of the dissemination and 
communication part of the INATEWS. In general in Indonesia, this component still faces the 
most challenges, primarily because there is a lack of a dedicated system to reach the 
community, and the existing one is characterised by breakdowns and systems failures. In 
addition, the dissemination and communication system depends on the institutional warning 
change which is still under development or only emerging in some areas. The 
communication of information is usually late and at times authorities are confused whether 
to inform the public or not.  
6.3.4 The Emerging National Approach to Response 
6.3.4.1 Sectoral Fragmentation and Coordination Difficulties 
 
There is a wide scope of activities and actors involved in this phase. The attention here is on 
the issues of disaster preparedness for an effective response at all levels. There are several 
national to village level personnel and volunteers tasked with response and they include 
PMI, the Rapid Response Team (TRC), and others. International organisations that are 
mandated include UNOCHA, UNICEF, WFP, UNFPA. However, currently, there are poor 
coordination mechanisms due to sectoral fragmentation causing overlapping and 
duplication. BNPB said: 
“The absence of integration and harmonisation of inter-institutional rules resulted in lack of 
coordination and confusion, particularly in budget use” (Interview 1, 16 February 2009). 
An institutional arrangement for financial reserves is in place to support response and 
recovery when required. Emergency/ buffer stocks have been prepared by the government 
for Disaster Emergency response at all levels (tents, rice medical supplies etc) and the 
available contingency budget can be increased when needed. Under the Government 
Regulation No.23/2008, donor organisations can also provide contingency funds.   
6.3.4.2 Disaster Preparedness and Contingency Plans 
 
To this end, GTZ-IS has produced two case studies for evacuation planning (one with DLR), 
a manual for tsunami drill (Bantul), documentation of the drill in Bantul, evacuation plans at 
sub-village level and provision of evacuation signs. RISTEK produced a guideline68
                                                            
68 The Guideline elaborates on the need for testing the tsunami EWS, establishment of an organising committee, disaster scenario 
formulation, planning, preparation and implementation, documentation, dissemination, monitoring and evaluation and expected output 
 on 
tsunami drill implementation for cities and regencies with the support of BGR/GITEWS in 
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2008. This document has been distributed at different levels. In addition, a reaction scheme 
to tsunami warnings has been developed by GTZ-IS and partners.  
On the other hand, disaster preparedness and contingency plans in case of emergency are 
poorly developed across Indonesia. National–Scale contingency plans, simulation, and 
tsunami drills have not been realised yet. Simulations and tsunami drills are not 
comprehensive, performed at sectoral level or in certain regions. Tsunami drills were carried 
out in West Sumatra (Padang) on 26 December 2005, Bali on 26 December 2006, Banten 
on 26 December 2007, Aceh on 2 November 2008, Yogyakarta on 24 December 2008, 
Gorontalo on 26 December 2008, North Sulawesi on 27 December 2009. 
BNPB highlighted that: 
“Disaster preparedness and contingency plans for emergency response situations were 
implemented in no more that 10% of Indonesia at different levels and those places that 
have preparedness and contingency plans will need to update and test these plans 
regularly” (Interview 1, 16 February 2009)..  
According to BNPB the poor achievement in contingency planning is related to the low levels 
of awareness at the regional, societal and sectoral levels on the importance of disaster 
preparedness and contingency plans. In addition, progress has been hampered as actors 
failed to achieve collective agreement. It is also argued that the lack of risk assessment, 
and poor availability of risk and zoning maps has crippled progress throughout Indonesia. 
Therefore, BNPB highlighted that: 
“Arranging an integrated contingency plan should be one of the priorities delegated to the 
steering committee of BNPB, and also to build a system of comprehensive institutional 
capacity development that is supported by the commitment of local authorities to ensure its 
implementation and allocation of sufficient resource” (Interview 1, 16 February 2009).  
However, very recently a regional tsunami drill known as the “Indian Ocean Wave Exercise 
2009” was organised and coordinated by ICG-IOTEWS with member countries. It has 
contributed to the increased Indonesian capacity in response at the regional to local level. 
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6.4 Summary of Chapter 6 
 
This chapter has shown that the actors’ participation is rather complex, characterised by a 
high degree of multi-stakeholder participation at various levels and across scales. Collective 
decisions are sometimes compromised due to the large action arena and technical 
complexities involved. Actors’ interest, incentives and agenda range from research and 
development, human security and minimising damage costs to maintaining development 
and economic gains. The participation dynamics of actors showcase the hierarchical power 
structure of actors based on domains of authority in knowledge and expertise, as well as 
and those of authority of hierarchy and discipline. Such a multi-stakeholder participation 
structure has a profound impact on the final outcome in the action decision arena. 
International participation is grounded on a mixture of multilateral and bilateral cooperation 
with Indonesia. The emerging new bilateral partnership between Indonesia and Germany is 
trying to follow on from the traditional TEWS forerunners such as the United States and 
Japan, at least in the technical component of the TEWS. The mixture of multi and bilateral 
environmental governance adopted by Indonesia is ideal to rapidly build national resilience 
to tsunami hazards and risks. Consequently, such a strategy initially invited mild rivalry and 
‘silent’ conflicts at the international level as new global actors for TEWS emerged. However, 
in some cases actors have collaborated and applied win-win strategies to resolve potential 
conflicts.  
The government bureaucrats are satisfied with the prevailing decree of transparency while 
the international and non-government actors demand more transparency in the process. 
The process of producing the tsunami service is characterised by sound competition, 
exclusion strategies and rivalry, where being more informed brings key advantages. Even 
so, a high level of individual cohesion and trust prevails among actors.  
TEWS became a national priority after the December 2004 calamity; however there are 
mixed signals about whether the TEWS is still a government priority. Actors are generally 
well informed about institutional development and the major institutional arrangement 
challenges in the downstream component compared to the upstream component of the 
TEWS. 
On the other hand, the government’s national budget spending on DM has increased 
significantly. Indonesia’s DRR financing has reached 2.1% of the total national budget. 
However, in reality most spending is for post disaster rather than for preparedness which 
represents only 0.17 % per annum. In addition, the sector-specific funding has also 
recently decreased while the approved budget is consistently lower than the proposed 
budget for DM financing. Actors are also not satisfied with the budget available at the local 
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level to manage disaster risk activities; however very recently the local contingency budget 
has increased compared to the national budget, signifying an important step towards coping 
and managing hazards at the local level. Intriguingly, the budget allocation at the sub-
national level is spatially variable, suggesting an unjust allocation of resources. In addition, 
the on call-budget mobilisation has been very slow due to multi-level bureaucratic 
procedures. These are fundamental institutional weaknesses in the financial arrangement 
that must be addressed.  The key milestone achieved is the integration of the DM Plan and 
National Action Plan for DRR (NAP-DRR 2010-2014) into the National Development Plan 
(NDP) to ensure that DRR is included in the Government Annual Plans and DM budgeting in 
Indonesia.  
There are many challenges in implementing the polycentric-multi-layered architectures and 
structures. Few provinces and districts have actually completed the DM local regulation 
Perda to allow the transformation to take place, and less than 20 % of the provinces have 
yet established provincial level disaster management agencies, and less than 2% of the 
districts and municipalities have DM officers (BPBD). Furthermore, the EOCs are few in 
number at provincial level and fairly ineffective at lower levels. The key obstacles include 
multi-level commitment, bureaucracy, a large number of actors with different agendas, 
financial resources, and specialised human capacities. Institutionalising and embedding the 
INATEWS within the BNPB as a larger architecture is a key step towards a multi-hazard 
approach, improved institutional coordination, and performance. However, the danger is the 
creation of a large superstructure vulnerable to bureaucracy and poor performance.  
Formal and informal institutional arrangements among actors have centred on the local 
reaction and response behaviours distinguished by scientific and non-scientific approaches 
and their potential advantages (i.e. paternalistically shared amongst the locals through 
generations), and disadvantages encompassing being exclusive, non–replicable, frequently 
undermining local authorities and  frequently characterised by mysticism and superstitious 
norms based on social constructs of environmental risks. In contrast, the functionality of 
institutional arrangement in terms of multi-level roles and responsibilities through SOPs at 
all levels is still not very clear despite an overall improvement in coordination, mainly 
through the appointment of an interim coordinator through Decree 21/2005. It is found that 
rules are more functional in the upstream technical component of the TEWS while 
institutional arrangements at the local level are often urgently developed to carry out 
activities such as drills, and this raises the question of their legitimacy given that the origin 
of institutions significantly influences their stability and potential for change. 
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Institutional monitoring and enforcement in the TEWS is a new concept among actors in 
Indonesia. Sporadic, ad-hoc drills and table top evaluation have provided some 
opportunities to monitor operational rules but lack proper feedback.  Actors pay close 
attention to the financial arrangements, but surprisingly, actors at sub-national level are 
unwilling to spend on DRR, perhaps to avoid legal risks associated with DM spending. The 
greater concern is that financial details and reporting among actors is lacking, raising 
further questions about good governance. The lesson of environmental conservation and 
spatial planning underlines the challenge of institutional enforcement versus extreme 
poverty and the need for development. In the latter case, enforcement lessons have shown 
that overlapping institutional mandates, lack of cooperation among actors and long 
bureaucratic procedures, bribes and corruption undermine any efforts for institutional 
enforcement.  
There is a general consensus that even the new institutional frameworks have not 
addressed adequately the paradigm shift from response to preparedness due to strong links 
to path dependencies. However, more time is needed for weaknesses to be identified to 
motivate institutional changes at the higher level.  
In the context of the TEWS elements, it is found that national risk knowledge has improved 
significantly in terms of new hazard assessments and more attention to vulnerability. New 
approaches and methodologies are emerging for risk assessment and creation of risk 
knowledge. However, risk assessment has focused mainly on high hazard impact areas and 
there is a lack of risk assessment capacities, tools and standardised methodologies at local 
level. Risk communication has improved nationally but is insufficient and requires more 
multi-sector participation beyond the state and civil societies. 
In terms of the NTWC, despite being operational since November 2008, actors have 
highlighted the key weaknesses and gaps centring on the density of the seismic network 
and tsunami observation in the deep sea. Consequently, there are many false tsunami 
alerts and there is a need to have a compromise between actual technical capabilities and 
political-social goals. The strategy of elevating the threshold magnitude for issuing potential 
tsunami alerts on one hand would increase the chance of reducing false alerts at the 
expense of a likely miss of tsunamis generated from moderate earthquakes below the new 
elevated threshold. 
In the response phase, the major gap is the lack of national disaster preparedness and 
contingency plans. Drills are not well developed and implemented across Indonesia despite 
some efforts to prepare ad-hoc drills in some province-districts, including the involvement 
in the Indian Ocean tsunami drill in late 2009. The reason for the poor achievement in 
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contingency planning is related to difficulties in reaching collective agreement due to the 
large number of stakeholders involved, low levels of awareness in the regional, societal and 
sectoral level on the importance of such plans, and in some cases the lack of risk 
assessment to kick start the process. 
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7. The Tsunami Early Warning System at the Level of Padang 
and Bali, Indonesia 
 
This chapter focuses on the provincial and district level in the large coastal city of Padang 
and south Bali. It examines and compares the architecture and the actors’ interactions in 
the two locations at the sub-national levels. The other central question focuses on the 
prevailing problems, gaps and challenges in implementing such a desired TEWS at the local 
level. The analysis is primarily based on in-depth interviews with actors at different levels, 
focus group discussions in the study areas, and workshop and conference deliberations 
triangulated with other secondary data sources. A few coastal inhabitants were also 
interviewed.  
7.1 The Actors Participation, Cooperation at the Level of Padang and Bali  
7.1.1 Government Participation and Cooperation  
Padang local government was the first city in Indonesia in November 2006 to agree on a 
partnership cooperation with GTZ-IS in the context of building a comprehensive TEWS.  The 
leadership of the mayor of Padang City was founded on the collective vision raised by 
KOGAMI that Padang would be the first city to have an end-to-end TEWS in Indonesia.  The 
efforts of the local mayor were recognised in 2007 when the mayor received the BMKG 
award presented by the President of Indonesia. In order to implement a TEWS in Padang, 
the actors took the initiative of developing a joint synchronised annual work plan to support 
the process of implementing a TEW in Padang. The concept is also synchronized with the 
local strategy for disaster preparedness (Padang Strategic Plan for Disaster Preparedness).  
In comparison, unlike Padang, Bali lacked initial initiatives and leadership in tsunami 
preparedness and TEWS. Actors reported that initially there was some resistance among 
certain actors in Bali, who feared that such tsunami preparedness activities would have 
negative impacts on the tourism sector. Therefore, cooperation between GTZ-IS had to be 
initiated through a visit to the government agencies. A plan for a pilot project was 
submitted to the city development agency (BAPPEDA) in Denpasar, the Bali Tourism Board 
and the local government of Bali. A couple of months later, the Governor of Bali and Deputy 
Bupati of Badung agreed to negotiate on the proposal. Meanwhile, informal participation in 
the form of capacity building from Balinese institutions was initiated. A joint agreement on 
capacity building for the TEWS and preparedness was agreed and signed in May 2007 
between the Province Government of Bali and GTZ-IS during the opening ceremony of the 
TEWS Assessment and Planning in Bali workshop, attended by a total of 90 actors 
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representing provincial public institutions.  Working groups were organised equipped with 
an agreed action plan for the development of TEW in cooperation with Bali province and 
Badung District. The cooperation commitment was formalized by signing a cooperation 
agreement with the Vice Bupati of Badung in March 2007. 
7.1.2 Civil Societies and Private Sector Participation and Cooperation 
As indicated earlier, the key civil society participating in Padang is KOGAMI. The next 
chapter will examine in detail the role of KOGAMI in tsunami governance in Padang. 
Collective participation includes stakeholders participating in SOPs development through 
working groups and mid-term planning.  
On the other hand, unlike Padang, NGO participation in Bali had to be encouraged through 
basic orientation seminars organised by the Centre of Environmental Education (PPLH) with 
support from GTZ-IS in August 2007. These awareness and basic knowledge training 
sessions in Bali targeted teachers, NGO workers and a women’s group. An ex-member of 
the Indonesian Red Cross (PMI) in Bali said: 
“We have initially carried out village disaster preparedness and socialisation regarding TEW 
dissemination in three villages and with the people living close to the sirens installed by 
BMKG in cooperation with IDEP, SATLAK and SATKORLAK... We have also distributed 
educational materials to the community and are facilitating the development of SOP” 
(Interview 12, 9 February 2009).  
Interestingly, a framework for a private sector partnership with the tourism sector was 
discussed with the representatives from the Bali Tourism Board and the Bali Hotel 
Association (BHA) and others. Cooperation agreements on tsunami preparedness and 
capacity development were formalised between the Bali tourism sector and GTZ-IS. Key 
activities involving the hotel establishments include the distributing of tsunami information 
to tourists and locals at their own cost. One issue to keep in mind was highlighted by 
UNESCO who said: 
“Hotels might not like to continue distributing tsunami information because of the extra cost 
to them, especially in the case for lower star hotel establishments” (Interview 3, 27 October 
2008). 
This suggests that smaller hotel establishments need support to carry out activities to 
promote awareness of tsunami risk and preparedness. 
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In a very recent press release in September 2009 the Bali Hotel Association indicated the 
collective participation and cooperation between nine hotels by signing a Memorandum of 
Understanding (MoU) with the local village as an institutional mechanism marking the 
successful preparation of Kelurahan Tanjung Benoa hotels in becoming tsunami-ready69
7.1.3 Community Participation and Cooperation 
. 
This provides the legitimacy for the hotels and village people to cooperate in Tanjung Benoa 
to jointly prepare for tsunamis, for example by providing local village people access to the 
hotels in the case of an anticipated tsunami. This achievement has been supported by 
multi-sectoral actors such as the Indonesian Red Cross, the German Joint Committee, GTZ-
IS-GITEWS and the Indonesian Tourism and Culture Ministry.  
 
Community participation described by all actors includes involvement of the public in 
workshops, evacuation planning, developing evacuation routes, posting sign boards and 
participating in tsunami preparedness drills. The community is also involved in the strategic 
planning. Actors perceived that the participation and cooperation of the community has 
improved but there is a need to improve the participation of the local people at the national 
level.  
Further examination of the local participation dynamics reveals that some actors are not 
employing the local participatory methods and are paying close attention to gender issues 
when interacting with the local people. For instance, UNESCO outlines that: 
“The gatherings are dominantly attended by males and there is gender inequality in 
participation. In addition, participation of the community and local leaders should not be 
through formal conferences and workshops but rather it should be through informal social 
processes such as focus group discussions and social gatherings” (Interview 3, 27 October 
2008). 
This suggests that the methods and techniques to encourage participation need to fit the 
existing institutional social order. In depth interviews with actors involved in the community 
such as KOGAMI, MPBI, and GTZ-IS indicated that participatory approaches and 
socialisation techniques are used to interact with the communities. A review of the capacity 
building component of the GITEWS project underlined the use of simple visual aids for local 
authorities and outreach communities (GTZ-IS 2009). 
                                                            
69 The Segara Hotel, Benoa Rose Residence, Benoa Palm, Ramada Benoa Hotel, Rasa Sayang Hotel, The Bali Khama Hotel, Puri Panca Setia 
Hotel, Club Bali Mirage, Grand Bali Mirage Hotel 
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A people-centred EWS also depends on whether policy and decision-makers listen to the 
community directly or through their local representatives. Actors generally perceived that 
some decision-makers are listening to the community through different negotiation 
channels but often through NGO’s advocacy.  
KOGAMI states: 
“Most often it is the community of Padang who decide on the evacuation route and 
conditions for their participation. For instance the community asked the authorities for a 
bridge to be built to facilitate the evacuation drill. However, building evacuation roads and 
bridges is costly and the administrative procedures are long, and the community are still 
waiting” (Interview 9, 3 March 2009). 
In contrast, in Bali, participation and the decision-making process is a complex mesh 
between the local government and religious and cultural structures. This is highlighted by 
the statement by the GTZ-IS local representative: 
“We have working groups here and we meet regularly with the head of villages. However, 
the likely outcome is unpredictable because in Bali, Kuta there are various decision 
structures” (Interview 12, 9 February 2009). 
7.1.4 Transparency and Accountability  
Actors who are collaborating with international actors indicated that there is an 
improvement in transparency and accountability within the TEWS process because of the 
established procedures of constant evaluation, monitoring and reporting at all levels. This 
suggests that within the project, concept transparency and accountability are well 
addressed. However, beyond the project concept, transparency and accountability are 
perceived as not very clear.  
7.2 Tsunami Early Warning System-Related Architecture at the Level of Padang 
and Bali 
7.2.1 Financial Arrangements 
The important issue to highlight at this level is that  according to the contingency budget for 
the province, Padang had an increase from about +0.6 to +2.0 % of their local budget 
while the Bali local budget increased from about +0.4 to +3.0 % from 2007 to 2009 
respectively. Actors in Bali and Padang indicate that the fixed running costs are now 
guaranteed while other financial arrangements for establishing EWS and DM architectures 
are lacking. Some actors stated that in their opinion the government has not provided 
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adequate and consistent financial resources to implement the planned activities and this 
seems to make them doubt if the TEWS is still a government priority. 
7.2.2 Local Institutional Arrangements regarding Tsunami Early Warning  
In Padang, the earliest exposure to institutional development in the context of work flows, 
SOP development, and evacuation planning was supported by a UNU-EHS expert at the 
Padang Working Group in November 2006. Participatory workshops were organised in West 
Sumatra Province and Kota Padang early in the process in order to have a clear idea of the 
local situation in terms of actors, roles and responsibilities for the development of a legal 
framework. The implications of a lack of clear roles and responsibilities were highlighted by 
the GTZ-IS local advisor in Padang who stated that: 
“A dramatic and threatening incident occurred here in Padang when there was a 
disagreement between provincial leaders and the City in Padang following an earthquake in 
March 2007. The provincial level announced that no evacuation was needed but the mayor 
of Padang requested the community to evacuate.” (Interview 13, 27 February 2009). 
In 2008, Padang city became the first city in Indonesia to have a local law (Perda) to 
regulate DM. The local regulation development and institutionalisation involved the Law 
Division, Social Welfare and Disaster Management Agency of Government of Padang and 
KOGAMI. This positive outcome was the result of clear leadership, cooperation, negotiation 
and deliberation between all institutional actors. Furthermore, local actors indicated that 
they were pressing to have a Governor’s Decree to guarantee the necessary legal and 
administrative framework for the DM system in Padang. Currently, a mayoral regulation on 
TEW is going through the legislative process. The legislative process should cover aspects 
such as the capacity of the regional DM agency and the EOCs to function efficiently. 
However, the policy makers and stakeholders involved in drafting the regulation on TEW 
earlier decided to postpone final approval of the regulation decree until the system at the 
national level has been finalized and the references clearly defined.  A draft version of the 
TEW SOPs was presented to the Padang municipal policy-making board during the 
inauguration of the new DM agency (BNPB).  
 
In Bali, the local actors reported that the first workshop for local SOP development was 
carried out in Sanur in October 2006. In addition, Balinese actors reported how they 
exchanged experiences on SOP and participated in related workshops in Padang and Jakarta 
with support from GTZ-IS. At the same time, an inter-institutional working group for 
Tsunami Preparedness and EW was established.  
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On the other hand, in Bali, the GTZ-IS local advisor stated that: 
“A provincial regulation has been drafted by the Bali working group based on the concept 
document developed by the TEWS working group and GTZ-IS. The legislative concept 
document, updated tsunami hazard map, and related technical documents were handed 
over to the governor in June 2009. The governor has expressed his support for the draft 
provincial regulation and has urged actors to continue with the initiative” (Interview 12, 9 
February 2009).  
To this end, TEW and DM architectures in Bali include Decrees of the Governor 29/2009, 
30/2009, 31/2009 that concern the establishment of the EOC (PUSDALOPS) and the DM 
Agency (BPBD) at the provincial level and tsunami warning procedures in Bali respectively. 
The Governor Decree 31/2009 addresses the newly developed SOPs, which delegate 
decision-making to the EOC and recognise the tsunami hazard map developed with the 
support of the GITEWS project as the official map for southern Bali. 
7.2.3 Religious and Cultural Norms  
It is absolutely critical to understand the religious and cultural dimensions of religion and 
cultural norms in order to root the TEWS and DM into the society. For example, in Bali, it is 
important to pay attention on the views of the Balinese culture regarding earthquakes and 
their meaning. Earthquakes for the Balinese are not simply disasters; there is a hidden 
meaning or a prophecy for every earthquake based on the sacred Palelindon (treatise on 
earthquakes) manuscript.  Interestingly, the cultural view reflecting “disaster prevention 
and mitigation” lies in another manuscript called “Lontar Pacaruan Linuh”, or “treatise on 
appeasing the earthquake”, which gives details of offerings and ceremonies to offset the 
negative effect of the earthquake, so the bad prophecy will not be materialized.  
In this context, it is not surprising to find that local people in Bali tend to follow strongly 
their religious and cultural norms. The GTZ-IS local advisor in Bali said: 
“The Balinese community in general has strong traditions and culture, and these constitute 
assets of the people’s capacity that need to be empowered and optimized..... in addition, if 
I have a difficult choice to make on certain issues, I would rather follow instructions and 
decisions from the community traditional leaders than from the state” (Interview 12, 9 
February 2009). 
  
It is clear that the Balinese religions and culture are strongly interconnected and cannot be 
undermined, but should be empowered and integrated in the EWS and DRR. The 
challenging question is how. To partly solve the problem, the Province of Bali, in 
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cooperation with GTZ-IS, held a seminar resourced from competent experts on Hindu 
Religion and Balinese Custom and Cultural Perspectives on the TEWS in Denpasar in 
September 2007. The seminar was attended by more than fifty actors from diverse 
institutions including the media, universities, and traditional village leaders. Important 
messages from the Balinese perspective included living in harmony with the environment, 
proper technical interpretation in the general teaching and the integration of EW into the 
Balinese customs, and cultural perspectives.  
On the issue of integration and fit of the TEWS, some cultural village leaders expressed 
their expectation that the BMKG TEWS would be linked with the existing local community 
system using the ‘kulkul or kentongan’. This was also the interest of the head of the 
province's Regional Community Protection Agency who wanted to develop a community-
based disaster management system in which citizens were trained to identify and be 
responsive to signs of disasters. Thus, the administration is considering incorporating the 
‘kulkul or kentongan’ Balinese traditional alarm system in the disaster mitigation 
regulations. This clearly suggests it is a more challenging task to root the TEWS in the 
Balinese society compared to Padang; however if successful it has potential advantages of 
being effective and sustainable.  
7.2.4 Formal Sub-National Institutional Structures   
7.2.4.1 Sub-National Disaster Management Agencies  
 
In the past, at sub-national level both former local disaster response authorities 
SATKORLAK (city) and SATLAK (district) existed in the same city because Padang is the 
capital of the city, hosting both the provincial and municipal governments. The institutions 
and agencies operating in Padang in the past under SATKORLAK include the armed forces, 
the police department at the provincial level, search and rescue, the BMKG regional office, 
Red Cross Sumatra, Education Services, the telecommunication agency, the electric 
company and the health department. In August 2009, the government of Padang 
represented by the Deputy Mayor inaugurated the new Padang Disaster Management Office 
(BPBD). In Bali the influence of DM authorities was very much absent.  According to the 
provincial EOC: 
 
“Bali did not host local DM authorities (SATKORLAK, SATLAK) and the local BMKG in the 
past. We are now trying to build these structures with the French Red Cross assistance and 
finding more competent people to run the office” (Interview 28, 9 February 2009). 
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It is highlighted that even in early 2009; the establishment of BPBD in Badung district was 
still pending. Figure 44 shows the multi-level structure consisting of the steering committee 
and executive committee of national DM (BNPB), and the sub-national DM agency (BPBD).It 
also shows links with the President of the Republic of Indonesia, the political administrative 
levels consisting of the governor at provincial level and the mayor at district/municipality 
level, the respective EOCs, and links to the community. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
National Level 
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MAYOR 
BNPB 
BPBD 
BPBD 
STEERING EXECUTIVE 
STEERING EXECUTIVE 
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Figure 44: The multi-level architectures, structures and links to the community. 
Source: Author 
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7.2.4.2 Sub National Emergency Operations Centre  
 
The local government (PEMKO) in Padang initially operationalised a temporary 24/7 EOC 
(PUSDALOP) for TEW purposes located at the Padang Fire Brigade with some technical 
support from GTZ-IS. Recently, during the inauguration of the BNPB in August 2009, the 
new EOC was also launched in Padang. Very recently BGR stated that: 
 
“Each Emergency Operation Centre finally decides and is backed-up legally by BNPB/BPBD, 
and KESRA (Coordinating Minister for People’s Welfare) supervises effective coordination 
between BNPB and sectors/ministries” (Interview 2, 25 January 2010). 
 
One advantage of the local EOC was demonstrated when strong winds generated extremely 
high waves impacting on several settlements near the northern beach of Padang. The EOC 
coordinated the efforts of the fire brigade, police, navy and KOGAMI to evacuate and shelter 
500 people.  
 
The government of Badung District (Bali) in cooperation with GTZ-IS also initially 
operationalised a temporary 24/7 unit for TEW. A new provincial EOC was also under 
construction during the field research. The EOC was inaugurated in August 2009 in 
Denpasar, and recently institutionalised with Governor Decree 29/2009. Furthermore, the 
new Governor Decree 31/2009 addresses the operations of the newly constructed EOC, 
which delegate decision-making to the EOC. The establishment of EOC at district level, 
particularly in Bali, is not being adequately addressed yet. Figure 45 shows the temporary 
and new Emergency Operations Centre under construction in Bali. 
 
 
Figure 45: Temporary (left) and new EOC (right) under construction in Bali 
Source: Author 2009 
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7.2.5 Emerging Institutional Coordination  
As stated in the previous chapter, the new DM agencies and EOC at multiple levels are the 
ideal polycentric architectures for improved institutional coordination for the TEWS and DRR 
in Indonesia. From the actors’ perspective, it is perceived that coordination has improved at 
different levels down to the local level. For example, KOGAMI in Padang stated that: 
 
“We have observed an increase in coordination and facilitation from the national 
government rather than directly executing activities and programs at the local level as in 
the past” (Interview 9, 3 March 2009). 
 
On the other hand, another mechanism which has contributed towards improved 
coordination is coordination meetings to discuss the division of roles and responsibilities 
regarding TEW between the government levels. However, not all actors are satisfied with 
the level of coordination.  For instance the Environmental Education Centre (PPLH) Director 
has criticized the Bali administration and related institutions for lacking coordination and 
aggressiveness in their preparation for natural disasters (Jakarta Post 24.09.2007). 
7.2.6 The Emerging Institutional Tsunami Warning Chain at the Sub National 
Level  
Chapter 6 provided details of the national tsunami warning process in Indonesia. As 
indicated before, there is also no final consensus of a tsunami warning chain at sub-national 
level between the province and districts. Nevertheless, in Padang and Bali, actors have 
agreed that once tsunami information is received from BMKG or interface institutions the 
provincial and district governments, through their respective EOCs, have the legitimate 
authority to decide as per SOP on operating sirens and evacuation. This implies the SOPs at 
district level describe the delegation of authority from the mayor to the EOC to call for 
evacuation of communities. The development of an SOP follows the division of responsibility 
(decentralisation architecture) between province and the district level. However, actors 
have not yet fully agreed on the inter-level institutional arrangement between the provinces 
and the districts. Other issues to be addressed include how the warning will be delivered to 
the districts and to whom, and what procedures will be followed at the district level when 
warnings or guidance are received from the provincial EOC. In chapter 9, the author 
proposes a concept model for TEW.  
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7.3 Risk Knowledge at the Level of Padang and Bali 
 
Some actors have complained about the long delay in producing the risk maps in Bali and 
Padang. The long delay is partly because of the lack of accurate and detailed data to 
produce reliable formal standard risk maps for better decision-making. This is further 
discussed below: 
7.3.1 Hazard and Risk Mapping: A Highly Negotiated and Contested Issue  
The tsunami hazard-risk mapping process in the study areas highlighted some important 
governance elements between actors that should be considered. An official tsunami hazard, 
vulnerability and risk map was desired by all the actors due to the fact that there were 
several unofficial maps in circulation in Pandang. The existing zoned tsunami hazard map 
had been very useful. This was based on simple inundation up to a certain contour height, 
and was developed earlier by KOGAMI in cooperation and partnership with UNESCO. 
However, the tsunami hazard map needs to be updated to correctly define the risk zones 
for evacuation, spatial planning and development. 
 
The tsunami hazard and risk mapping process started with base studies to find available 
information on tsunami hazards conducted by actors of a working group. As indicated in the 
previous chapter there was no convergence and agreement between actors on tsunami 
inundation modelling. Since 2007, there have been discussions and debate on tsunami 
hazards and vulnerability in Padang, initiated in the “International Symposium on Disaster 
in Indonesia, Problem and Solution”, the seminar “Scientist Meets Politics-Padang 
Consultative Group” and the “International Symposium in Hazard Map”. The output of the 
Symposium was known as “the 1st Padang Consensus” in 2008. In the first Padang 
Consensus, international actors from Japan, the United States, Germany and other local 
actors agreed on standard guidelines such as the use of non-uniform land surface 
roughness for preparing an official tsunami hazard and risk map for further use in 
evacuation, spatial planning, and development in Padang city. Consequently, two 
workshops were organised between 12-1370
 
 April 2010 to follow-up on the discussions of 
the Padang Consensus with the objectives of presenting the available tsunami high-
resolution hazard modelling and assessment from various research groups, especially 
considering the agreed scenarios and data stemming from the first Padang Consensus of 
August 2008. 
                                                            
70 Presented project results on social vulnerability of the LAST-MILE project for UNU-EHS on behalf of PD Dr. Birkmann and Setiadi and 
participated in the workshop deliberations. 
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At this point the Japanese and the United States actors were not participating in the final 
showdown. Nevertheless, the deliberations were characterised by lengthy mediation and 
debates, especially between two actors from Germany, DLR representing the GITEWS 
project and actors from the Franzius Institute of Hannover representing the “Last Mile” 
project. Interestingly, the “Last Mile” Project actors claimed: 
 
“We have apparently met almost all the guidelines of the first Padang consensus which 
includes tsunami modelling using the worst credible earthquake scenario, highest land 
topography data resolution and addressed the issue of non-uniform land roughness. The 
only criteria we have all not been able to satisfy is model validation because this simulated 
event has not actually occurred in Padang before”(Interview 14, 14 April 2010). 
 
On the other hand DLR said: 
  
“We have employed the most conservative approach based on the probabilistic prediction 
scenario, uniform land roughness and slightly lower resolution land topography data. As a 
consequence, our result shows a greater degree of tsunami inundation compared to the 
Last Mile Project actors from the Franzius Institute” (Interview 15, 21 April 2010).  
 
However, the debate shifted to seek answers on whether the map to be selected should 
represent the worst or least tsunami inundation. The selection of any of the inundation and 
risk maps has enormous implications for evacuation, spatial planning and development in 
Padang. However, the final challenge is who will finally decide? The Provincial and City 
planning agency and other local actors were confronted and were unable to make a final 
decision. The local actors recommended that the scientific actors resolve and settle the 
contentious issues. Finally, it was agreed that the hazard-risk mapping carried out by the 
Franzius Institute, representing the last mile project simulating least inundation be accepted 
and recommended as the final hazard–risk map for Padang city.  
 
In the case of Bali, tsunami hazard-risk mapping was initiated by having a TEWS 
assessment and planning workshop held early in April 2007. For evacuation planning, the 
village of Kuta in Badung district was selected as a pilot study area for the mapping process 
because of its representative structure for tourist coastal areas. Actors exchanged 
knowledge, provided spatial and statistical data and developed a cooperation mechanism 
and a joint working plan. Similar to Padang, national experts, representatives from district 
governments, GTZ-IS, and GITEWS partners developed a general approach for tsunami 
hazard mapping that can be applied at district level. The GTZ-IS local advisor stated: 
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“We have agreed on a reference scenario and criteria for tsunami hazard zoning in order to 
develop a zoned tsunami hazard map as a planning tool in Bali” (Interview 12, 9 February 
2009). 
 
Actors considered the facts that Bali had experienced several strong earthquakes of 
moment magnitude greater than 6.0 in historical times including the years of 1976, 1979, 
1984 and 2004, and there are four sources for tsunami. On this basis, actors agreed and 
recommended a multi-scenario approach. Further debate focused on the exclusion of highly 
unlikely scenarios. Finally, the multi scenario hazard map and documentation process was 
completed in April 2008 through multi-institutional cooperation and collective deliberations 
and negotiations with the involvement of actors from the Balinese Government, Indonesian 
scientific institutions and partners from the GITEWS project. The process of developing 
hazard-risk maps in Bali was characterised by less competition, debate and contested issues 
because the LAST-MILE project does not include Bali.  Both documents were presented and 
handed over to the Balinese authorities. Figures 17 and 18 in Chapter 3 showcase the DLR-
GITEWS tsunami hazard and daytime population exposure maps for Bali.  
 
However, for equitable opportunities in risk knowledge, the risk mapping should include the 
entire coastline of Bali, not only the southern coast where the tourism activities are located. 
The coastal residence of Sanur for instance, a few kilometres further northeast, is not 
covered in the present risk map. Sanur is a coastal stretch of beach of Denpasar city in 
south east Bali, and it has grown into a little town in its own right. It is observed that there 
are various elements at risk in Sanur ranging from traditional fishing, coastal tourism, 
school and family recreational activities along the coast (Figure 46). 
 
7.3.1.1 Risk Communication: Education, Awareness and Socialization  
 
Overall, Bali and Padang have been subjected to fairly similar education and awareness 
strategies on tsunami risk and disasters, but they vary in intensity.  These include outreach 
activities such as educational tsunami posters, comics in English and Bahasa, short training 
videos and modules for the training of facilitators, and training materials for the 
contribution of school curricula. These products have involved collaboration and cooperation 
between a number of actors such as GTZ-IS, IOC-UNESCO, LIPI, and the Red Cross with 
the support of UNISDR, the Indonesian Ministry of Home Affairs, BMKG, and BNPB. 
 
To highlight the efforts made in Padang, various national exhibitions along Taman Budaya 
beach were organised by LIPI and PEMKO. The exhibitions were officially opened by the 
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Governor of West Sumatra Province and this attracted thousands of local visitors from all 
over the Province. Meanwhile in Bali, the initial efforts include the distribution of posters to 
schools and  public health centres as well as the Balinese Tourism Associations (GTZ-IS 
2009).  
 
In order to efficiently communicate risk knowledge to a wider audience and to enhance 
community participation, a group of actors from various institutions participated in a 
training course. The course prepared actors for a tsunami awareness campaign to be 
carried out in the villages along the coast of Badung district and simultaneously implement 
a socialisation campaign which is managed by Badung district authorities. The GTZ-IS local 
advisor reported that in Bali: 
 
“An outreach campaign to spread basic knowledge on tsunami hazard and tsunami early 
warning in villages along the southern coast of Bali was implemented by involving target 
groups and representatives from the traditional structures (Desa Adat), youth 
organizations, women’s organizations and other important organizations in the villages. 
Usually around 30 to 40 people attended the meetings, which involved socialisation 
activities including performance” (Interview 12, 9 February 2009). 
 
Training was also provided to the primary school teachers and employees operating the Ritz 
Carlton security office to help set up the BHA TEW Service with the assistance of the local 
government (BUDPAR). However, much more needs to be done, and this is reflected in the 
statement made by the BHA’s Tsunami Alert Coordinator, who was reported as saying “The 
people of the Tanjung Benoa villages lack knowledge and awareness to overcome tsunami 
disasters which have become a very high risk for them. The local residences do not have a 
proper evacuation site, because almost no building in the villages is a safe place to avoid 
the tsunami, except for the hotels"(Antara 17. 09. 2009).  
 
The latest workshop in Padang from 12-14 April 2010 was another major attempt to 
communicate the formal risk knowledge created for the responsible institutions at the local 
level for endorsement, implementation and further socialisation within the community at 
risk.  Earlier, the GTZ-IS local advisor highlighted that: 
 
“The real challenge is to familiarise the government agencies, development sector and 
community with these products, through education and socialisation activities and to 
streamline the risk knowledge into local planning and development” (Interview 13, 27 
February 2009).  
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Figure 46: Vulnerable elements along Sanur beach, Bali, Indonesia 
Source: Author 2009 
7.3.2 Communities Risk Concern  
The local actors who interact directly with the community perceived that the public concerns 
for tsunami risk are high mainly in the risk areas only. For example thousands of people 
attended the national exhibition on tsunamis over just a few days even though they had to 
pay a small fee. MPBI commented that: 
 
“Recent events and information have increased the people’s concern, but some 
communities in high risk areas even with no information, are concerned and rely on local 
wisdom. The communities are concerned about the high technology and how to understand 
at the local level, and they raise questions of what to do?” (Interview 5, 3 November 2008). 
 
On the other hand, one 41-year-old man who has been a fisherman in a nearby village in 
Padang for 25 years with his home close to the beach believes there is no way of escaping 
fate: 
 
“We don’t care about this tsunami issue. The most important thing is to go fishing and get 
some money, so we can stay alive. We submit our fate to God. Our destiny has been 
written. If we die because of a tsunami, there’s nothing else we can do. We are not 
afraid...it feels normal. Just take a look around, everybody here has his home near the 
beach. If a tsunami hits this place, I will just submit my fate to God. Big earthquakes rarely 
occur here, that’s why I’m not too worried about this. But of course we have to be on the 
alert. When we hear the sirens, we will run to higher ground” (Interview 16, 4 March 2009). 
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The fisherman’s account shows elements of 
concern, and indicates actions to follow in the 
event of a tsunami warning; however the 
fisherman is not willing to relocate as this 
could impact and disrupt his usual livelihood. 
In other words, the message is that the 
fisherman is ready to accept or tolerate a 
certain amount of risk so that he can continue 
to earn his living and thus cope with the daily 
struggles (Figure 47).  
 
7.3.3 Risk Perceptions and Understanding of the Communities 
All actors interviewed perceived that correct risk understanding and perceptions are still 
lacking, but the situation is spatially diverse depending on the communities who have been 
exposed to education, awareness and actual experiences. Most actors generally perceived 
that the Padang community has good perceptions of tsunami risk and people are interested 
in doing things. The GTZ-IS local advisor in Padang city explained that: 
“Padang community was not only exposed to education and awareness but we have actually 
experienced some earthquakes and tsunamis and we find people evacuating themselves”.  
According to RISTEK, the interim coordinator of the INATEWS, there are three reasons 
explaining the current low level of risk awareness of tsunamis in Bali, Padang and 
throughout Indonesia: 
“Firstly local governments have been requested to come up with risk maps, but capacities 
are lacking and most communities are still learning by doing. Secondly, the authorities are 
still working on official risk maps as the country is big and official risk maps have not been 
published in the media yet. Thirdly, of critical concern is that risk maps have not actually 
been distributed and circulated to the community at risk as was observed in Bantul in the 
case of the last drill” (Interview 7, 15 January 2009).  
However, one major element which constantly affects all the education and awareness 
carried out by all the actors such as KOGAMI based on the scientific risk approach is linked 
with the old religious superstitious traditions. In the devastated city of Padang, following a 
major earthquake killing more than 1000 people, an Islamic watch web site71
                                                            
71 http://islamizationwatch.blogspot.com/2009/10/indonesians-blame-earthquake-on-unlucky.html 
 indicated “  
 
Figure 47: Vulnerable elements along Padang coast  
Source: Author 2009 
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...a commonly heard refrain has been that the quake is a test, or a punishment, ordained 
by God. Furthermore according to one interview, a local person was quoted as saying “I 
think the quake happened because many of the youths in Padang commit sins, especially 
during Ramadan”.  These perceptions are not new but are indeed very old views of hazards 
globally as being a part of the problem of evil, or more particularly, part of the problem of 
"natural evil" (Miller 2001) and lack of understanding of scripture and testimonies attributed 
solely to God's purposeful action.  
7.4 Dissemination and Communication at the Level of Padang and Bali 
7.4.1 Formal Institutions and Systems for Dissemination and Communication  
Some of the formal interface institutions involved in disseminating and communicating 
tsunami information include the DM agencies, the department of home affairs, the national 
police, the army, the department of information, communication and technology, and the 
provincial government and district.  
7.4.1.1 The FM-RDS (Radio Data System) 
 
In both study areas, more than 30 selected public and private institutions have the 
capability to further disseminate tsunami information to the community from BMKG via this 
FM-RDS technology. The FM-RDS (Radio Data System) technology works on the same 
principle as traffic warnings via car radio in Germany. If a warning is sent out, this is 
conveyed automatically, independently of whether the EW receiver is switched on or off or 
is adjusted to another radio station. Bali was the first location in Indonesia to test the FM-
RDS technology as part of the end-to-end EWS. The main test was performed during the 
Bali Drill on the 26th of December 2006. Thirty-seven FM RDS72
7.4.1.2 The Locally Developed Communication System 
 receivers were distributed 
to the institutions and tested between December 2006 to January 2007. The private sector 
is particularly interested in this tool, but there have been some obstacles concerning 
property rights for the institutional integration of FM-RDS in the TEWS.  
 
The development of the TEWS this far has witnessed few innovation efforts in terms of 
development of local technologies. However, among the few which have emerged is a 
system called the ‘RABAB’ communication system. It is a simple and cheap, with a 24X7 
standby function and battery backup, and provides wide area coverage for local tsunami 
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information dissemination. It was installed in January 2008 by the Padang Working Group. 
The GTZ-IS local advisor indicated that  
 
“The RABAB communication system provides the flexibility to local authorities (mayor, 
police, and army) to send out information (audio voice and sound) by a normal FM Radio 
without the necessity to be physically at the emergency command centre” (Interview 17, 3 
March 2009).  
7.4.1.3 The RANET Community–Based Communication Tool 
 
In addition, the “RAdio and InterNET” system known as RANET contributed to the live 
tsunami drill by sending information into Indonesia’s TEWS so that local operators could 
sound an alarm. The RANET system is a useful community-based communications program 
designed to reach the “last mile”. The Bali Hotel Association has implemented their own 
RANET warning dissemination service covering many four and five-star rated hotels on 
Bali’s southern shoreline.  
However, the RANET system is emerging as a disappointment for the Bali Hotel Association. 
The actors are now learning that the system will be phased out. The Bali Hotel Association 
said: 
“We are quite disappointed at this news because this information should have been 
communicated to us earlier as we have already invested a lot of money in this RANET 
system” (Interview 18, 6 January 2009).  
Further questioning of BMKG and RISTEK revealed that the producers of the RANET system, 
the National Oceanic Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) in the United States, are actually 
ending their program on RANET due to financial difficulties. This experience has raised an 
issue between private-non-government actors and the government institutions, because it 
is perceived that with more information such an investment could have been avoided.  
7.4.1.4 Coastal Sirens 
 
On the other hand, in the immediate areas along the coast where people have to be 
evacuated in an event of a tsunami, a network of nine sirens has been strategically placed 
in the city near the coastline by the local government of Padang based on a proposal from 
the Padang Communication Group (Figure 48). These sirens can be triggered from BMKG in 
Jakarta and local EOCs in Padang. The sirens were successfully tested in December 2007 in 
the West Sumatra Tsunami Drill. The sirens have an operating range of just under 1000 
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meters. In a survey73
Figure 50).  
 conducted by UNU-EHS (2009) in Padang city, it was found that 
sirens contribute to around 50 % of the information received by the public (see left panel of  
 
Currently, Bali has six sirens placed along the 
coast in the southern area of the island, 
installed by BMKG, as labelled on Figure 49. 
Personnel observation indicated that in Sanur 
for example, the siren was tucked away in 
the less inhabited and visited areas of the 
coast. The siren could have been strategically 
placed at the centre where most local people 
are operating tourism-related activities from 
restaurants to boat excursions and where 
most local families spend time on the beach. 
The visibility of the siren will serve as a 
constant reminder of the tsunami risk. On the 
other hand, in Padang the sirens were 
positioned a few kilometres away from the 
coast in the heart of the urban areas. 
Tsunami information such as sign boards and 
evacuation routes could not be found 
anywhere in the immediate area, but 1-2 km 
away from the coast. Tsunami information 
needs to be displayed clearly along the coast, 
not only along and around the main streets.  
 
However, the problem about sirens is that in 
reality, many local people question the sirens. 
For example KOGAMI states: 
 
“Some people do not understand the need for 
sirens, how they work, the meaning of the 
sound, and they do not know the exact 
procedures for evacuation” (Interview 9, 3 
March 2009).  
                                                            
73  Part of the “Last- Mile” Project - only for Padang city 
 
Figure 48: Siren network in Padang, Indonesia  
Source: UNU-EHS 2010 
 
Figure 49: Siren network in Bali, Indonesia 
 
Source: Author 
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This suggests that the community are not familiar with these strange new devices along the 
coast. The other problem is that currently there is no formal agreement on siren operation, 
including the way the alert is sounded.  
7.4.1.5 Personal Media System  
  
The private media system plays a critical role in informing the public. Elements of the 
system include radio, TV (i.e. direct systems), mobile phone and landline telephone (i.e. 
indirect systems) (see left panel of Figure 50). Radio as a direct official communication and 
dissemination system is a very effective medium to reach out to the public (UNU-EHS 
2008). It has a dissemination rate of 60% compared to TV, landline phone and SMS at 
25%, 10% and 5% respectively. Hence, mobile SMS is the least effective and reliable 
system for communication and dissemination during a crisis situation.  However, it is 
pointed out that the earthquake events occurred during the daytime and it is not surprising 
to find that most people would receive tsunami information on the radio. During the 
evening and night people may prefer to watch TV rather than listen to the radio, and this 
needs to be captured in new surveys. On the other hand, it is clear that the number of 
households with a TV is reasonably high in Indonesia at 65.4% (see section 4.2.3.4 of 
Chapter 4) compared to radio sets at 26 million in a population of 200 million. Hence, 
different media systems have a different effectiveness according to the time of the warning. 
 
In addition, some actors question whether radio is actually an effective and reliable system 
in the case of alerting the community quickly in the case of a local tsunami. Nevertheless, 
the strategy to adopt is to use a multiple-mode communication and dissemination system 
with consistent and clear tsunami information to the public.  
7.4.2 Informal Institutions and Systems for Dissemination and Communication  
7.4.2.1 Connecting the TEWS with Mosques and Speakers in Padang 
In Padang, a communications task force was formed in 2007 to implement new ideas of a 
dissemination and communication system to support the TEWS. This included drafting the 
necessary SOPs to advance the development of the new mosque speaker triggering 
mechanism. In a very recent informant interview, GTZ-IS74
“KOGAMI supported by GTZ-IS is running a pilot dissemination network in Padang that will 
connect 30 mosques and five other locations directly with the local Emergency Operations 
Centre (PUSDALOPS) of the City of Padang. If the system functions, this would imply that 
 stated: 
                                                            
74 Michael Hoppe-GTZ-IS 
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the people in the surroundings will be able to receive warnings and guidance from the 
government of the city” (Interview 19, 02 February 2010). 
Such an endeavour is viewed as very important and would be meaningful to the people 
involved in terms of installing devices (i.e. speakers in mosques) that fit with the current 
practices in a given existing institutional order75
7.4.2.2 Linking the TEWS to the ‘Kulkul’ System in Bali 
. The potential effectiveness of public-
mosque-trained people in delivering indirect tsunami information and guidance to the public 
is estimated at 25% (See left panel of Figure 50).   
In contrast, in Bali, the ‘Kulkul’ system would ideally replace modern sirens in areas where 
such technology is not available or appropriate. The ‘Kulkul’ system has traditionally been 
used in Balinese villages to call the community members for public gatherings or to inform 
them of threats. Each banjar (traditional neighbourhood association) has a tower housing 
several kulkul, which are wooden bells with different pitches. The bells can be struck 
differently to convey different announcements. A bell struck in a fast, uninterrupted rhythm 
indicates danger. When alerted of danger, citizens rush to the village tower to be given 
instructions. Each traditional village (Desa Pekraman) is usually made up of between four to 
eight banjar. Currently there are over 1,400 traditional villages across Bali. Unfortunately, it 
is unknown what concrete steps have been taken to link the kulkul system to the TEWS.  
 
Figure 50: Access to dissemination media (left) and spatial coverage (right) in Padang 
Source: UNU-EHS 2010 
 
                                                            
75 Muslin dominance in religion 
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7.4.3 Information Gap and Clarity between Official and Unofficial Notification 
In Padang, actors need to address the 
existing tsunami information gaps as 
shown in the right panel of Figure 50. On 
the other hand, according to the UNU-
EHS survey in 2008, it is clear that the 
ability to understand tsunami warnings in 
Padang decreases by 20% for informal 
notification compared to access from 
official warning as shown in Figure 51. 
This highlights the effectiveness of official 
and informal communication and 
dissemination systems in the case of 
Padang city. 
7.5 Response Capabilities at the Level of Padang and Bali 
7.5.1 Formal Institutions Involved in Response  
In both study areas, formal institutions involved in response include the different DM 
Agencies (BNPB), the fire brigade, the police, the armed forces, SAR, the Indonesian Red 
Cross (PMI), KOGAMI (Padang), the media, the national water and electricity company, 
Food and Water departments (Ministry of Public Welfare; Department of Social), Telkom, 
Health and Sanitary departments (Department of Health), the Indonesian Culture and 
Tourism Minister (Bali), the Department of Internal Affairs, the Department Public Works 
and the Agency for Rehabilitation and Reconstruction. 
 
In addition, in Padang a trained community response team is also an important element of 
the people-centred TEWS architecture for distributing tsunami information indirectly to the 
public as indicated in the left panel of Figure 50. The community response team contributes 
about 25% of the information distributed to the public in Padang.  
7.5.2 Evacuation Planning and Preparedness  
In terms of tsunami response capabilities, the actors and the community at risk carried out 
tsunami drills in Padang city in West Sumatra one year after the tsunami in December 
2004. In addition, Community-Based Disaster Preparedness has been conducted by the 
Indonesian Red Cross (PMI) in Padang in three pilot villages.  In February 2009, a pilot 
tsunami drill was conducted. The authorities received tsunami information from BMKG 
 
Figure 51: Ability to understand formal and informal 
tsunami information 
Source: UNU-EHS 2010 
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which was disseminated to the community using two-way communication radios in each 
pilot village. For efficient community response, the representatives from a community and 
partners have also agreed on a reaction scheme while SOPs are being developed by the 
GITEWS and partners for TEW.  
In 2006, Bali was the first location in Indonesia to attempt the full end-to-end TEWS drill. It 
is reported that about 15,000 people including foreign tourists participated in a national 
tsunami drill conducted on Bali’s Sindi Beach. However, the most critical issue is that there 
is no agreed plan on when and how often to carry out simulations and drills in these 
communities in Indonesia.  
The actors have deliberated extensively on the issue of evacuation planning. For instance, 
in Bali, the evacuation map will be based on the recently developed tsunami hazard map for 
southern Bali. A dialogue with actors from the Kuta community was held in June to discuss 
the ideas of the working group and to collect further input and ideas. Through several 
meetings actors agreed on the establishment of two zones for evacuation and basic ideas of 
evacuation planning, and they proposed conveying the outcome to all managers of the 
association. However, so far there are no formal agreed disaster preparedness plans and 
contingency plans in place in any administrative levels in Padang or Bali because official risk 
maps have only just been completed. Thus, evacuation and spatial planning as part of the 
contingency planning and preparedness are expected to dominate the action arena in both 
Bali and Padang.  
Meanwhile, evacuation buildings are also planned. In this context, the Indonesian Culture 
and Tourism Minister is reported as saying “This will accelerate the ministry's program to 
provide a safe and secure feeling for holidaymakers... escape buildings for other coastal 
areas would be built in stages depending on the availability of the ministry's budget while 
welcoming local administrations who wanted to build their own facilities with their own 
budget.” The buildings are planned to be built on or near Bali’s beaches. However, strong 
local critics have emerged of the Indonesian Culture and Tourism Ministry related to the 
issue of shelter and evacuation in Nusa Dua, Bali. One restaurant owner interviewed in the 
periphery of Nusa Dua complained that: 
“Firstly, the proposed tsunami shelters would only cater for tourists in the area as locals are 
unlawfully prohibited access to Nusa Dua’s beaches. Secondly, why the need to build  
tsunami-safe shelters when the hotels can cater for such needs” (Interview 20, 12 February 
2009).  
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The restaurant owner raises an important issue of equity and access rights of the village 
community when evacuating after a tsunami warning. Ideally, tsunami evacuation shelters 
would help protect people who would have no time to escape to the hotels. This is clearly 
shown in the evacuation time map of Figure 52. It is underlined that for a tsunami warning, 
the tsunami arrival time is 20 minutes, with an expected wave height of 3 meters at the 
coast. In the case of a major tsunami warning the people’s immediate response capability 
will vary from more than 120, 90-120, 60-90, 30-60 and 30 minutes of evacuation time to 
reach the closest evacuation target point depending on the position from the coast to the 
higher ground. Areas indicated in green can be evacuated in 20 minutes. The potential large 
number of casualties is found to be concentrated on the east and west side of Kuta, 
indicated by the dark grey portion of the circle. These are the priority areas for planning 
and building tsunami evacuation buildings.  
On the other hand in Padang KOGAMI argues that: 
“In certain areas it is very difficult for the people to evacuate because there is lack of 
infrastructure for earthquakes, like bridges or roads for evacuation. Even if all the people in 
Padang knew how to evacuate we predict that 60, 000 people could not survive because of 
the infrastructure problem... We have identified a military area as a potential evacuation 
zone, but our requests to the government have been consistently rejected” (Interview 9, 3 
March 2009). 
Similarly, McCloskey, a seismologist at the Environmental Sciences Research Institute at 
the University of Ulster in Coleraine, Northern Ireland argued “if the people of Padang are 
well prepared, then most should survive if they can reach the 10 metre contour... however, 
over 100,000 people – a seventh of the city's population – are blocked from running directly 
to higher ground by the barbed wire-laced, 10-metre-high walls of a huge military airport. 
Padang needs to build a tunnel under that airport, because if they don't these poor people 
will have to run parallel to the coast for several hundred meters while the tsunami is coming 
at them.  So far, no steps have been taken to build such an exit route” (New Scientist 
10.09.2010).  The evacuation time map of Padang (Figure 53) shows the coastal 
communities would need at least 60 minutes to complete the evacuation; however the 
tsunami would strike the coast in about 20 minutes. The important difference compared to 
Bali is that in Padang the entire stretch of the coast is characterised by a likely higher 
potential number of casualties indicated in the dark grey portion of the circle. These are the 
areas to plan and build additional tsunami vertical evacuation buildings as indicated by the 
red-orange areas.  
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An effective response by the community depends on the environment, for example the 
presence of obstacles such as traffic jams. Personnel observations indicate the potential 
traffic problems in the event of evacuation in Padang. KOGAMI reported a traffic jam some 
three hours after a tsunami warning was issued in Padang in 2005. A recent study shows 
there are few roads which can facilitate full evacuation while other roads that lie in the 
dense population area cannot satisfy the evacuation requirements in Padang. It is predicted 
that within the next ten years due to increased urbanisation and population growth, 
Padang’s existing tsunami evacuation routes will probably fail to save all the people (Febrin 
2008). In contrast, Bali roads and traffic are in better condition76
 
; however detailed studies 
and evaluation would be necessary to derive a better assessment under a crisis situation. 
Figure 52: Evacuation time map for major tsunami warnings  
 
Source: DLR in the framework of the GITEWS project 2009 
                                                            
76 Own observation for  south Bali which is also the highest tsunami risk area 
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Figure 53: Tsunami evacuation time map in Padang 
 
Source: DLR in the framework of the GITEWS project 2009 
7.5.2.1 Vertical Evacuation 
 
It is clear that in both cases a large portion of the coastal communities in the case of a near 
field tsunami would have difficulty escaping to higher ground. The challenge therefore is to 
address how to carry out evacuation vertically. However, there is a lack of vertical 
evacuation facilities and a clear institutional arrangements for vertical evacuation in both 
locations, particularly in Padang. However, there are some emerging initiatives and efforts 
to embrace. For example, the Padang provincial government provided 1.7 hectares of land 
with support from public works for building four twin apartment blocks in July 2009 in Purus 
Village to accommodate 3,200 people for the dual purpose of accommodation and for 
vertical evacuation in the event of a tsunami. The Padang government is committed to 
securing national and international cooperation and support to provide vertical evacuation in 
all tsunami-prone areas of Padang. Another fisherman along the Padang coast interviewed 
on the matter said that: 
 
“Building vertical evacuation buildings for the people would be wiser than building the 
expensive sea walls in Padang” (Interview 21, 4 March 2009). 
The Tsunami Early Warning System at the Level of Padang and Bali, Indonesia 
 
 
176 
 
Interestingly, in Bali, this challenge was partly achieved when an MoU was agreed between 
the nine hotels and the villages in 2009. This implies ‘labelled tsunami ready hotels’ have 
formally agreed on a joint evacuation space, an evacuation trigger, evacuation procedures 
and codes of conduct allowing the villages at risk to get to the hotels in case of an official 
tsunami alarm. However, tsunami drills between the villagers and tourists need to be 
practiced and scheduled in regular exercises. In addition, the cooperation needs to be 
scaled up throughout Bali to include more hotel establishments and villages at risk rather 
than confined only to the nine high class hotels in Tanjung Benoa. GTZ-IS (2009) views this 
initiative as a long-term solution if promoted and implemented on a larger scale in the 
southern part of Bali. However, UNESCO warned: 
“It is unknown how hotels would react and respond if there is any demand for all hotels to 
provide space for vertical evacuation” (Interview 3, 27 October 2008). 
Therefore, to minimise potential conflicts erupting in an already fragile environment 
between tourism-related activities and tsunami preparedness, this issue is best solved 
through intensive negotiation and consultations with the hotelier actors. 
7.5.3 Institutional Tsunami Preparedness in the Tourism-Related Establishment 
in Bali 
The tourism-related establishment survey in south Bali shows firstly that tsunami 
awareness is higher than the awareness of climate change in Bali (Figure 54). Interestingly 
half of the establishments have a low to very low perception that a tsunami will occur in the 
next 1-5 years. The perception that a tsunami will probably occur in Bali in the next 50-100 
years is slightly higher. However, 75% of the establishment was not aware of the tsunami 
disaster of 1815 which killed 10,250 people in Bali. Only half of the establishments had high 
to very high awareness of the tsunami risk areas in Bali.  
 
Figure 54: Tsunami risk knowledge in Bali for tourism-related establishments  
Source: Author 
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The survey also suggests all the tourism-related establishments have been informed and 
been advised by the authorities about tsunami risk. However, tourists generally do not ask 
questions about tsunami risks and only 25% of the establishments surveyed communicate 
tsunami risks to the tourists, as shown in Figure 55.  Seventy-five percent of the 
establishments are linked with the TEWS and have received tsunami information in the 
past. Surprisingly, 75% of the hotel establishments reported that the tsunami information 
and what to do was clear; however, only 50% of the establishments pointed out that the 
tsunami information was timely and accurate. Encouragingly, all establishments indicated 
they had trust in the TEWS.  
 
Figure 55: Tsunami warning information in Bali for tourism-related establishments  
Source: Author 
Interestingly, 75% of the establishments indicated that they knew what to do in the event 
of an earthquake or tsunami event and had emergency response plans. Moreover, all 
establishments indicated an interest in being linked with TEWS and develop emergency 
plans as illustrated in Figure 56. However, only 75% of the tourism establishments were 
participating in community tsunami preparedness schemes. 
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Figure 56: Institutional tsunami response in Bali for tourism-related establishments  
Source: Author 
7.6 Summary of Chapter 7 
 
Overall, this chapter has shown that, initially, political commitment, leadership and 
participation as indicators of good governance were higher in Padang compared to Bali.  
This was driven by the strong leadership of the mayor and local NGO (i.e. KOGAMI). In Bali, 
there is an emerging cooperation following initial resistance, but this is characterised by a 
higher degree of negotiation and deliberation among actors. The emerging multi-
stakeholder partnership with the tourism sector and the traditional and cultural structures is 
far more complex in Bali than in Padang, but it may ultimately be the critical element which 
defines TEWS sustainability in Bali. The communities are also participating, but community 
leadership in the TEWS is lacking.  
Padang became the first city in Indonesia to have a local institutional DM regulation, while 
in Bali the regulation is still in progress. The TEWS and DM architectures in Padang include 
a new DM Agency and EOC at provincial level, while Bali received a new EOC at the 
provincial level only. Key local regulations on TEW and DM in Bali include the Governor’s 
Decrees 29/2009, 30/2009, 31/2009 concerning the establishment of the EOC, the DM 
Agency (BPBD) at the provincial level and tsunami warning procedures in Bali respectively. 
The Governor Decree 31/2009 addresses the newly developed SOPs, which delegate 
decision-making to the EOC and recognise the tsunami hazard map, developed with the 
support of the GITEWS project, as the official map for southern Bali. Therefore, each EOC 
makes the final decision and is backed-up legally by BNPB/BPBD and KESRA.  
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Inter-institutional coordination has improved both in Padang and Bali. Key mechanisms that 
have improved coordination include the establishment of multi-level DM architectures and 
SOPs with the government acting as facilitators rather than implementers at local level. 
However, the development of multi-level work flows and SOPs have presented the central 
challenge. Therefore, a final consensus on a tsunami warning chain is gradually surfacing.  
Actors have agreed through the Governors Decree that once tsunami information is 
received from BMKG or interface institutions the provincial and district governments 
through their respective EOCs have the legitimate authority to make decisions as per SOPs.  
Risk knowledge creation is a highly contested issue, especially in Padang; however the 
process has been characterised by multi-institutional cooperation, collective participation, 
intense debate and negotiations among diverse actors. For equitable risk knowledge, risk 
mapping should extend to the whole coastline of Bali. There has been a significant increase 
in disaster preparedness education and awareness in Padang and Bali. However, most 
actors perceived that good perceptions of tsunami risk are higher in Padang because the 
community have been subjected to a more intense education program carried out by 
KOGAMI while at the same time have experienced some real earthquake-tsunami events. 
Risk concerns are relatively high in the high risk areas but people do also tolerate a certain 
level of risk because of their usual livelihood conditions. Risk communication in Bali has 
been quite effective by training trainers, target groups and traditional structures to 
effectively transfer risk knowledge to the community. The religious-social construct may 
strongly negatively affect the communities’ good risk perceptions of tsunami hazards and 
disasters. The emerging new risk knowledge needs to be communicated and socialised at 
multi-levels.  
 
There are a number of formal and informal institutions involved and being equipped with 
different communication tools to further disseminate tsunami information downstream to 
the community. A key obstacle to unlock in the future is the legal arrangements to allow the 
integration of FM-RDS in the TEWS. FM-RDS has enormous opportunities for improving the 
effectiveness of the TEWS in Indonesia. The effort or idea of installing speakers in mosques 
in Padang and temples in Bali with Kulkul is viewed as an important step to fit meaningful 
practices into a given existing institutional order, but it lacks formal recognition and 
legitimacy for effectiveness and sustainability. The development of a local warning 
dissemination service among hotels in Bali is an interesting partnership development, but 
the effort needs to be scaled up nationally for equitable benefits. The combined use of 
formal-informal institutions, tools and trained agents contributes significantly towards a 
people-centred EWS and in filling the gaps and reducing social vulnerability in information 
The Tsunami Early Warning System at the Level of Padang and Bali, Indonesia 
 
 
180 
 
access. The effectiveness of various media systems varies with time, hence a multi-mode 
dissemination and communication system is always required.  
 
Due to the delay in producing the tsunami risk maps, institutional preparedness (i.e. 
evacuation planning, contingency planning etc) have not progressed significantly in Padang 
and Bali, but would be the next priority area to address. Both Padang and Bali have carried 
out TEWS drills; however the drills are ad-hoc and need to be institutionalised into 
scheduled inter-annual events. Evacuation routes and vertical evacuation have been 
developed on a small scale through joint collaboration between the actors and the 
community. Padang needs innovative partnership to build vertical evacuation buildings 
quickly. A small village in Nusa Dua Peninsula has formally institutionalised procedures for 
timely tsunami vertical evacuation in cooperation with neighbouring hotels; however the 
concept needs to be developed and scaled up in Bali. The tourism related establishment 
survey in Bali indicated fairly good institutional preparedness for tsunamis; however, 
tsunami risk knowledge and its communication to tourists are lacking.  
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8. Agency, Effectiveness and Sustainability  
 
In the first part of this chapter, the central questions are who are the agents of TEWS 
governance and how do they govern? What makes them agents? What is their power base?  
By what means do actors become authoritative. Is it delegation of authority based on 
relational behaviour or an approach based on social interactions? What are the conditions 
for emerging agents at different levels? Does the source of authority differ across policy 
domains? 
The second part briefly explores for any signs of the impacts of DM spending in terms of 
improvement of human security. The third part of the chapter explores the performance of 
the INATEWS to this end, mainly from the media’s perspective. The fourth part of the 
chapter presents the main prevailing unsatisfactory outcome and emphasises the major 
incentive mechanisms identified by the actors to effect change at different levels. The last 
part of this chapter provides the author’s own perspective of a TEWS model for Indonesia 
based on key theoretical concepts, empirical observations and the findings of this research 
study. 
8.1 Agents and Agency in Relation to the Tsunami Early Warning System 
 
Before identifying the agents related to TEWS governance, it is necessary to have a better 
understanding of the concept of agency, of how agents differ from actors, and what 
constitutes agency (ESG 2009). Agency is understood in this study as the capacity to act in 
the face of earth system transformation or to produce effects that ultimately shape natural 
processes (ESG 2009) or processes between human and physical systems. It considers 
agency in a multilevel context where actors have stepped in to fill the gap where the 
national government has not been able to effectively respond on its own. This implies that 
the study focuses on agents and agency from the non-government individuals or 
organisations and also applies the concept only in the case of national actors (i.e. excluding 
international actors).  
8.1.1 Agent and Agency: Indonesian Society for Disaster Management 
The Indonesian Society for Disaster Management (MPBI) was established in March 2003 as 
a professional network for individuals working in the field of DM. The MPBI organisational 
structure consists of a governing body of seven presidents with a range of backgrounds 
from hazards specialists to practitioners of law and legislation. It consists of a secretary 
Agency, Effectiveness and Sustainability  
 
 
182 
 
general, vice secretary, treasurer and secretary to run the organisation on a daily basis. 
The member assembly is the highest authority. MPBI has a very extensive network of 
partners at various levels and scales including OXFAM. UN-OCAH, UNDP, AusAID, USAID etc  
MPBI’s mission is to support comprehensive disaster management to achieve safety and 
protection from disasters and to create welfare for society in Indonesia. It is committed to 
the Hyogo Framework for Action and has focused on areas ranging from the preparation of 
the DM Bill (enacted on April 26, 2007 to the Law No. 24 Year 2007 on Disaster 
Management), encouraging development regulations derived from the Law 24/2007 at both 
the national and regional levels to carrying out multi-level disaster training.  
MPBI and other partners were apparently driven by the incentive that the DM reform 
process was overshadowed by the emergency responses to national security in the form of 
regional conflict and acts of terrorism while persistent failures continued in managing 
disasters. As early as 2005, it was reported that the DM law was ranked priority 55 of 234 
pieces of legislation for the parliament (UNDP, 2009). MPBI and partners wanted to 
spearhead and fill the existing gap on the issues of DM legal reform in Indonesia because 
the local state government had been unable to respond effectively on its own. This was an 
opportunity to exercise agency beyond the state.  
According to UNDP Indonesia (2009); MPBI was already collaborating with UNDP, OCHA and 
BAKORNAS PB on DM legal reform in 2003. This effort was materialised in 2005 when MPBI 
formulated an initial strategy for legal reform with partners. It was the road map for the DM 
reform process.  In 2005 the DM law was included in the list of priority legislative reforms. 
While UNDP organized meetings with the Legislative Agency within the House of 
Representatives (Baleg) and provided funding to draft sections of the DM law, MPBI started 
to assemble the civil society organizations, organize workshops and build mass public 
support for the DM law with the support of UNDP, OCHA. As the political commitment 
gained momentum for DM reform, MPBI worked to strengthen capacity within, and beyond, 
the government as the parliament drafted Indonesia’s Disaster Management Bill with the 
keen participation and commitment from the government, particularly BAKORNAS. In 
addition, MPBI helped stakeholders at the local level gained a deeper understanding of the 
scope of this proposed new law.  New actors joined the cause based on the level of trust 
among actors. MPBI also earned the trust of new actors, creating a strong well-coordinated 
network and collaboration which extended to both the executive and legislative branches of 
the government and within the DM community, partners, and within the government of 
Indonesia. In the end, MPBI led the DM process while other partners such as UNDP gave 
coordination and technical assistance.  
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MPBI has certainly influenced and shaped the final outcome of the DM legal reform process. 
Three very important events took place consecutively. These were (1) the launch of the 
National Action Plan for Disaster Risk Reduction (NAP DRR), (2) the passage of the Disaster 
Management Bill by the House of Representatives, and (3) the disaster management 
platform which emerged from the DM law process. MPBI is also facilitating the process by 
which local policymakers and stakeholders can draft their own legal reforms and action plan 
documents to suit the needs of their communities. It has successfully created two key tools 
that have increased awareness throughout the network of civil society and government 
institutions, and it has aided local governments in reforming their disaster management 
laws to suit their community needs. Other outcomes include workshops in the four highly 
disaster-prone provinces of West Sumatra, Bali, East Java, and West Nusa Tenggara. MPBI 
said that “we will continue to support local governments in the formation of local disaster 
management laws”.  
It is quite clear that MPBI has emerged as an agent in driving and shaping governance and 
institutional change in DM at multiple levels and scales in Indonesia. It has exercised 
agency and filled the gap which the official state government was unable to effectively 
attend to due to lack of policy and priorities in national security threats from social conflicts 
and acts of terrorism. MPBI have clearly gone beyond simply DM reform lobbying and 
advising national governments in the creation and implementation of rules. They have 
substantially participated at various levels and scales. They have proposed new legal 
standards in DM and have developed very extensive partners at all levels and disciplines. 
Consequently, there is a reconfiguration of authority in the DM sphere. They possess the 
ability to prescribe behaviour and have obtained the trust and consent of the governed and 
are capable of influence the final outcome. MPBI has emerged as an authoritative and 
legitimate agent through a mix of knowledge base, consent and trust from the state, 
international and national partners and from the broad-based community. The other 
underlying conditions which have helped MPBI emerge as an agent are the need to exercise 
flexibility, patience and coordination among a diverse array of partners. The agency of MPBI 
is believed to resonate across multiple levels and spatial scales in the area of disaster 
management in Indonesia, although presently its authority is rather limited across policy 
domains.  
8.1.2 Agents and Agency in Preparedness: Tsunami Alert Community Foundation 
The idea of the Tsunami Alert Community Foundation (KOGAMI) as an NGO surfaced when 
a San Francisco-based NGO called the SurfZone Relief Operation (SRO), wanted to set up 
an educational program for disaster preparedness. SRO was already providing aid 
distribution with the support of some locals to the tsunami victims of December 26, 2004 to 
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the island of Simeuleu. On July 4, 2005 a formal meeting was held at a cafe, attended by 
several individuals concerned about the threat of earthquake and tsunamis in West 
Sumatra.  The SRO decided to volunteer to form a non-governmental organization that was 
named the TSUNAMI ALERT COMMUNITY FOUNDATION (KOGAMI). KOGAMI was officially 
established on 21 September 2005. KOGAMI is led by an executive Director, P. Rina Dewi. 
Its organizational structure includes an advisory board, supervisory board, as administrative 
Director and a program Director. There are around 12 permanent staff members and 200 
facilitators, who are all local volunteers. KOGAMI currently operates in a small building in 
Padang, with apparently limited infrastructure and resources.  
Its official vision is based on a Culture of Building Disaster Preparedness. KOGAMI’s current 
working arena is Padang because the city has the largest population of people at risk of a 
major tsunami. Out of Padang’s 750,000 residents, 400,000 live or work along the coast. 
According to Patra Rina Dewi, the current executive Director of the Tsunami Alert 
Community (KOGAMI), although Padang and the rest of West Sumatra were not affected by 
the Aceh Tsunami, the people of Padang were greatly traumatised from the news of the 
tsunami calamity. Patra said “... they were scared because there was no information about 
when they had to run or what action they should take.” Apparently, the other main reason 
driving the actors of SRO and founder KOGAMI to initiate change was linked to the 
discovery in March 2005 that the city of Padang has one of the highest risks of tsunami 
threat in the world. This came from the National Geographic magazine brought by actors 
from SRO, San Francisco. KOGAMI realised it was not only necessary to provide assistance 
to tsunami survivors on Simeulue but also to address evacuation planning for the city of 
Padang.  
Therefore, on July 27, 2005, KOGAMI had a ‘serious meeting’ with the mayor of Padang as 
there were no preparedness plans for the community in the coastal area and there was a 
lack of government and community capacities to respond to the threat. KOGAMI urged the 
mayor of Padang to pay serious attention to building community preparedness in Padang. 
In other words, the state could not exercise agency successfully at the local level in the 
area of city preparedness for tsunami hazard and risks. This clearly implies that KOGAMI 
wanted to lead and fill the existing gap on the issues of community preparedness in Padang 
where the local state government had been unable to effectively respond on its own. This 
was an opportunity to exercise agency beyond the state. In the end a mutual civil society-
public partnership and cooperation was founded based on the common vision that Padang 
would be the first city to have an end-to-end TEWS in Indonesia.  
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Intriguingly, KOGAMI had no knowledge and background of hazard early warning systems, 
hazard preparedness or disasters. At this point, it is clear that the KOGAMI power base was 
certainly neither knowledge nor hierarchy-based. Despite these limitations, KOGAMI 
submitted a community preparedness plan to the mayor of Padang which was given the 
green light. The community preparedness plan became more urgent when soon after, on 10 
April 2005, Padang was struck by an earthquake measuring 6.8 moment magnitude.  
Interestingly, KOGAMI also successfully captured the interest and response of the President 
of the Republic of Indonesia, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, while he was visiting the city of 
Padang on April 13, 2005 following the West Sumatra earthquake and the eruption of 
mount Talang in Solok district. The President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono ordered that 
activities and plans of SRO and the emerging KOGAMI should continue as they were very 
beneficial for the community. 
To implement the plan to make preparedness education a priority KOGAMI initially adopted 
a range of community strategies ranging from socialization, door to door canvassing, 
meeting with community leaders, distribution of leaflets, and outreach to schools and 
mosques.  Initially KOGAMI had been rejected by the community and some elements of the 
government because they were not ready to hear the word ‘tsunami’ as it threatened 
business opportunities in Padang. However, according to KOGAMI, the reception was very 
good based on the increasing demand for earthquake and tsunami education from schools 
and public groups.  
KOGAMI worked with the people with support from the Mercy Corps. The activities were 
guided through further cooperation with faculty members of the Andalas University of 
Padang and members of the Californian NGO and members of different institutions. 
UNESCO has also supported KOGAMI in different settings. The government and the West 
Sumatra town of Padang were finally able to officially support KOGAMI activities by 
allocating budget funds almost three years later in 2008 following the enactment of the DM 
law No 24 / 2007 and the regulations on disaster funds. The engagement was then marked 
by a cooperation agreement in the form of an MoU between the Government of Padang and 
KOGAMI. In a short period of time KOGAMI official strategic partners have expanded to 
include international bodies such as UNESCO, ISDR, UNDP, Mercy Corps, SURFAID 
International (SRO), GTZ and USAID. Its network with the national NGOs includes MPBI and 
IDEP, while universities range from Andalas University, the University of Washington, and 
Waseda University. State partners are the Government of West Sumatra Province, the 
Municipality of Padang, the Marine and Fisheries department, and LIPI.  
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KOGAMI has initiated and implemented a range of activities in cooperation with the local 
government and partners such as UNESCO since the beginning, and has also contributed 
significantly in developing policies regarding preparedness in Padang.  They have set up a 
number of programs, including disaster mitigation and surveys and assessments which 
focused on identification of eight main sectors at risk in the coastal areas of the city, 
preliminary identification of hazards, an evacuation plan for the city including mapped 
evacuation routes and safe areas based on simple observations. Other activities include 
educational programs for school students, educational material development, and capacity 
building.  Since 2005, a total of 61 schools have received training starting from first grade 
on how to deal with natural disasters. In January 2009, a trial program to integrate disaster 
preparation into the curriculum began in 12 Padang schools. Education workshops are also 
held in villages to ensure a system is in place and that everyone has the necessary 
knowledge of disaster planning and evacuation strategies. Preventive-measure groups have 
also been established in each mapped risk zone. These groups focus on disaster and 
emergency preparation for at least three days in the red zones as it is expected that 
national assistance will arrive only after 24 hours and local resources will have to be able to 
shelter casualties for that amount of time. As early as June 11, 2005, Padang exercised the 
first tsunami evacuation simulation in Indonesia. An estimated number of 3000 people were 
involved in the simulation. 
Furthermore, KOGAMI facilitated responsible agencies for disaster response to design a 
standard operating procedure for DM. KOGAMI is also closely collaborating with the mayor 
to establish a decree and cooperating with BNPB to make this legalized SOP a model for 
other cities in Indonesia.  
 Another challenge KOGAMI had to constantly overcome was the prevailing religious beliefs 
and the local mind-set that locals have: 
“Some locals argue that if Allah thinks we’re meant to die, we shall die...We need to break 
down this perception because we need to do our best first, and then leave it to God” 
(Interview 9, 3 March 2009). 
KOGAMI also faced potential conflicts with some partners on the issue of technical TEWS 
versus community preparedness. KOGAMI initially argued that “the only usefulness they 
assign to the system (i.e. TEW) is in supplying proper information regarding when families 
can return to their houses in coastal areas once a tsunami has passed” (Villagran 2005). 
This critical view on the limited use of the TEWS has also been commented on at the 
highest levels of the Parliament of Indonesia. It is believed that such a TEWS will only 
benefit the countries of the Indian Ocean and not Indonesia because of the challenge of 
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locally generated tsunamis (Villagran 2005). Therefore, Villagran recommended that 
UNESCO-IOC and the institutions involved should design an awareness campaign to 
counteract such a belief.  
However, when KOGAMI was questioned again during my interview in Padang on the issue, 
the response actually revealed that KOGAMI had good concepts despite being uninformed 
on the different sources and mechanisms of tsunami generation such as the difference 
between near and far field tsunamis, slow earthquakes and landslide-generated tsunamis. 
Nevertheless, KOGAMI actually clarified and stated:  
“We want to educate the community first until the TEWS is fully effective ... only then can 
one depend on the technical TEWS, but not the reverse as is the case now” (Interview 9, 3 
March 2009). 
In other words KOGAMI believes that the TEWS starts with the fundamental issue of people. 
Gradually, the efforts of KOGAMI have been recognised by different institutions such as 
SATLAK, SATKORLAK now BNPB, LIPI, GTZ-IS, and the government as a committed partner 
in local disaster preparedness activities in Padang. However, such recognition had to be 
earned. KOGAMI said  
“Initially the government did not recognise and support us; however the government has 
found advantages in supporting NGOs such as KOGAMI” (Interview 9, 3 March 2009). 
Furthermore, on 6 May 2008, the City Hall of San Francisco in the United States, recognised 
the Founder and Director of KOGAMI –Patra Rina Dewi, for organising the volunteer 
response for in assisting victims of the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami, for her innovative 
solutions and continued dedication to preparing West Sumatra and other earthquake and 
Tsunami-endangered regions, for her international leadership in community preparedness 
and disaster mitigation, and for her ongoing relationship with San Francisco and Californian 
agencies.  
Finally, all indications show that KOGAMI has emerged as an agent in community disaster 
preparedness in Padang, Indonesia. They have also gone beyond lobbying and advising 
national governments in the creation and implementation of rules. They have substantially 
participated in and /or proposed new approaches and rules. They have negotiated their own 
standards and have developed quite extensive partners in a short period of time. As a result 
there is a reconfiguration of authority, particularly at the local level. They possess the 
ability to prescribe behaviour, obtain consent of the governed, and are capable of 
influencing and shaping outcomes. KOGAMI has emerged as an authoritative and legitimate 
agent through consent from the local government, community and partners, both formally 
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or informally. The agency of KOGAMI is believed to resonate strongest at the sub-national 
levels in Padang and other provinces in the area of community preparedness for disaster, 
but presently their authority is decaying rapidly across policy domains. 
8.2 Measuring the Effectiveness of the Tsunami Early Warning System in 
Indonesia 
 
A geologist and Chairman of the Exploration Think Tank Indonesia, ETTI stated, “the 
effectiveness of the high-tech installations has yet to be tested though….. a billion rupiah 
have been spent over there just to show the people and the world we are doing something. 
But in terms of scientific things it’s ridiculous … without building inherent awareness in the 
social community, all that technology is just garbage, just nothing… Perhaps it should have 
been spent on other things that are very important: campaigning, going into the grassroots, 
building social awareness rather than introducing high tech that many scientists are 
skeptical about” (Asia Calling 13.06.2007).  
The challenging and daunting question is therefore how to test or measure the effectiveness 
of the TEWS, which is in dynamic evolution, as exemplified by the INATEWS. This will help 
in managing and improving the system. It is pointed out that earlier chapters have also 
identified weak points, gaps and constraints in the process of implementing the new TEWS. 
However, the system’s effectiveness is most often valued in terms of the final outcome 
during actual events, as indicated in the Institutional Analysis framework.  
In order to evaluate the effectiveness of the TEWS, analysis is carried out across all the 
TEWS elements during an event, paying close attention to the existing notions and 
descriptions of EWS effectiveness discussed in Chapter 2. The rationale of how the events 
are selected is based on (1) the characteristics of the earthquake and risk to the respective 
communities, (2) how the actors and the community at risk reacted and responded to the 
risk, and  (3) the level of impact in terms of lives lost and damage reported. As the system 
is evolving, it is necessary to measure the effectiveness as a function of time after the 
December 2004 tsunami calamity. The information is primarily based on the media 
perspective, key informant interviews and observations. These materials were compared, 
verified by mean of triangulation, and collated into a larger narrative on TEWS effectiveness 
or performance. The following provides an analysis of the selected tsunami hazard risk and 
disasters classified into earlier and recent earthquake-tsunami shocks after the 26th 
December 2004 tsunami. The earlier shocks are those occurring between the period of 
2005-2007 and the recent shocks are those occurring after the year 2007 (see Table 4). 
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8.2.1 Earlier Earthquake-Tsunami Shocks  
8.2.1.1 The Case of the 28 March 2005 Earthquake: Sumatra 
A few months after the December 2004 earthquake, while Indonesia was still in disaster 
shock, a second deadly tsunami disaster struck on 28th March 2005, killing at least 1,000 
people following an earthquake with a moment magnitude of 8.7 which hit the coast of 
Sumatra. In this second experience, the Indonesian authorities took more than 30 minutes 
to manually process and locate the earthquake off Sumatra. In this second experience, 
Indonesia clearly had not made any progress in the TEWS.  
8.2.1.2 The Case of the 17 July 2006 Earthquake: South coast of Java 
 
Some 17 months later, on 17th July 2006, a major earthquake of moment magnitude 7.7 
occurred on the south coast of Java generating a three-meter high tsunami with a run-up of 
182 m along a 177 km stretch that caused extensive damage, destroying houses, 
restaurants, cars and hotels on the south coast, and taking the lives of at least 668 people 
and leaving at least 65 missing including three foreigners (WHO 2006).  
This time, the development of the TEWS started to come into question. Analysis of the 
operations shows that a tsunami bulletin was actually issued by the PTWC in Hawaii 12 
minutes after the earthquake alerting Indonesia (Java) and Australia (Christmas Island) to 
a possible local tsunami affecting coasts within a 100 km radius from the quake epicentre. 
The alert was sent 24 minutes before the estimated tsunami impact time. The State 
Minister for RISTEK confirmed that Indonesian officials had received bulletins from both the 
PWTC in Hawaii and JMA twenty minutes before the first tsunami wave struck (Guardian 
18.07 2006). Two and a half hours later, a second bulletin from the PTWC confirmed the 
occurrence of a local tsunami.  
In terms of local observation and forecast, BMKG still could not quickly and accurately 
estimate the size of the earthquake. RISTEK acknowledged there were no operational 
devices to detect tsunamis since they had been damaged and decommissioned and one was 
awaiting repair (MSNBC 18.07.2006). The surprising and most concerning issue within the 
process of dissemination and communication of the tsunami risk is underlined by the 
statement made by the state minister for RISTEK who said “the government did not 
publicise the bulletins because they did not want to cause unnecessary alarm” (CNN 
19.07.2006). The other interesting fact is that the minister also commented on the likely 
consequences if it was actually a false tsunami warning. 
The event revealed elements of inter-intuitional process in communication and 
dissemination among actors since the minister also said “warnings were issued seven 
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minutes before the incident via 400 text messages to the government representatives, 
district heads and mayors” (Jakarta Post 20.07.2006). On the other hand, this account is 
clear evidence that the tsunami information ended up circulating among actors but never 
actually reached the coastal community at risk.  
Furthermore, at the local level the dissemination and communication system also faced a 
major problem. BMKG said that “telecommunication lines to the affected areas were cut by 
the quake, causing the few available lines from Jakarta to be jammed by worried relatives, 
and therefore no available phone line was free for BMKG to warn the authorities in charge” 
(BBC 19.06.2006). It was also revealed that the southern Java area had no system to warn 
the people of the coming waves.  
In this case, it is clear that the system lacked the observational and forecasting capacity, 
rapid backup systems, clear protocols and mechanism for tsunami warning, or a formal 
institutional arrangement to ensure warnings were actually communicated to reach the 
people at risk rather than circulating among government bureaucrats. Proper dedicated 
dissemination and communication systems should be used rather than depending on the 
public system. Overall the TEWS largely failed to alert the communities at risk.  
However, the emerging and interesting issue is that the Indonesian authorities such as 
RISTEK, BMKG faced increasing tensions of accountability, despite the lack of DM laws and 
legislation during that time, from not only the free press media, but also from the political 
legislative system and the community. For instance the Parliament called the minister for 
explanations. In his defence, the minister explained that “he was misquoted… his ministry is 
not the appointed authorized agency to issue warnings to the public. This duty is entrusted 
to the Meteorological and Geophysics Office” (Ministry of Tourism and Culture 2006). 
On the other hand, some villagers in the community complained that “there was little or no 
warning ahead of the tsunami” while a Java resident, whose village of Batukaras was one of 
those affected, said “...why did a warning not reach Java's affected communities in time? 
(BBC 19.06.2006). The undesired, negative outcome and emerging accountability pressed 
the government and all actors to intensify their efforts to deliver the so-called TEWS which 
had been promised earlier.  
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8.2.1.3 The Case of the 12th September 2007 Earthquake: Bengulu 
 
8.2.1.3.1 Rapid Earthquake Monitoring, Dissemination and Communication 
It is noted that the German-Indonesian TEWS (GITEWS) was well in progress and this time 
the monitoring, warning and dissemination of the 12th September 2007 event set a record 
with alarms being triggered less than two minutes after the earthquake and a warning was 
sent approximately two minutes later. It was the first estimate of where and how powerful 
the earthquake was from the established system in BMKG. The message was also received 
by the public from diverse media outlets such as radio, TV, SMS and in some areas by 
RANET (UNESCAP 2009). Indonesia was able to issue a national warning to local authorities 
within ten minutes of the earthquake, comparable to the speed of issuing tsunami warnings 
in the USA and Japan. In this event, the INATEWS system was effective in terms of 
earthquake detection, estimation, dissemination and communication of earthquake-tsunami 
information to the interface institutions through the various systems downstream to the 
community at risk. However, the outcome of the 12th September 2007 event also revealed 
important gaps and weaknesses as discussed below. 
8.2.1.3.2 Over-reactions, False Tsunami Warnings and Sirens Not Functioning 
Authorities in the Indian Ocean issued a series of tsunami alerts after a powerful quake hit 
Indonesia's Sumatra Island. However, in reality, only a few localized and non-fatal tsunamis 
were generated (Reuters 14.09.2007). This implies the tsunami warning forecast was timely 
but not accurate. Reuters questioned if authorities had over-reacted. However, seismologist 
Mike Turnbull of Australia's Central Queensland University argued that "It would have been 
irresponsible not to issue the warnings”  An official at RISTEK said “a warning, even if it was 
false, was better than none, but …at the moment the system is not fully reliable, and that is 
why there are many false warnings”. Nevertheless, an effective warning system is judged 
not only in terms of being timely in detecting earthquakes, but more in terms of its ability 
to indicate, for example, if a tsunami has been generated such that informed decisions and 
action can be taken. False warnings rapidly degrade people’s trust in the early warning 
systems.  
On the other hand, the village chief of Padang Bakung in Bengulu province reported that 
"We have a siren, but it doesn't work because of power failures after the quake"(Reuters 
14.09.2007). This account by the chief of the village highlights again the flaws in the 
dissemination and communication system without proper backup systems. 
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8.2.1.3.3 Reaction and Response Behaviours  
The reaction and response behaviours of the event have raised question even in Padang 
city. Some actors during the interview highlighted that people do not interpret well the 
tsunami warning from BMKG which consists of only technical words such as earthquake 
intensity, location, depth and the word ‘potentsi’ tsunami.  
In addition, a UNU-EHS survey (2008) reported that only 22%  of the respondents in 
Padang city during the Bengulu earthquake actually evacuated on ground shaking while the 
rest stayed on the alert despite receiving rapid tsunami warning information, but no 
guidance of what to do was issued by BMKG (GTZ-IS 2007). They did not perceive the 
messages as a call to take action and evacuate. GTZ-IS (2007) rightly suggested that a 
warning without clear guidance does not trigger consistent reaction because it leads to a 
high level of uncertainty for people who must decide whether to evacuate or not.  
8.2.1.3.4 Warning Process Not a Simple Stimulus-Response 
GTZ-IS (2008) apparently views the reaction behaviour from a simple stimulus-response 
model (Mileti and Beck 1975). However, in reality, warning involves far more than just a 
linear transmission of the message. In a review of the warning process and evacuation 
behaviour, it was found that warning behaviour involves selective perception, collective 
multiple perceptions and social interactions including other independent observations to 
socially confirm the warning message before accepting or rejecting a warning which may 
evoke an appropriate response (Quarantelli 1990). Hence reaction behaviour is not a simple 
stimulus-response behaviour. Believability depends on the confirmation process (i.e. there 
was no confirmation from BMKG), the proximity of the threat (i.e. not indicated in the 
warning) and the perception of danger as real (i.e. ‘potentsi’ tsunami probably does not 
indicate if danger is real).  
On the other hand, the village chief in Bengulu reported that “villagers fled after seeing the 
water pull back” while one businessman from the Padang coast interviewed said  
''Whenever there are rumours of tsunami, I close up my shop and run. But it's just 
rumours, causing trouble, causing traffic. Next time I'm going to wait and see if the water 
goes out before I run'' (Interview 22, 02 March 2009). 
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This adds more evidence that people most often carry out personal observation of the 
precursor environment, to confirm that the threat behind the warning; hence the process is 
not based on a simple stimulus-response.  
8.2.1.3.5 Mosque as Safe Haven 
As indicated earlier, Padang is perceived as a model for an end-to-end TEWS in Indonesia. 
However, the low community response provokes further questions. An in-depth interview 
with the local NGO KOGAMI in Padang revealed an interesting issue that should not be 
ignored when rooting an EWS in society. KOGAMI said: 
“The poor responses of the community at risk were probably due to the coincidence of the 
earthquake and the tsunami warning with the first day of Ramadan…. Most of the local 
people remained in the mosques as they were praying” (Interview 9, 3 March 2009). 
This account and observation 
probably suggests that people 
perceive that in mosque they are 
safe and there is no need to 
evacuate as indicated in Figure 57 
where the author highlighted 
“Nothing remains except for 
mosque.... A safe haven”. The 
author also gave explanations of 
the flow dynamics around the 
concrete pillars which do not have 
a blocking effect which could 
weaken and collapse the building. 
However, not all mosques are 
built on concrete pillars and have 
satisfied tsunami engineering building codes. Therefore, the message that mosque is a safe 
haven should be treated with caution.  
8.2.1.3.6 Ambiguity in Warning and Understanding of the Tsunami Warning 
Scheme 
The fact that people did not view the BMKG warning as information about an imminent 
threat requiring immediate reaction provokes further questions. Firstly, it is likely that the 
word ‘potentsi’ tsunami although scientifically correct (GTZ-IS 2008) may actually be 
ambiguous to the ordinary citizen. 
 
Figure 57: Tsunami impact area with mosque still remaining  
 
Source: Diposatono 2008 
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On the other hand, the fact that 21 % of the people interviewed (UNU-EHS 2008) stayed on 
the alert suggests there is a lack of knowledge of the tsunami hazard threat in terms of its 
speed of impact. Furthermore, there is a likely possibility that the people did not understand 
the tsunami warning scheme, or perhaps the authorities educated the public about the 
warning levels to be used, but in reality, during that event the authorities did not follow the 
warning procedures as the confirmation step was not carried out.  
8.2.2 Recent Earthquake-Tsunami Shocks  
8.2.2.1 The Case of January and February 2009 Earthquake: North coast of West 
Papua and Sulawesi Island 
 
Another major earthquake of 7.6 moment magnitude struck near the north coast of West 
Papua, Indonesia, killing at least two people and injuring 35, and damaging dozens of 
houses, with four buildings collapsing. A tsunami warning was initially issued but lifted 
within an hour of the quake (BMKG 04.01.2009, CNN 04.01.2009). Fairly similar procedures 
were carried out in the case of the February Sulawesi earthquake. In both cases, the 
process of issuing the warning and cancellation within an hour suggest improving 
operational capabilities at national level despite more initial false tsunami alerts. The main 
problem identified is the inability to confirm if a tsunami has been generated or not. 
8.2.2.2 The Case of 11 August 2009 Earthquake: Andaman Islands 
 
Very recently, on 11th August 2009, a large earthquake of moment magnitude 7.6 occurred 
in the Andaman Islands prompting PTWC to issue a tsunami alert for coastal regions of 
Indonesia, Burma, Thailand, India and Bangladesh. The PTWC cancelled the alert two hours 
after the massive earthquake (IOC 11.08.2009). On the other hand, BMKG was completely 
silent on the earthquake event77
 “The earthquake occurrence is outside the jurisdiction of Indonesia...  The INATEWS 
system can only give a tsunami warning if the epicentre is in the Indonesian region even 
though the system could ‘detect’ the earthquake source...There are plans to enlarge the 
seismic observation system beyond the Indonesian region” (Interview 23, 11 August 2009). 
. There were no real-time observations and reporting of the 
earthquake event at BMKG even though Indonesia was among the countries on the alert list 
from PTWC. It is unknown if institutions were internally informed, but there was no news on 
the event locally, except breaking news reported in the international media such as CNN 
and the BBC. Local experts related to the system at BMKG were immediately contacted to 
explain the silence of BMKG. The local expert explained: 
                                                            
77 The BMKG website did not indicate the occurrence of the earthquake  near real time 
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This suggests very clearly that currently BMKG has limited capabilities for monitoring 
earthquakes just outside its territory despite being in operation since November 2008. 
BMKG needs to establish clear procedures to deal with the present observational gaps. The 
immediate solution is to make use of the JMA and PTWC tsunami information while 
expanding the observational capacity beyond its territorial boundaries.  The other serious 
concern identified is that the authorities continue to have a dilemma regarding   
communicating risk information to the community.  
8.2.2.3 The Case of the 2 September 2009 Earthquake: Java, Bali, Sumatra  
 
At least 39 people in five cities and regencies in West Java died while 57 residents of two 
villages in southern Cianjur Regency houses were buried under landslides from the cliffs 
following the big earthquake. In addition, 1200 houses experienced minor damage while 
976 houses collapsed following an earthquake of moment magnitude 7.3 on 2nd September 
2009 some 142 kilometres southwest of Tasikmalaya District, West Java (KOMPAS 
03.09.2009). 
The key weakness identified was that the three tsunami-detection buoys78
                                                            
78 Installed around the coast of Cilacap regency. 
 failed, and the 
Regional DM Agency in Cilacap had no idea why. The Head of the Sub Division for Disaster 
Mitigation in Cilacap admitted that “there is no expert who can operate them, hence we do 
not know why the equipment was not functioning...” In addition, it was reported that even 
the  two radio transmission units that serve to inform of the tsunami threat in the BPBD 
Office in Cilacap had no-one to operate and had been tested only a couple of  times 
(Regional KOMPAS 03.09.2009). The challenging reality is that training to operate the 
tsunami detection equipment was not addressed despite requests to the donors i.e. the 
GITEWS due to other priorities (Regional KOMPASS 03.09.2009).  The tsunami sirens in 
Cilacap also did not function because residents reported that the equipment had been 
stolen, while the earthquake shocks cut off the electricity (KOMPAS 03.09.2009). In another 
area, 400 km northwest of Cilacap, at Pelabuhan ratu, Sukabumi, a siren alarm went on for 
about 10 seconds but then stopped (Antara 03.09.2009). KOMPAS, the local newspaper 
concluded that “the local people should read the water; should it recede, they should go to 
higher ground, leave the sophisticated and expensive technology unused”. This report of 
KOMPAS requests people to observe the sea level change. This is a not an appropriate 
recommendation from KOMPAS. This highlights the need to engage effectively with the 
media. On the other hand, such frustration exemplifies the discontent and unsatisfactory 
outcome of the effectiveness of the expensive technological TEWS. This outcome clearly 
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points to the issue of the challenge of local communities up taking new imported technology 
and the lack of effective local governance at the local level.  
8.2.2.4 The Case of the 30 September Earthquake: Padang 
 
On 30th September 2009 a large earthquake killed 1,100 people and caused many buildings 
to collapse, with widespread damage. The quake was estimated at a moment magnitude of 
6.8, at 14 minutes after the event by the PTWC and JMA (IOC 30.09.2009). On the other 
hand, BMKG estimated the earthquake moment magnitude at 7.6 some 4 minutes after the 
event (BMKG 30.09.2009). Later it was revised to 7.9 Mw. All the tsunami warning centres 
were accurate in terms of not issuing a tsunami alert; however, the question is what could 
have been the consequences of the earlier underestimation of the earthquake? 
According to the GTZ-IS local advisor in Padang, after the earthquake, power was cut and 
cellular networks including GSM were also down. This implies that mobile text messages 
could not be communicated to the public during the first hour. Fortunately, there was 
backup power at the EOC. The landline telephone system was still operating and able to 
provide an internet connection to receive earthquake information from BMKG. The 
information from BMKG had reached Padang authorities about five minutes after the 
earthquake but was only available to the public about 20 to 25 minutes later, when the 
mayor received information and announced it (GTZ-IS 2009). The EOC used FM, VHF radio 
networks to tell communities and agencies that there was no tsunami threat and inform the 
people to stop evacuating. Other communication equipment such as sirens was not used as 
there was no tsunami threat. 
 
Interestingly, it was also found that there was no communication between the mayor and 
the EOC, and they acted independently.  The mayor could not receive information from 
BMKG via text message. This implies there was no effective coordination between the 
institutional actors, and the tsunami information was too late. Despite the announcement 
by the EOC and the mayor that there was no tsunami threat, people continued to evacuate. 
It is not clear why they did so; however the tsunami risk communication from the mayor to 
the community was surely not timely. Confirmation of tsunami or no tsunami should ideally 
happen 10-30 minutes after the earthquake. However, there are unclear local reports that 
indicate that the earthquake damage also triggered one siren to go on accidentally for some 
time and it is unclear if people continued to evacuate because of that. This suggests that in 
a crisis situation, the formal institutional warning chain process from national level to the 
local level in Padang did not materialize. Nevertheless, people in Padang started self-
evacuation after the strong tremors, which led to a major traffic jam. This event highlights 
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again the local reactions and response of the community irrespective of the national TEWS. 
There were coordinated arrangements to dispatch disaster teams to Padang, although it 
took several hours to reach the remote areas. The earthquake badly damaged the EOC. 
There was a chance that the whole building could have collapsed and this would imply that 
even the first line of defence would have failed. It is not clear whether the newly built EOC 
was designed according to strict building codes for a high seismic area. Table 7 highlights 
the positive (+), negative (-) and important outcome across all the TEWS elements.  
8.3 Cost Benefit of Investing in Disaster Management in Indonesia 
 
To date, there has been a lack of 
cost benefit analysis to show the 
impacts of investing in DRR 
including the TEWS. Surely, this 
question merits detailed research 
on its own. However, it is 
important to explore the impacts 
of DRR financing. In order to 
gain some insight into this rather 
intriguing question only the 
contingency budget expenses are 
analysed. To facilitate plotting of 
all the relevant parameters (i.e. 
disaster events, deaths, losses 
and the DRR expenditure) the 
data are standardised to allow plotting on the same scale as shown in Figure 58. It is found 
that in 2004, the contingency budget was at its lowest. Interestingly, it is observed that 
after 200479 even though the number of reported disaster events increased80
                                                            
79 The number of deaths and losses were exceptional mainly due to the tsunami 
, the total 
number of deaths and losses did not increase. This signals that the DRR financing which 
increased after 2005 is probably already having a positive impact in reducing the severity of 
more disaster events in Indonesia.  
80 Reporting of disaster events has also apparently increased compared to the earlier period, and this could be a biased interpretation of the initial trend. 
 
 
Figure 58: Impact of investing in DRR in Indonesia 
Source: Author 
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Earthquake 
magnitude-location  
and Time 
Monitoring and Forecasting Dissemination and Communication Response  False 
/Accurate  
Timely Fatalities Level of 
Damage 
8.7Mw -Sumatra 
28-03-2005 
-Slow    -  1000 - 
7.7Mw-South Coast of 
Java 
17-07-2006 
-No back up ocean 
instrument in place 
 
-Perceptions of unnecessary public alarms; 
-Failure in institutional warning chain;   
-Communication and dissemination break 
down.  
   668  Extensive 
8.0Mw-Bengulu 
12-09-2007 
+Rapid observation and 
forecasting 
 
+Timely communication between institutions; 
-Sirens not functioning  
 
-Low response, people stayed on alert 
-Lack of understanding of warning 
scheme and warning 
-False alert  - - 
7.6 Mw-Sulawesi Island 
11-02-2009 
+Rapid observation and 
forecasting 
+Timely communication between institutions - -False alert +Alert 
cancelled 
(2) 
 
buildings 
damaged 
7.6Mw-Andermann Island 
 
11- 07-2009 
-No real time reporting;  
-Limitations in seismic 
observation area 
- - -False alert 
from   
PTWC/JMA 
- - - 
7.3Mw-Java-Bali-Sumatra 
  
02-09-2009 
 
-Ocean sensors not 
functioning; 
-No expert; 
-Equipment not functioning 
and stolen 
-Sirens not functioning - -  (39) 1200 
homes 
damages 
and 976 
collapsed 
 
7.3Mw-West Java 
 
02-09-2009 
+Rapid observation and 
Forecasting 
 
-Lack of a dedicated mobile phone system and 
malfunctioning internet connection; 
+Timely communication  
+Advisory guidance issued by speakers and 
mosques (No siren was used);  
+All clear communicated one hour later via 
pubic media. 
-Other districts at risk did not react; 
-Many did not evacuate and asked for 
information from institutions; 
-Many did not hear warnings due to  
noise distortion from the speakers;  
 +Advisory 
Cancelled 
 
  
7.9Mw-Padang 
 
30-09-2009 
+Rapid observation and 
forecasting 
-Initially BMKG under 
measured the earthquake at 
7.6 Mw 
 
-Risk communication was untimely; 
+ Telephone and internet connection working to 
receive information from BMKG; 
-Power, cellular networks, and  GSM failure;   
-Failure in text messaging initially; 
+Back up power at EOC ; 
+ VHF radio networks and FM radio  functions  
 
+People started self-evacuation after the 
strong tremors; 
-Traffic jam; 
-People not listening to EOC and mayor 
(people continued to evacuate); 
+Regional coordination arrangements  
+Accurate alert Tsunami 
guidelines 
rather 
late 
 
(1100) Widespread 
damage 
and 
collapsed 
buildings 
 
7.7 Mw -Aceh-Sinabang 
area 
O7-04-2010  
+Rapid observation and 
forecasting 
 
+Sirens went on in many areas including on the 
island of Simeulue 
+Local residents immediately fled to 
high ground 
+ Accurate 
alert 
 several 
people 
affected 
 
Table 4: Measuring the effectiveness of INATEWS events in Indonesia. 
  
Source: Author. NB: The numbers in the brackets represents earthquake victims, Mw: Moment magnitude
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8.4 Actors’ Perspective of the Main Problems and the Incentive Change  
It is highlighted that the interviewees had a chance to identify, list and discuss the main 
problems and what they thought would be the best way to achieve a good outcome 
through new incentives which could target and impact at all levels to ensure the 
effectiveness and sustainability of the INATEWS. The main problems identified and 
incentives proposed are further discussed below:  
8.4.1 Multi-Hazard Approach Framework 
The rationale for developing a multi-hazard–risk approach is grounded on three issues 
including the relatively high mortality risk from multiple hazards (since Indonesia ranks 
12th among countries in terms of mortality risks from multiple hazards), infrequency of 
tsunamis and the high cost of maintaining such an expensive system. The actors’ 
perception of the multi-hazard approach is explored. It is also found that there are key 
challenges and opportunities when considering a multi-hazard approach.  
8.4.1.1 Challenges in Implementing a Multi-Hazard Approach 
 
On one hand, all the actors interviewed indicated that the multi-hazard-risk approach is 
not yet being addressed in Indonesia. BNPB acknowledges that the application is still not 
fully implemented across policy and practice, but the concept has been partially 
acknowledged in the formulating strategy and use in the National Action Plan for DRR 
2010-2014. 
A key problem in implementing a multi-hazard approach is institutional and 
organizational challenges. The hazard EWS in Indonesia is fragmented and dispersed and 
more time is needed to develop an integrated framework for the separate hazard EWSs. 
For example, flood warnings are carried out by public works while the volcano early 
warning system is under the responsibility of the Centre for Volcanology and Geologic 
Hazard Mitigation and the Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources (PVMBG), while 
BMKG is the legitimate institution providing various services from weather, climate, to 
tsunami information. The other problem identified is that within the same organization, 
services are produced under different departments and there are challenges to bringing 
together the different products and services. The BMKG director for earthquakes said: 
“The Weather Centre tried to upload their system on the Decision Support System (DSS) 
for the weather related information, but we had problems” (Interview 24, 19 January 
2009). 
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The third issue is the geographical occurrence of hazards and disasters. BMKG pointed 
out: 
“The immediate problem with the multi-hazard approach is that each respective hazard 
is spatially specific in occurrence and the problem is how to organize such a national 
effort for a large country consisting of diverse organizations located in different areas of 
the country to deal with such spatial challenges” (Interview 24, 19 January 2009). 
The fourth challenge is the lack of leadership and adequate resources to implement a 
multi-hazard framework approach in Indonesia. For instance BNPB argues: 
“RISTEK, the present coordinator of the TEWS, is inexperienced in the technical process 
for implementing a multi-hazard approach; however once the newly created BNPB 
settles in the local areas it will be in a better position to influence DM towards the multi-
hazard approach. In addition the real problem is to have adequate resources and 
budget…if there is an adequate budget then we can think more widely about all hazards” 
(Interview 1, 16 January 2009).  
BNPB is already facing tough challenges and is struggling to cope with existing 
challenges of integrating the TEWS within BNPB as part of the fundamental process 
towards a multi-hazard approach and in implementing structures at all levels nationwide. 
According to a very recent informant interview with BGR, the challenge is for BNPB to 
build up a qualified and competent work force from the current 111 to 400 staff.  
8.4.1.2 Opportunities in Implementing a Multi-Hazard Approach 
 
On the other hand, despite the challenges, actors have ranked the issue of the multi-
hazard approach as a high priority in Indonesia. Actors point out that INATEWS 
development has served for the first time as a collective effort and inspiration in 
Indonesia. RISTEK highlighted: 
“The development of the TEWS is a good model because it is attributed to emotional 
involvement of the people following the December 2004 disaster. It demonstrated for 
the first time that cooperation among actors is the only way to cope with such extreme 
challenges; other disasters do not have this model. TEWS success should be inspiring in 
the development of a multi-hazard framework (Interview 7, 15 January 2009).  
This argument strongly suggests that the unique experience of the different actors in 
terms of their collective participation, cooperation, mediation and negotiation are the key 
elements offering wide opportunities to implement a multi-hazard approach in Indonesia. 
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8.4.2 Strengthening and Seeking New Innovative Partnership and Cooperation 
The actors identified partnership as a key prevailing problem and then pointed out that 
IOC-UNESCO should offer a policy for maintenance. It is highlighted that BGR (2009) 
also concludes that TEWS sustainability is through the maintenance of the existing 
partners for the TEWS in Indonesia.  
However, what is even more important is to seek for new innovative and creative 
partnerships to go beyond what has already been achieved. For instance, after years of 
failures in developing weather networks over Africa, the World Meteorological 
Organization (WMO) developed an innovative initiative and partnership with Ericson and 
the Earth Institute at Columbia University to bridge the ground-level weather 
observation gap by installing automatic weather observations stations throughout Africa 
(Global Humanitarian Forum 2009). Such a partnership would, for example, be 
particularly encouraged in the manufacturing of the automatic radio alert system for 
mass notifications. RISTEK said: 
“Indonesia rejected the proposal from Germany for importing these automatic radio alert 
systems… our engineers can manufacture them” (Interview 7, 15 January 2009). 
However to this end it appears nothing has been achieved.  Therefore, innovative and 
creative partnerships would serve as a new incentive to help create an effective and 
sustainable TEWS. 
Fresh endeavours to help fine tune prevailing weaknesses and sustain the TEWS and 
DRR initiatives include new bilateral cooperation on challenging issues such as the new 
cooperation between Indonesia and Australia which extends to 2013 for setting up 
facilities for DRR in Jakarta, and to strengthen disaster response capacity in Indonesia. 
Bill Farmer from AusAID, Australia said "This aid is not just aid but also partnership” 
(Indonesian Platform for Disaster Risk Reduction 09.03.2009). Bilateral cooperation 
would help to scale–up financing initiatives to create adequate incentives and 
momentum to help address the core issues of the EWS and DRR. 
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8.4.2.1 Strengthening Multilateral Partnerships, Cooperation and Coordination: 
Regional Governance and Coordination  
 
One of the most important incentive mechanisms for INATEWS sustainability is linking 
the INATEWS with the Indian Ocean Tsunami Early Warning System (IOTEWS) as 
indicated in Figure 66. At the regional level, ICG/IOTWS also expects countries to build 
on the current progress and expects one or more Regional Tsunami Watch Providers to 
play a similar function to PTWC. The PTWC in Hawaii and the JMA in Tokyo currently 
provide tsunami alerts to the region, but by 2011 at the latest the Regional Tsunami 
Watch Providers, which provisionally include Australia, India, Indonesia, Malaysia and a 
regional centre in Bangkok, are set to take over this function. This means that the Indian 
Ocean region will no longer rely solely on official tsunami notifications from PTWC or 
JMA.  
According to the grand scenario, the Indonesian TEWS in the future will strengthen to 
function as a regional tsunami warning system or tsunami watch provider for the Indian 
Ocean. Therefore, Indonesia needs to continue to pursue strongly its goal of becoming a 
tsunami information provider81
8.4.3 Capacity Building for a Knowledge Base and Innovative Society 
 for the region under the regional coordination and 
governance framework of the IOC-UNESCO to help sustain its own TEWS, for example in 
terms of funding, expertise, quality, security and evaluation as pointed out at  a recent 
conference in Potsdam, Germany( BMKG 2009). 
It is vital to address capacity building challenges in order to guarantee the sustainability 
of the TEWS in the future. Capacity building should become a priority in future rather 
than being marginalised, and there is a need to change donors’ and capacity builders’ 
approaches on practicing capacity building (Briinkerhoff and Morgan 2010).  
Of greater concern is to urgently address the issues of likely discontinuity in capacity 
building that threatens INATEWS sustainability due to lack of legitimate leadership 
beyond the GITEWS project. Actors should recommend a new temporary institutional 
arrangement or an extension of the existing one so that interested organisations such as 
RISTEK can have the mandate and resources to continue until the mandated82
                                                            
81 RISTEK, Indonesia under the framework of IOC-UNESCO and IOTEWS coordinated the Indian Ocean Tsunami drill on 14th October 2009 
 
organisation BNPB is able to handle their own responsibilities. With adequate emphasis 
on capacity building, universities can increase the scope for higher level academic 
education while broadening DRR education through the school curriculum. Equipped with 
82 By DM law No.24/2007 
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such knowledge, society would be challenged to become more innovative, and thus 
better able to adapt to imported technologies and new challenges.  
8.4.4 Sharing and Exchange of Local Experiences 
The local traditional knowledge of the story of “Smong” in the Simelue islands taught us 
two main lessons. On one hand, it demonstrated the paternalistically shared knowledge 
of tsunami amongst the locals through generations, exclusively in the Simelue islands, 
and on the other hand it showed the fundamental weakness that such knowledge was 
hardly replicated in neighbouring districts.  Therefore, the lesson learnt was that a  new 
strategy of sharing and exchange of local experiences should be encouraged and 
facilitated between provinces and regions to ensure knowledge is replicated and inclusive 
for all risk communities in Indonesia. Sharing and exchanging of information, tools, 
methodologies, base line studies, experience, lessons learnt and best practices to new 
areas from the three pilot project areas of Bali, Padang and Java is of crucial importance 
within the process of building national resilience to the uncertain tsunami risks. Actors 
reported that there is some interest in sharing and exchange of experience between 
provinces. For example, Cilacap province approached the project implementers and pilot 
areas to discuss how to develop their own TEWS program. However, currently the effort 
for sharing and exchanging experience lacks national momentum.  
8.4.5 Gender Perspectives 
There is little acknowledgement of the issue of gender perspective in the TEWS and DM 
policy or practice. In general they have received little attention because of poor 
understanding of gender vulnerabilities and risks to disasters (ISDR 2007). In Indonesia, 
BNPB reports that there has been little effort in engaging with relevant sectors such as 
the Ministry for Women’s Empowerment. Therefore, it is vital that gender is also 
addressed effectively, and this can be achieved by formulating clear policies to 
mainstream gender perspectives on the issues to create new incentives. 
 
Links can be established with international bodies and social networks can be built to 
encourage cooperation. Building resilience to tsunamis provides good opportunities for 
women to play public roles with the support of their families and communities. It is an 
opportunity to increase participation by having men and women working on the same 
issues such as awareness-raising and capacity-building. Women’s participation can be 
important in building safe communities and households and equal access to information 
(ISDR 2007). In a nutshell, women can contribute and provide new incentives for 
tsunami community resilience. 
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8.4.6 Disaster Risk Reduction and Climate Change Adaptation  
According to UNFCCC83
8.4.6.1 Tsunami Resilience and Climate Change Adaptation: Potential Threat or 
Opportunity? 
, adaptation to climate change is vital in order to reduce the 
impacts of climate change that are happening now, and to increase resilience to future 
impacts. The Bali Action Plan identifies adaptation as one of the five key building blocks 
required for a strengthened future response to climate change. Developing countries 
require international assistance to support adaptation and this includes funding, 
technology transfer and capacity building. 
 
SWOT84 analysis revealed some actors’ perception that climate change mitigation and 
adaptation activities are potential threats to the sustainability of the TEWS. The 
explanation is that there is an increasing shift in interest to climate change mitigation 
and adaptation. Actors reported that donors and actors are already shifting interest from 
tsunamis to climate change.  In 2009, BMG changed its name to BMKG to become the 
legitimate focal point institution dealing with climate change in Indonesia. Deeper 
questioning revealed that the actors’ shift in interest is driven by the better financial 
mechanism, economic incentives and opportunities in climate change mitigation and 
adaptation compared to tsunami resilience building.  Initially this appeared to be turning 
into a dilemma in terms of sustaining tsunami resilience. It is also often argued85
It is pointed out that tsunami hazards and disasters and climate change are part of the 
greater discourse on hazard origin, causes, and the need for a hazard classification 
scheme, and the implications of management of these areas. Pearce (2000) argues that 
it is important to classify the causes of hazards because lack of communication between 
various scientists leads to potential duplication in research if gaps are unaddressed. The 
second most important reason is that the type of hazard affects the choice of mitigation 
strategy (Godschalk 1998) and failure to accurately classify types of hazards may lead to 
the misapplication of mitigation strategies. 
 that 
there are no links between tsunami and climate change adaptation.  
On the other hand, a number of researchers (Kreps 1991, Quarantelli 1991) have earlier 
questioned the need to separate the causes of hazards from one another. Jovanovic 
(1988) believes that human-induced and natural hazards are interrelated because 
humans can influence natural events and conversely, natural events can change and 
modify human activities. However, the argument is that CCA is differentiated from DRR 
                                                            
83 http://unfccc.int/adaptation/items/4159.php 
84 Strength, Weakness, Opportunity and Threat 
85 i.e. Personal  discussion with Villagran in 2008 
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since the former involves preparing for and adapting to the known and unknown effects 
and impacts of climate change while DRR involves strengthening efforts to reducing 
existing vulnerability and risk with the objective of promoting resilience, safeguarding 
human security and sustainable development. In other words, there are many overlaps 
between DRR and CCA in terms of reducing a community’s vulnerabilities. A challenging 
question is, what if climate change adaptation fails? DRR is a highly promising tool to 
maintain this balance and to promote more resilience and adaptive capacities, 
particularly regarding extreme events linked to climate change. The main concern 
pointed out is that the humanitarian community is the first one to be confronted with the 
consequences of the failure in adaptation (Birkmann, Tetzlaff and Zentel 2009). Despite 
the challenges in linking DRR and CCA, the way forward is to fundamentally recognise 
that tsunami hazards and preparedness is part of DRR. This being true, tsunami hazard 
and resilience building can be linked to CCA as long as one no longer views the link in 
the context of hazard classification, but rather in terms of impacts and coastal 
communities’ vulnerabilities and coping and response capacities. Specific details on how 
to bridge the gap are provided by (Birkmann, Tetzlaff and Zentel 2009). Therefore, by 
considering the links between DRR and climate change adaptation, tsunami resilience 
capacities can be sustained. It is rather a window of opportunity, a potential incentive 
rather than an absolute threat.  
8.4.7 Mainstreaming Disaster Risk Reduction into Sustainable Development 
The prevailing unsatisfactory outcome especially in the last mile concept of the TEWS 
should in principle be largely addressed through the HFA considering that recently all the 
countries in the region have agreed to the leading framework in DRR that will enhance 
regional cooperation and nations’ capacities. The ASEAN Agreement for Disaster 
Management and Emergency Response will intensify the collaboration between nations in 
DRR. It will also increase the technical cooperation among member states and establish 
an ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance on disaster management. 
The integration of DRR in planning and sustainable development is central in the ISDR 
polices and should be at the heart of all country’s development initiatives and activities.  
However, in Indonesia most actors perceived that DRR is not yet linked to sustainable 
development. Deeper questioning established a strong relationship between the past 
failures in harmonizing disaster-related budget planning with national planning. GTZ-IS 
argued: 
Agency, Effectiveness and Sustainability  
 
 
206 
 
“There are weak links between DRR and sustainable development because the national 
planning cycle in Indonesia is every ten years while local planning is every five years” 
(Interview 8, 29 January 2009). 
However, as indicated earlier, very recently in 2009, BAPPENAS swiftly took actions to 
include the DM Plan and National Action Plan for DRR (NAP-DRR 2010-2014)86
Despite the current weaknesses, mainstreaming of DRR into development has started. 
For example the Spatial Planning Law No.26/2008 has accommodated DRR assessment 
in planning and land use. However, the challenge of mainstreaming DRR into 
development, for example in environmentally-related policies and plans, lacks 
stakeholder participation and the policies are too broad to be implemented. This 
suggests that actors need to have a clear plan and prioritise activities to create the 
incentive from a DRR perspective.  
 in the 
National Development Plan (NDP). With adequate funding and resources, the DRR 
initiative can be linked with sustainable development.  
8.4.8 Coastal City Planning and Governance  
The earthquake–tsunami experiences clearly pointed to the need to address the EWS 
and evacuation with caution based on the communities’ reaction-response behaviours. 
Evidence has clearly indicated that whether people exercise a local approach (i.e. 
evacuate themselves when the ground shakes) or a national approach from a tsunami 
warning centre, evacuation has so far been characterised by some chaotic behaviour and 
traffic jams. This clearly suggests far deeper problems other than the TEWS. These 
problems will continue, no matter what TEWS design is used. In this respect, a separate 
but integrated scaled-up effort should be placed not only on evacuation, but on how the 
city is designed, planned and governed. To achieve such goals among other initiatives 
requires enhancing the support from sector specific legislation such as the spatial 
planning Act No.24/1992, law number 23 / 1997 on the Environment Management law 
number 23/1997 and the Coastal and Small Island Management Law No.27/2007.  
Of particular interest is the relatively new Coastal and Small Island Management Law No. 
27/2007. It is a very strong sector specific law for integrated coastal zone management 
including mitigation of coastal hazards such as tsunamis. To reduce the impact of coastal 
disasters in Indonesia, the Ministry of Marine Affairs and Fisheries (MoMAF) is also 
proactive in minimizing the impact of coastal disasters on coastal communities and on 
aquaculture activities. The Integrated Coastal Zone Management (ICZM) objective is to 
achieve a balance between the natural resources, human utilization, and disaster 
                                                            
86 Expected to be endorsed by the President 
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mitigation aspects to enhance coastal socio-ecology resilience. A healthy coastal 
ecosystem condition helps in the sustainability of exploitation activities by humans while 
ecological conditions due to exploitation by humans will decline in the absence of a 
disaster mitigation concept in the coastal area. In this respect, MoMAF has reformulated 
the building code for earthquakes and tsunamis to include the existing traditional design 
with some modern building techniques.  
In a key informant interview; MoMAF pointed out that:  
“An integrated hazard mitigation plan is a key element in very developed coastal areas. 
The program has been implemented in 15 provinces in Indonesia and now we are 
replicating it in other provinces…So far we have built 200 earthquake and tsunami 
‘friendly’ houses in several coastal districts/cities that are at risk of earthquake and 
tsunami. It is hoped that these designs and concepts will create new interest in 
traditional adaptable architecture and so will be replicated by local builders” (Interview 
25, 03 November 2008). 
The statement clearly shows that MOMAF is spearheading an approach based on “living 
with the risk” by employing adaptable infrastructures for coastal hazards that are part of 
the geo-physical reality of Indonesia. This is viewed as a new incentive for the many 
coastal people. It provides an option for local actors to reduce their vulnerability to 
coastal hazards, empowering the community in terms of their economic livelihood, social 
cohesiveness, community awareness, and access to capital and markets, while 
increasing the coastal environment capacity to provide its services for livelihood 
sustainability.  
8.5 A Theoretical Basis for an Effective and Sustainable Tsunami Early 
Warning System  
 
It should be stressed that the polycentric and multi-layered institutions synchronized 
according to the decentralized political-administrative system are ideal governance 
architectures for general DRR. However, the architecture is not completely suitable for 
dealing with local field earthquake-generated tsunamis. There is sufficient evidence to 
suggest that the current TEWS which relies on a technocratic approach and follows a 
multi-level linear warning chain process with polycentric governance architecture would 
be partially or completely ineffective in dealing with first the earthquake, and the near 
field tsunamis as revealed in the case studies.  
For instance in one case, a warning simply circulated among officials and was not quickly 
communicated to the people at risk. Even BMKG acknowledged that “...we were 
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compounded by the speed at which Monday's tsunami struck”. In the last major 
earthquake experience in Padang, the EOC received information from BMKG five minutes 
after the earthquake. Assuming all the procedures were carried out successfully, the 
bottom line is that it would simply be impossible to evacuate all the people at risk in the 
remaining 15-20 minutes if people wait for and depend on BMKG information in Jakarta. 
The bitter reality is that official earthquake-tsunami information was largely absent in 
the first 30 minutes after the earthquake (GTZ-IS 2010). This really highlights the fact 
that even the highly technological TEWS will not be enough to save lives.  
 
In addition, it is important to pay attention to and observe how the society immediately 
responds to the immediate threats.  Empirical evidence suggests that people most often 
carry out personal observation of the precursor environment to confirm the threat, 
suggesting that the warning process is not based on a simple stimulus-response. This 
was exemplified when some villagers fled after seeing the water pull back on the 12th 
September 2007, after an 8.4 moment magnitude earthquake in Bengulu. This also 
happened during the 30 September 6.8 moment magnitude earthquake in Padang city 
when people went to the coast 
to observe the sea level and or 
started self-evacuation after 
feeling the strong tremors and 
continued to do so even when 
the mayor later gave no 
communication of tsunami risk. 
It is highlighted that 51% of the 
200 respondents interviewed 
evacuated in the first hour (GTZ-
IS 2010) and in the first five to 
ten minutes almost 70% of the 
respondents had evacuated 
before receiving an official 
warning. This conveys a very strong message regarding the role of the local approach 
compared to the national TEWS approach which must not be ignored. It is not clear what 
the underlying reasons for the self-evacuation were, however they seem to have been a 
combination of factors including the elements of panic, uncertainty and fear from the 
strong earthquake, unofficial warning (i.e. word of mouth) during that time, or perhaps 
the result of the previous education and awareness (i.e. see Figure 59 for index on how 
intended evacuation increases with increasing awareness). 
 
Figure 59: Correlation between intended evacuation behaviour and 
awareness index 
Source: UNU-EHS-LIPI household survey data 2008 
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According to the survey, GTZ-IS suggested that the people actually trusted the mayor 
and the government to provide them with accurate information directly after an 
earthquake; however the actual reaction-response behaviour suggests otherwise. It is 
also recalled that earlier, 26% of 1000 respondents interviewed in 2008 indicated lack of 
trust in the TEWS. The experience conveys a rather clear message about how to design a 
TEWS, irrespective of the actual reasons for evacuation. It clearly shows an emerging 
micro-level, people-centred local approach independent of the national technical EWS.  
 
The GITEWS developed a novel rapid approach for monitoring and forecasting tsunamis, 
but the required time to evacuate in the event of a tsunami is simply not enough even if 
the dissemination and communication across the warning chain to the people is timely 
and effective. Hence, from a resilience point of view there is a problem of the fit and 
adaptability of the existing TEWS to the ecological challenge, and there is a need to 
rethink about the real challenge of the problem to achieve a better outcome. 
8.5.1 The Local Tsunami Early Warning Model: Adaptive-People Centred 
Approach 
The local TEW approach involves people at risk starting some kind of anticipated 
response once a significant earthquake (i.e. a near field earthquake) is felt, and no-one 
should wait for an official warning. A people-centred EWS empowers human agents who 
are ‘threatened by hazards to act in sufficient time and in an appropriate manner to 
reduce the possibility of personal injury, loss of life and damage to property and the 
environment’ (Wiltshire and Ambling 2006:1). In this context, different components of 
the local TEWS approach are explained which consist of a combination of (1) social micro 
level reaction and response (2) the response of the EOC to earthquakes felt of certain 
threshold duration, and (3) the use of religious-cultural based structures and norms. The 
concept is that the TEWS starts not only with observation and monitoring from the 
instruments but also from the correct reaction-response of the people.  
 
The emerging reaction behaviour pattern observed is that as soon as an earthquake is 
felt (EQf), most people according to their perception and belief (PB) socially and 
interactively through their networks socially confirm (SC) the threat in order to come to 
a decision (DS). In addition, there are independent observations (IO)87
                                                            
87 Earthquake felt intensity. Sea level observation by ordinary citizens is not recommended 
 of the precursor 
environment before carrying out an anticipated response. The reaction-response model 
(Quarantelli 1990) is therefore systematized and applied at the micro–local level (Figure 
62). It represents step 1 when viewed from the local level as shown in the dotted circle 
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in Figure 60. The social-reaction response would most probably continue for some time 
and would need a local legitimate authority to lead the process.  
 
It is highlighted that LIPI argues: 
“We should increase awareness and preparedness such that even before BMKG issues 
warning information people are already prepared” (Interview 26, 15 April 2010). 
             
Figure 60: Socio micro-level reaction response model  
Source: Author 
In the case that a significant earthquake is felt for long enough, say a time exceeding 15 
seconds (EQf>15s), the EOC should independently decide to sound the alarms as shown 
in Figure 61 because at this stage BMKG will still be collecting the seismic data and it is 
simply unwise to wait for another 5-10 minutes just to receive earthquake parameters 
and an uncertain probability of whether a tsunami has been generated. This represents 
step 2 as shown in the dotted circle in Figure 62. This process has actually been 
observed during real events. Interestingly, GTZ-IS (2010) also recommends that actors 
provide Padang’s EOC with the authority and mandate for decision-making and direct 
dissemination of public guidance. 
 
Furthermore, the commitment to link the mosque and Kulkul systems in Padang and Bali 
is also part of the local approach because these are socially accepted religious and 
cultural devices that need to be fully empowered, and this is represented as step 3 (see 
Figure 62). Local leaders and citizens should view such an arrangement as their own 
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system rather than be controlled by it. It is easy for local people to trust those socially 
and spatially nearest to them. The trained agents to help in response can also be 
considered part of this step. 
                  
Figure 61: Response of EOC and other local structures for long duration earthquakes  
Source: Author 
 
The local approach has many advantages; however it is also prone to false alarms as 
was observed in the April 10, 2005 event and others. Of greater concern is that the local 
approach may totally fail in the case of far field tsunamis, slow earthquakes, or even in 
cases of volcanic eruptions and landslide-generated tsunamis. In the case of far field 
tsunamis, the epicentre of the earthquake is far off in the ocean and one may not feel 
the earthquake on the mainland. On the other hand, slow earthquakes are known as 
“deceptive mild quakes”. They are caused by a “slow-slip” motion between oceanic 
plates. Hence, the coastal people may barely feel the seismic waves from this relatively 
gradual movement (Kanamori et al., 1993). This occurred on Nicaragua’s Pacific coast in 
September 1992 when 45 minutes later a tsunami of about 10 metres in height crashed 
onto a 300km-long stretch of the coastline. In the third case, less than 10% of volcanic 
eruptions and landslides may generate tsunamis (Hamzah et al., 2000). The common 
issue is that in all the three cases, the local approach based on feeling the earthquake 
would most probably fail. Therefore, it is important to integrate the local approach with 
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the national approach to improve the effectiveness of the TEWS. On this note, the new 
chairperson of working group three of the Indian Ocean TEWS from LIPI stated: 
“...we simply cannot avoid the technology” (Interview 2, 16 April 2010).  
This strongly suggests that in contrast to some actors’ thinking, an effective and 
sustainable EWS cannot totally escape some elements of a technocratic approach, but 
should be embraced. 
8.5.2 Integration of the Local Approach into the National Early Warning System   
Naturally, as the event progresses, earthquake and tsunami information is expected to 
flow from the INATEWS in a period 5<T<10 minutes through the interface institutions or 
directly to the EOC or public via the mass media. Hence, at this stage the EWS will 
change from the local to the national system approach. This represents step 4 of the 
process. However, even at this point, the mandated authorities can only provide certain 
observed earthquake information and the probabilistic occurrence of a tsunami based on 
a close match from simulated scenarios. It is very unlikely BMKG could confirm tsunami 
generation or not at this point for most significant earthquake occurrences. Ideally, only 
after a period of 10<T<30 minutes would the authorities be in a position to confirm if a 
tsunami had been generated or not, and this would represent step 5 of the tsunami 
warning process.  At this point, once the information was more certain, the authorities 
could continue or cancel the evacuation process. Therefore, the earlier INATEWS process 
(Figure 39) is modified as shown in Figure 62.   
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Figure 62: Integrated local adaptive people-centred and national TEWS approach 
Source: Author 
Agency, Effectiveness and Sustainability  
 
 
214 
 
8.5.2.1 Far Field Tsunamis 
 
As indicated earlier, although Indonesia was on the list of countries on tsunami watch by 
the PTWC following the July earthquake off Indonesia’s territory in 2009 and during the 
Chilean earthquake, there were no reports of an institutional response or official 
communication of the risk to the community. This is not to suggest that internal 
institutions were not preparing and coordinating among themselves.  In that sense, it is 
argued that the tsunami warning system does not pay enough attention to far field 
tsunamis.  
To address far field tsunami risks, the INATEWS needs to be embedded in the regional-
global IOC-UNESCO TEWS coordination framework as shown in Figure 63. In this 
context, the institutional arrangement and operational TEWS alert system needs to 
include the tsunami watch phase as part of the existing tsunami information system. In 
addition, the institutional preparedness will need to address the tsunami risk as a 
function of distance and time from expected landfall impact. For example, in Hawaii, 
sirens are sounded more frequently as the risk increases. Overall, the operational 
tsunami alert level needs to also show clearly what the corresponding decisions and 
actions are likely to be, as shown in Figure 64.  
 
Figure 63: Mix model of TEWS 
Source: Author 
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Agency, Effectiveness and Sustainability  
 
 
215 
 
It is argued that the integration of the local approach with the formal TEWS will 
transform the technocratic-top-down-single-TEWS into the people-centred TEWS by 
defining characteristics of a mixed-composite of EWS models. Such an arrangement 
between formal and informal institutions has the advantage of being flexible, adaptable 
and fits to the socio-ecological challenge. Evidently, the whole system would require and 
depend on a disaster preparedness subculture, and this is what KOGAMI had in mind 
since the beginning and is highlighted as follows: 
 “There are no informal rules because local wisdom, which is considered as  informal 
rules, is employed in our daily practices, but among the community and actors there are 
some perceptions of conflict” (Interview 9, 3 March 2009). 
 
 
Source: Author 
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Figure 64: The INATEWS alert system and proposed actions  
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8.6 Summary of Chapter 8 
 
This chapter has shown that there are two non-state actors who have emerged as 
agents and have exercised agency beyond the state where and when the state 
government was unable to effectively respond to TEWS-related governance. On one 
hand, MPBI has emerged as an agent in driving and shaping governance and institutional 
change in DM on multiple levels and scales in Indonesia, while on the other hand, 
KOGAMI has emerged as an agent in exercising agency in community disaster 
preparedness in Padang city in Indonesia. The underlying conditions of their authority 
and legitimacy include a mix of knowledge base, consent and trust from the state, and 
an extensive network of partners at international, national and local level including 
support from the broad-based community. Additional conditions include exercising 
flexibility, patience and coordination among a diverse array of partners. 
On the other hand, actual significant events are used to measure the effectiveness of the 
TEWS. The immediate events in the earlier period of 2005-2007 revealed that the TEWS 
in Indonesia continued to face major problems, from very slow monitoring and 
forecasting to tsunami information being circulated among institutional actors and failing 
to reach the community at risk. Government authorities are still confronted with a risk 
communication dilemma. On the other hand, authoritative actors have become 
increasingly more accountable from the free press media, political system and the 
community. The role of the media in influencing risk perception is not to be ignored and 
needs to be exploited.   
Recently, the TEWS has emerged as an effective technical system in rapidly monitoring 
and issuing warnings. However, seismic observational and operational capabilities are 
also limited outside the Indonesian territory; thus BMKG needs to clearly establish 
operational procedures to deal with the present regional observational gaps.  There are 
signs of improving institutional capabilities in terms of issuing the tsunami warnings and 
cancellations, despite continued false tsunami alerts. In addition, the INATEWS needs a 
reliable partner to spearhead a dedicated rapid dissemination and communication 
system.  
Evidence suggests some promising local approaches independent of the national 
technical TEWS, but tsunami warnings without clear guidance do not trigger consistent 
reactions. The TEWS is currently overwhelmed with issues ranging from simple potential 
ambiguity in warning information, likely false risk perceptions within the community to 
lack of understanding of the operational tsunami warning scheme. 
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At the local level the ground realities are even more challenging in terms of poor local 
governance compounded by delays and a lack of financial resources. The difficulty of 
learning and adapting to the sophisticated TEWS underlines the challenge and dangers of 
importing new technology without fundamentally understanding the culture, perception 
and the dynamics of the local people.  
The experiences have pointed to the dangers of synchronizing the formal institutional 
linear warning chain with the polycentric-multilayered architectures of governance, and 
relying on a technocratic approach. The mode of tsunami governance between local and 
national technocratic approaches is a constant issue of debate and tension. Therefore, a 
theoretical integrated TEWS framework is put forward based on theoretical concepts, 
findings and observation to help address the existing problems of fit and adaptability of 
the TEWS to the ecological challenge. The TEWS operational tsunami alert system needs 
to be modified to include far field tsunami risk, the tsunami watch phase and what 
actions to carry out.  
Furthermore, the existing outcome in terms of the TEWS is clearly unsatisfactory. New 
incentive mechanisms are proposed to change the existing outcome to address issues of 
effectiveness and sustainability. In this context, the multi-hazard-risk approach is one of 
the key incentive mechanisms to help sustain the TEWS. In reality, actors perceived that 
the multi-hazard approach is largely unaddressed in Indonesia because of poor 
organization, time and space factors regarding hazard occurrence, technical complexity 
and funding challenges. Nevertheless, most actors perceived the multi-hazard approach 
to be of top priority and would benefit from the unique experience in developing the 
TEWS.  
New innovative and creative partnerships are also required to initiate proper economic–
driven incentives, particularly in the dissemination and communication part of the TEWS. 
Enhanced bilateral and multilateral cooperation can help sustain partnerships for 
developing and maintaining the system in Indonesia. A strong link between the 
INATEWS and IOTEWS needs to be pursued for policy maintenance, regional 
governance, coordination, and cooperation. 
The practice of marginalising capacity building in projects requires a rethink process to 
ensure human capacity building becomes central for INATEWS sustainability. National 
resilience to tsunami hazard risks depends on the ability to share and exchange the local 
experiences and lessons learnt and ensure that best practices are replicated and 
inclusive for all tsunami risk communities. The role of gender in tsunami resilience has 
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been overlooked and it is becoming clear that women can contribute and provide new 
incentives for tsunami community resilience. 
Climate change mitigation and adaptation is perceived as a threat to the sustainability of 
the TEWS because of shifting interest and funding towards climate change issues. 
However, this should be viewed as a window of opportunity as long as tsunami resilience 
building and climate change risks are no longer viewed from a hazard classification 
perspective but rather in terms of overlaps between DRR and climate change adaptation.  
The HFA serves as a driving incentive mechanism to further enhance regional 
cooperation and build disaster risk resilient communities, including tsunamis. In this 
respect, there are weak links between DRR and sustainable development in Indonesia. 
However, the integration of the DRR planning into the national budgeting and planning 
will help to bridge the gap.  
Coastal planning and governance has emerged as a key issue to be addressed as the 
TEWS is only part of the solution. Among other initiatives, the integrated use of the 
sector specific legislations such as the Small Island Management law No.27/2007 will 
help to fill the existing gaps and serve as a key institutional incentive for better risk and 
disaster governance, assuming actors collaborate across scales and levels. 
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9. Conclusion  
 
In order to conclude the research on the role of risk governance, multi-institutional 
arrangements and polycentric frameworks for a resilient Tsunami Early Warning System in 
Indonesia, this section summarises and puts key ideas and findings into perspective.  
9.1.1 Earlier Tsunami Early Warning Capacities, Hindering and Driving Forces for 
Change 
In this study it was found that the coping capacities in Indonesia were severely exceeded on 
the 26th December 2004, not only because there was no EWS for tsunamis but also due to a 
range of underlying causes linked with poor attention and recognition of resilience 
capacities from a socio-ecological perspective. These causes included critical threshold, 
knowledge uncertainties, the element of surprise, ability to re-organise, learn and adapt, 
scale, and institutional fit to match the ecological challenge. The existing institutional 
arrangements and frameworks were designed for disaster emergency and recovery only. 
Consequently, all elements of governance of tsunami hazard risk and disasters failed. 
The hindering factors for institutional change towards disaster and risk preparedness 
include the issues of national security, social conflict, and the challenges of implementing 
the decentralization policies in Indonesia. Consequently, the outcome of lack of TEWS 
governance was characterised by persistent disasters and this explains why the coping 
capacities were severely exceeded in the December 2004 tsunami.  
It is argued that the extreme shock of the tsunami disaster coupled with the HFA (2005-
2015) momentum for DRR provided the driving incentives and opportunity to initiate and 
implement major institutional changes towards disaster risk preparedness in Indonesia. To 
spearhead the TEWS, a Grand Scenario strategy was developed while the GITEWS project 
with other partners would help partly implement the new ambitious plan. However, the 
Grand scenario lacked multi-stakeholder participation from the beginning, and consequently 
inherited and propagated key institutional weaknesses across the process of building 
resilience to tsunami hazard and risks.  
9.1.2 Governance and the Tsunami Early Warning System in Indonesia 
It was found that although the economic system of governance is promising, Indonesia will 
face tough challenges to implement and sustain an effective TEWS based on the prevailing 
political-social governance system, in comparison with Japan and the United States which 
have decades of operational TEWS backed with a very strong governance system. 
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9.1.3 Tsunami Early Warning System-Related Architecture in Indonesia 
The study established that there has been substantial and remarkable institutional change 
to support DRR and TEWS governance in Indonesia. The major institutional legal 
arrangement is the DM law No. 24/2007. It provides a comprehensive basis for the rules of 
the game in DM supporting the paradigm shift from disaster response to preparedness and 
mitigation in Indonesia. Other supporting Government Regulations are the PP 21/2008, 
PP22/2008 and PP23/2008 to regulate DM arrangements, financing and external support 
respectively. The DM law governs the EWS and its integration as part of the Indonesian DM 
system. An interim institutional Ministerial Decree, Sk21/2005 provided the momentum and 
coordination mechanism for developing the INATEWS despite key institutional weaknesses 
such as a lack of institutional attention on risk knowledge, communication and 
dissemination. The Presidential Regulation, 8 / 2008 legitimised the establishment of the 
multiple-level DM Agency. A major change is the new steering committee of the BNPB 
legitimising the participation of diverse institutions and the professional community apart 
from the state actors; an outcome achieved through good governance.  
Institutionalising and embedding the INATEWS within the BNPB as a larger architecture is a 
key step towards a multi-hazard approach and improved institutional coordination and 
performance. However, the integration is also prone to poor effective governance 
performance if proper attention is not paid to the bureaucratic norms in Indonesia. The 
global-regional governance framework for tsunami hazard and risks under IOC-UNESCO 
coordination and the developing multi-level architectures and structures synchronised with 
the existing decentralisation are ideal polycentric-multilayered architectures for optimum 
performance to reduce vulnerability and build resilience to local and trans-boundary risks 
such as tsunamis in Indonesia. However, there are many challenges in implementing the 
polycentric-multi-layered architectures and structures throughout Indonesia. Few provinces 
and districts have actually completed the DM local regulation to allow the transformation to 
take place. Less than 20 % of the provinces have yet established the local DM agencies and 
less than 2% of the districts and municipalities have DM officers (BPBD). Furthermore, the 
EOCs are few in number at provincial level and are fairly ineffective at lower levels. The key 
obstacles include multi-level commitment, government bureaucracy, and a large number of 
actors with different agendas, financial resources, and specialised human capacities. 
Consequently, institutional mandates and clear SOPs are also still under development. A 
national formal institutional TEWS chain is gradually emerging. BMKG is the mandated 
NTWC linked directly to the community and the interface institutions for further 
dissemination and communication and for response. The multi-level EOCs are to be 
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mandated through the local government to make local decisions on what to do in the event 
of a significant earthquake and anticipated tsunami. 
Institutional monitoring and enforcement in the TEWS/DM is a new concept among actors in 
Indonesia. Currently, the operational rules are more functional in the upstream technical 
component of the TEWS. Interestingly, institutional arrangements and their monitoring at 
the local level are not well planned and organised and their legitimacy is in question given 
that the origin of institutions significantly influences their stability and potential for change.  
Detailed financial tracing is virtually non-existent and raises further questions on good 
governance. The institutional enforcement in spatial planning in Bali has provided useful 
insights associated with the future potential challenges of institutional monitoring and 
enforcement versus dynamic pressures (i.e. extreme poverty and the urge for 
development) and their root causes (i.e. lack of government effectiveness, bureaucracy and 
corruption). Overall, there is a general consensus that even the new institutional 
arrangements and frameworks and their implementation have not addressed adequately 
the paradigm shift from disaster response to preparedness. However, more weaknesses 
need to be identified with time to motivate major institutional changes at the highest level 
in Indonesia.  
9.1.4 Actors and the Tsunami Early Warning System Architecture in Indonesia 
Actor participation in Indonesia is rather complex, and is characterised by a high degree of 
multi-stakeholder participation at various levels and across scales. The agenda of actors 
includes research and development, human security, minimising damage costs, maintaining 
development and economic gains. The participation dynamics of actors showcase the 
hierarchical power structure of actors based on domains of authority in knowledge and 
expertise, and in hierarchy and discipline. Such a multi-stakeholder participation structure 
has a profound impact on the final outcome in the TEWS action decision arena. 
The mixture of multilateral (IOC-UNESCO-IOTEWS) and bilateral (i.e. the GITEWS) 
environmental governance adopted by Indonesia is ideal for rapidly building national 
resilience to tsunami hazards and risks. Such a governance approach also invites potential 
rivalry and conflicts as new TEWS actors emerge (i.e. Germany). However, through 
collaboration and mutual-win strategies, conflicts have been resolved. Throughout the large 
action arena, transparency is not always satisfactory, especially when observed from the 
non-state actors. Nevertheless, there is a high level of individual cohesion and trust among 
actors, which is sometimes affected by cultural barriers and how financial resources are 
distributed. 
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It should be pointed out that TEWS became a national priority after the December 2004 
calamity; however currently there are mixed signals about whether TEWS/DM is still a 
government priority. In this context, an important indicator of political commitment is the 
actual DM financing which is an issue that is continually contested and negotiated. On one 
hand, the government national budget spending on DM has increased significantly to reach 
2.1% of the total national budget88
The study has shown that there are at least two non-state actors who have emerged as 
agents and have exercised agency beyond the state where and when the state government 
was unable to effectively respond. On one hand, MPBI has emerged as an agent in driving 
and shaping governance and institutional change in DM at multiple levels and scales in 
Indonesia. On the other hand, KOGAMI has emerged as an agent in exercising agency in 
community disaster preparedness in Indonesia. The underlying conditions of their authority 
and legitimacy include a mix of knowledge base, consent and trust from the state, and an 
extensive network at multiple levels and across scales including support from the broad-
based community. Additional conditions include exercising flexibility, patience and effective 
coordination among a diverse array of partners. 
. Interestingly, the key milestone achieved is the 
integration of the DM Plan and National Action Plan for DRR (NAP-DRR 2010-2014) into the 
National Development Plan (NDP) to ensure that DRR is included in the Government Annual 
Plans and DM budgeting in Indonesia. Very recently the local contingency budget has 
increased, signifying an important step towards achieving effective decentralization to help 
cope and manage the hazards locally. On the other hand, the budget allocation at sub-
national level is spatially variable and there are opportunities for unjust allocation of funds 
and resources, pointing to critical institutional weaknesses in the DM financing mechanisms. 
In addition, the on-call budget mobilisation is very slow due to perplexing bureaucratic 
procedures. The most concerning issue calling into question the so-called paradigm shift 
towards preparedness is that in reality most spending is for post disaster rather than for 
preparedness. Only 0.17% of the national budget is budgeted for preparedness. 
In the context of the TEWS perspective at national level, it was found that national risk 
knowledge has improved significantly in the region and within Indonesia in terms of new 
hazard assessments and some attention to vulnerability at different geographical scales in 
Indonesia. New approaches and methodologies are emerging for risk analysis assessment in 
a move towards better creation of risk knowledge. However, risk assessment has focused 
mainly on high hazard impact areas only and there is a lack of risk assessment capacities, 
tools and standardised methodologies at local level. To communicate and create a culture of 
risk preparedness in schools requires a higher order institutional arrangement. Risk 
                                                            
88 Thailand declared at the second session of the Global Platform for DRR held in Geneva, 16-19 June 2009 that their national budget for DRR 
had increased to 5.1% of their national budget, twice more than Indonesia  
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communication has improved nationally but is insufficient and requires more multi-sector 
participation beyond the state and civil societies.  
In terms of the observation and forecasting element of the TEWS, despite being officially 
operational since November 2008, there are key weaknesses and gaps centred on the 
density of the seismic network89
In the response phase of the TEWS, the major gap is the lack of disaster preparedness and 
contingency plans nationally. Drills are not well developed and implemented across 
Indonesia, despite some efforts to prepare for ad-hoc drills in some province-districts, and 
through Indonesia’s active participation in the Indian Ocean tsunami drill in late 2009. The 
reason for the poor achievement nationally in contingency planning is on one hand related 
to difficulties in reaching collective agreement on hazard and risk maps due to the large 
number of stakeholders involved, and on the other hand, low levels of interest in the 
importance of such plans to kick start the process.  
  and tsunami observation in the deep sea. Consequently, 
there are many false tsunami alerts because there is a lack of compromise between actual 
technical capabilities and socio-political goals. The alternative strategy of elevating the 
threshold magnitude for issuing potential tsunami alerts on one hand would increase the 
chance of reducing false tsunami alerts at the expense of a likely miss of tsunamis 
generated from moderate earthquakes below the new elevated threshold. 
9.1.5 The Tsunami Early Warning System at the Level of Padang and Bali 
Overall, fairly similar architectures are being developed and implemented in both locations 
in terms of local regulations, and there has been a Governor Decree to legitimise the 
establishment and functions of the local BNPB and EOC. However, the development of inter-
institutional arrangements has presented the central challenge and progress has been 
relatively slow. An emerging tsunami warning chain from national level to the local level in 
is gradually emerging in both places. The Governor Decree mandates that once tsunami 
information is received from BMKG or interface institutions the provincial and district 
governments through their respective EOCs have the legitimate authority to make decisions 
of what to do as per SOPs. In terms of response preparedness, both Padang and Bali have 
carried out TEWS drills; however the drills are ad-hoc and need to be institutionalised into 
scheduled inter-annual events. 
Interestingly, in Bali, the tourism-related establishment survey indicated fairly good 
institutional preparedness for tsunamis in terms of links with TEWC, emergency response 
plans, and satisfactory tsunami information from the tsunami warning centre. However, 
                                                            
89 Especially to the east of Indonesia which is not covered by GITEWS 
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historical tsunami disaster events are lacking and are poorly communicated to the tourist. 
The key contrasts between the development of tsunami resilience in Padang and Bali are as 
follows:  
• Political commitment, leadership and participation as indicators of good governance are 
perceived to be higher in Padang compared to Bali because of strong commitment and 
leadership from the mayor and the local NGO (i.e. KOGAMI), while Bali initially resisted 
tsunami preparedness fearing negative impacts on the tourism sector; 
• Consequently, Padang has made more progress in institutional disaster preparedness 
than Bali; 
• Padang tsunami disaster risk preparedness is also perceived to be higher because of 
more intense education,  an awareness program and actual experiences of earthquake-
tsunami events; 
• The emergence of the civil society KOGAMI as an agency in Padang has contributed 
significantly to local tsunami preparedness; 
• The preparation of tsunami hazard and risk maps for further evacuation, spatial 
planning and development in Padang has been a highly contested area characterised by 
a high level of debate, negotiation, institutional cooperation, and collective participation 
because a larger number of competing actors are involved compared to Bali; 
• The effort of installing speakers in mosques in Padang and temples in Bali with ‘Kulkul’ 
is viewed as an important step to fit meaningful practices into a given existing 
institutional order, but lacks legitimacy; 
• The process of rooting tsunami preparedness in Bali society is characterised by a higher 
degree of negotiation compared to Padang;  
• The emerging multi-stakeholder partnership with the tourism sector and the traditional 
and cultural structures is far more complex in Bali than in Padang; however it may 
ultimately be the critical element and model defining TEWS sustainability in Indonesia;  
•  Development of a local warning dissemination service among hotels in Bali and formal 
institutionalised procedures for timely tsunami vertical evacuation between village and 
neighbouring hotels;  
• Padang is more lacking in infrastructure for evacuation compared to Bali. 
9.1.6 An Effective and Sustainable Tsunami Early Warning System 
Measuring the effectiveness of the TEWS is a challenging task requiring a rigorous target 
group and household surveys. Nevertheless, the major earthquake and significant tsunami 
experiences, examined and analysed mainly from the media’s perspective, suggest that the 
INATEWS system has progressed mainly in terms of being fairly effective in seismic 
observation. However, considerable work needs to done across all elements for it to become 
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a reliable, effective TEWS. The parallel challenge is to also address coastal planning and 
governance.  
Despite the major effort and significant improvement in the TEWS elements including 
institutional arrangements and emerging good governance attributes, the outcome is 
generally not satisfactory yet. It is recalled that Indonesia has a weak system of 
governance and would probably face tough challenges to implement and sustain an 
effective TEWS. However, by embarking and focusing on a series of incentive mechanisms, 
the current challenges can be overcome. The incentive structures range from a multi-
hazard-risk approach, new innovative and creative partnerships especially with the private 
sector, factor gender issues in the TEWS to increase participation and collaboration,  
enhanced bilateral and multilateral cooperation, integration of the INATEWS with IOTEWS, 
unified and scaled up capacity building, sharing and exchange of local experiences, and 
ensuring that best practices are replicated and inclusive, tapping into the opportunities 
which exist between DRR and CCA and making optimum use of the HFA(2005-2015). 
An important finding is that this study points to the dangers of synchronizing the formal 
single institutional linear top-down warning chain for tsunamis with the polycentric-
multilayered architectures. Ironically, tensions arise and there is constant debate about the 
actual mode of TEWS governance and on whether to use a national technocratic approach 
or a local approach, or a scientific and non-scientific approach, and about the potential 
advantages (i.e. paternalistically shared amongst the locals through generations) and 
disadvantages (i.e. exclusive, non–replicable, frequently undermining local authorities and 
frequently characterised by mysticism and superstitious norms) of these approaches.  
Hence, a theoretical basis of a TEWS framework is proposed based on theoretical concepts, 
observations and empirical findings in Indonesia. It is a mixture model of the EWS process 
consisting of the local people-centred approach (i.e. adaptive self-organised social systems) 
and the national technocratic approach (system-oriented for robustness and system 
stability) to address both local and far field tsunamis and the issues of effectiveness and 
sustainability in tsunami resilience in Indonesia. 
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This study generally supports the argument that “unless experts and scientists address the 
incentive structures of selected governance indicators of the TEWS as in Japan’s or the 
USA’s TEWS infrastructure, the sustainability may seem mission impossible” (Lassa 2008). 
However, the sustainability of the TEWS cannot simply be measured in terms of macro level 
incentives of governance which cannot be changed overnight and are rather pervasive, but 
rather through a multi-level incentive approach operating at different temporal and spatial 
scales and to be able to recognise the role of agents and agency beyond state for 
sustainability.  A participatory approach in this study is also recognised as a potentially 
effective method for the implementation of an effective EWS (Sagala and Okada 2007) 
The study finds that there has been substantial effort and advancement in building 
resilience to tsunamis in Indonesia, and there are signs of positive benefits in investing in 
disaster risk preparedness.  
The role of risk governance, multi-institutional arrangements and polycentric frameworks in 
the context of the TEWS has strengthened the resilience capacities of Indonesia; but are 
strongly affected by institutional path dependencies. The future of the INATEWS should rest 
on both system and people-centred approaches and a broader coastal city planning and 
governance strategy to build effective and sustained resilience to the uncertain tsunami 
risks.  
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10. Recommendations, Limitations and the Way Forward  
 
In this final chapter, key recommendations are put forward to help improve TEWS 
governance in Indonesia. The chapter ends with a discussion of the key limitations and 
potential areas for future research related to the TEWS.  
The systems of governance and incentives structures should be a constant issue addressed 
by the broader actors and the Indonesian community as they cannot be changed in the 
short term. Meanwhile, the most plausible governance is to encourage multi-level incentive 
structures and mechanisms, which include the multi-hazard approach, enhanced bilateral 
and multilateral cooperation, innovative partnerships, capacity building, sharing and 
exchange of local experiences, mainstream gender perspectives in DRR, and linking DRR 
with climate change adaptation. A policy of integration of the INATEWS within a larger 
architecture (i.e. IOTEWS) for coordination with coastal zone city planning and governance 
is the key recommendation which will help address the issues of effectiveness and 
sustainability of the TEWS in Indonesia. These recommendations are expected to impact at 
different levels (i.e. policy and operational) to bring a better outcome. Other specific 
recommendations of this research study are as follows: 
10.1.1 Risk Knowledge 
Develop, implement and promote: 
1) Institutional leadership in hazard risk knowledge and communication;  
2) Higher order institutional arrangements and polices to integrate DRR in school 
curricula; 
3) A separate policy strategy for education and awareness is required for Negative 
Outcome Expectancy (NOE) such as those based on negative perceptions of religious 
and cultural constructs, limited use of the TEWS in the case of local tsunamis, and 
ongoing fears of potential negative impacts of hazard preparedness on economic 
activities (i.e. tourism); 
4) Promote the importance of risk assessment and disaster preparedness plans in 
society and across sectors; 
5) Tsunami risk knowledge communication in the tourism sector (i.e. leaflets );  
6) A medium to long-term integrated socio-political and economic strategy is required 
to address the root causes (i.e. ineffective governance) and the dynamic pressures 
such as poverty and  aggressive development to build a comprehensive and 
sustainable tsunami resilience culture; 
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10.1.2 Technical Monitoring and Forecasting System 
1) Operational TEWS alerts need to be revised to address tsunami probability 
accordingly. i.e. employ a tsunami watch for far field  tsunamis and address the 
issues of tsunami information if correctly interpreted by the general public; 
2) Realistic expectations of actual TEWS capabilities need to be communicated to the 
public to improve transparency and accountability.  
3) A major public education and awareness program is required  with high focus on 
tsunami warning procedures (i.e. levels of tsunami information and what to do) 
10.1.3 Dissemination and Communication 
1) For an effective EWS, good telecommunication infrastructures are very important 
because the Indonesian Information Communication Technology infrastructure is 
mainly concentrated in the big cities, therefore a significant policy is needed to fill 
the information gap;  
2) A major institutional leadership and innovative partnership is also needed to 
encourage dedicated systems of dissemination and communication from the 
authorities to the communities at risk; 
3) The design and operation of the siren network needs to be reviewed, including its 
standards of operation for both local and far field tsunamis  
10.1.4 Response 
1) The existing reaction scheme needs to consider response as a complex stimulus-
response consisting of social reactions and social confirmation of the warning rather 
than a simple linear response;  
2) Local government needs to develop, adapt and implement existing guidelines and 
make clear institutional arrangements for responses at different levels in Indonesia;  
3) Develop proper feedback and mechanisms for institutional monitoring; 
4) The local warning dissemination network among hotels and sectors needs to be 
scaled up while the institutional arrangements for evacuation between hotels and 
villages need to be exercised regularly as scheduled events (i.e. similar to IOTEWS 
drills executed in 2009 and the second and more elaborate one already planned for 
2011). 
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10.1.5 Cross-Cutting Issues  
1) It is recommended that the earthquake-tsunami information chain should not  be 
synchronised with the decentralisation and polycentric-multilayered architectures but 
rather consideration should be given to addressing the real ecological challenge 
based on a mixed model of a system-people-centred approach;  
2) The development of multi-level BNPB into a larger superstructure with complex 
functions requires close attention to avoid potentially rapidly creeping multi-level 
bureaucracy; 
3) Develop clear institutional mechanisms (i.e. based on disaster risk index) for 
effective and equitable DM financing allocation at sub-national level; 
4) Develop a proper financing mechanism and database at all levels and phases of DM 
to improve reporting, tracking and auditing of budget use;  
5) Social familiarisation of the institutional arrangements with the local government to 
empower them to make effective and optimum use of available funds and resources 
to avoid legal risks and penalties; 
6) DM financing data and statistics should be regularly published to improve 
transparency and accountability. 
10.2 Key Limitations and Areas for Further Research  
10.2.1 Evaluation of Internal Institutional Capacities 
Very often, actors claim that their organisation is best suited for certain projects or key 
responsibilities. Elite actors rarely declare their weaknesses, particularly regarding people 
and resource management, management systems, and practices which actually determine 
effectiveness and level of performance. The question is how to evaluate such claims or 
capacities.  Therefore, at the beginning of this research, an open system model was 
selected and modified to evaluate and assess strategic, environmental and organisational 
problems viewed from several levels of analysis on the internal issues of respective 
organisations. The analysis ideally covers the external environment, financial resource 
systems, roles and strategy, people and resource management, management systems and 
practices, organisation structure, output and performance. However, the internal evaluation 
of respective organisations and agencies would require embedding and studying each 
respective major stakeholder along the EW chain for a sufficient amount of time, which was 
not possible in this research. Therefore, only certain elements of the open system model 
were considered. In future, such a comprehensive open system model should be used on 
key stakeholders to investigate the internal institutional capacities and ascertain which 
institution would be best suited for key responsibilities, and determine key strengths and 
weaknesses for these institutions’ own further capacity building. 
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10.2.2 Analysis of the Monitoring and Enforcement of Institutional Rules 
It was not possible to capture in detail the monitoring and enforcement of the rules since 
the DM law, supporting regulations are new, while SOPs, institutional warning chain, risk 
zoning are still under development. Therefore, such analysis of the constraints of the rules 
on human activities would be highly relevant in future studies. 
10.2.3  Structural Equation Analysis: System and People-Centred Approach 
It would be interesting to explore how structural equation analysis can be applied to further 
understand the interaction between the local people-centred and the national system 
approaches in the context of the TEWS. Such approaches have been applied to understand 
risk perception and volcanic hazard mitigation (Paton et al., 2008) and system analysis of 
social resilience against volcanic risk in Indonesia and Japan (Sagala 2009). 
10.2.4  Analysis of the Effectiveness of the Tsunami Early Warning System 
The study has analysed the effectiveness of the TEWS measured from the actual outcome of 
significant events, viewed mainly from the actors’ and media perspective. However, it would 
be interesting to analyse and measure the TEWS effectiveness from the public point of view 
on a regular basis with more detailed indicators of effectiveness or performance. In order to 
assess the performance it is important to have input and feedback (Basher 2006) from ‘the 
end user community’ to the technical or scientific community that generates warnings.  
10.2.5 Evaluating the Impacts of the Incentive Change Mechanism Process 
The modified IAD framework has allowed past and prevailing incentives and problems to be 
analysed and assessed. It has also provided the opportunity to identify major existing 
problems and key incentive mechanisms to change the prevailing outcome. However, the 
impacts of these new incentives at different levels cannot be analysed and interpreted. 
Future research would need to focus on how such incentives are being implemented and 
what their impacts are.   
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12. Appendix 
Organization Corporate Responsibility Executive/ Operational INATEWS Mandate and Key Tasks 
KESRA 
Coordinate the planning and 
formulation of policies, synchronize 
implementation of policies related to 
people’s welfare and poverty, alleviate 
and coordinate cross-sector activities 
and international cooperation related 
to civil protection and natural DM  
Deputy for social vulnerability,  
Assistant Deputy for Technological 
& Environmental Disasters; 
Assistant Deputy for Natural 
Disaster Issues 
 
Formulate policies, synchronize the 
implementation of policies in the field of 
environmental and technological disasters, 
prevention of disasters and DM; 
Coordinate the legal aspects of the 
INATEWS development team and related 
institutions in the development of 
INATEWS 
RISTEK 
Formulate policies and coordinate on 
research, science and technology 
 
Deputy for Utilization & 
Dissemination of Science 
Technology;  
Assistant Deputy for Science & 
Technology Promotion & 
Marketing;  
Assistant Deputy for Analysis of 
Science and Technology Needs; 
Community Needs Studies; 
Academic Research & 
Development 
Coordinator of INATEWS stakeholder 
technical and operational activities, focal 
point for capacity building, organizes local 
content events, conferences, workshops, 
seminars and tsunami simulations, training 
of trainers, drills;  
Adapt the sophisticated INATEWS 
technology to Indonesian culture 
DEPDAGRI 
Formulate and implement policies, 
standards, norms and guidelines, 
criteria and procedures for DM; 
Coordinate the activities of DM with 
provincial and city governments 
 
Director General 
Director of DM 
 
Provide and implement relevant policies, 
regulations, guidelines, SOPs; 
Coordinate public education and support 
BMKG in dissemination system; 
Coordination of local governments; 
Support RISTEK in coordination of 
INATEWS, tsunami drills etc; 
Support BAKOSURTANAL and LIPI 
DEPLU 
Foreign affairs formulation and 
implementation of related policies and 
politics 
 
Head of Sub directorate of 
Technical Cooperation for 
International Organisations under 
Directorate of Technical 
Cooperation; 
Division Head for America under 
Sub directorate of Technical 
Cooperation for International 
Organisations 
Assist RISTEK in international stakeholder 
coordination; 
Support LIPI on research and development 
of geosciences and support MoHA on public 
education 
 
BNPB 
Formulate, monitor and evaluate 
national policy on DM; 
Coordinate and implement DM; 
Provide guidelines and guidance to the 
initiatives of DM; 
Determine standards and needs;         
Inform communities about DM and 
related activities 
Head of BNPB; 
Deputy for Prevention and 
Preparedness; 
Director DRR; 
Director of Preparedness; 
Director of community 
empowerment 
Provide policies, planning, coordination 
and implementation of activities related to 
national multi-hazard DM; 
Disseminate EW to public through EOC 
 
BAPPENAS 
Formulate polices and coordinate the 
implementation of policies in the field 
of national development planning 
 
Director of Industry, Science, 
Technology and state enterprises; 
Head of Industrial Organisation 
and Competition; 
Head of Science and Technology 
Development 
Support RISTEK in coordination; 
Support LIPI in research and MoHA in 
public education; 
Planning, monitoring the INATEWS budget 
and stakeholder development plans 
 
BMKG 
Assess, formulate and facilitate a 
national policy and coordinate activity 
in the field of Meteorology, 
Geophysics, Climatology and Air 
Quality 
Executive Head of BMKG; 
Deputy for Data and Information 
System; 
Centre for Geophysics Data 
Information System 
Responsible for seismic monitoring, 
tsunami operational warning centre and 
dissemination of warnings 
 
BPPT 
Formulate national policy on 
assessment and application of 
technology 
 
Deputy for Natural Resource 
Technology Development; 
Head of Marine Technology Survey 
 
Responsible for the deployment and 
operation of buoys;  
Operate research vessels for installation 
and maintenance, relocation of buoys;  
Oceanographic monitoring and tsunami 
modelling 
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Organization Corporate Responsibility Executive/ Operational INATEWS Mandate & Key Tasks 
BAKOSURTANAL Assess and formulate national 
policy in the field of surveying and 
mapping; 
Develop infrastructure of national 
spatial data 
Executive Deputy Infrastructure, 
Spatial Data; 
Operational Head Division Gravity 
and Tide 
 
Focal point for crustal deformation 
monitoring and geospatial data and 
information; 
Install and operate tide gauges and GPS 
networks; 
KOMINFO 
Formulate and implement national 
policies in the field of 
communication and informatics 
covering post, 
telecommunications, 
broadcasting, information & 
communication technology, 
multimedia services and 
dissemination of information 
Director of Communication Facility 
& Dissemination of Information; 
Director of Institutionalised 
Government Communication; 
Director of Communication 
Technology Facilities 
Focal point for Information and 
Communication Technology; 
Disseminate warning information by 
mass media and telecommunication; 
Public information and media 
campaigning on TEWS 
 
LAPAN 
Carry out government tasks on 
research, development, aerospace 
applications; 
Carry out secretariat function   
Head of Remote Sensing 
Application and Technology 
Development Centre; 
Head of Division Remote Sensing 
Data 
Provide Geospatial, remote sensing data 
to INATEWS operational stakeholders 
 
KLH 
Formulate policies and coordinate 
in the field of environment and 
impact analysis  
Assistant Deputy for Environment 
Data and Information Affairs; 
Head of Division Information 
Provide RISTEK and INATEWS with 
relevant environmental information and 
planning 
DKP 
Formulate policies and coordinate 
in the field of marine affairs and 
fisheries 
 
Head of Research Centre for 
Marine Affairs and Fisheries;  
Head of Sub directorate  for 
coastal; Disaster Mitigation and 
Pollution under Director General 
of Coastal Marine and Small 
Islands; 
Head of technical Services 
Division under BRKP 
Assist INATEWS stakeholders in all 
relevant aspects of marine and coastal 
affairs 
 
ESDM 
Provide policies, information and 
services on geological disasters, 
geosciences 
 
Head of Geology Agency; 
Head of Volcanology and 
Geological Disaster Mitigation 
Centre (PVMB) 
Support INATEWS stakeholders in the 
field of geological DM; 
Formulate and support implementation of 
polices and services for geological 
disaster mitigation including tsunami; 
LIPI 
Assessment and formulation on 
national policy of science 
research;  
The implementation of basic 
science research, inter & multi-
discipline research; 
Monitoring & evaluation of science 
and technology progress 
Deputy of Geosciences; 
Researcher, Supervisor of 
Compress Program 
 
Focal point for Research & Development 
of Geosciences and Community 
Awareness and Preparedness 
 
ITB 
Conduct Research & Development 
on identifying hazards and the 
magnitude of both natural and 
man-made hazards; 
Conduct multi-hazard vulnerability 
assessment; 
Organise & conduct research  
Rector ITB; 
Head of Mitigation Centre; 
Risk and DM, Public Education 
 
Prepare tsunami database; 
Develop human resources needed to 
sustain INATEWS 
 
DEPDIKNAS 
Formulate policies& coordinate in 
the field of national education 
Head of Curriculum Centre; 
Researcher 
 
Assist DEPDAGRI and INATEWS 
stakeholders related to public education, 
awareness, and preparedness 
DEPBUDPAR 
Formulate and implement 
technical policies and 
standardisation in the field of 
tourism destination development 
Director General of Tourism 
Destination Development; 
Head of Sub directorate of 
Tourism Product Facilitation 
Assist INATEWS stakeholders in issues 
related to tourism awareness and 
preparedness 
POLRI 
Protect and give service to people 
in the field of security, safety and 
peace; 
Give guidance through pre-
emptive and preventive actions to 
increase people’s awareness and 
law-abiding citizenship 
Deputy of POLRI for Operation; 
Head of Sub-Division of Data & 
Statistics 
 
Network communication from 
headquarters to the regional police 
(POLDA) as well as resort police used to 
communicate warnings to areas prone to 
tsunamis 
 
TNI Provide security 
 
Assistant operational of TNI; 
Commodore; 
Head of Sub-Division for DM 
Provide security in the INATEWS 
infrastructure; 
Provide emergency response, public 
awareness and preparedness 
 
Table 1: List of state organisations, showing corporate responsibility, executive and 
operational capacities and INATEWS-related mandates and tasks 
